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 This thesis studies the interrelationship between government and the shipbuilding 
industry in the United Kingdom during the so-called ‘Golden Age’ of economic growth 
between 1945 and 1973. It argues that actions of government in the 1960s and 70s aimed at 
arresting the decline of shipbuilding as an industry instead acted first as a brake on the 
industry’s development and second as one of the principal agents of its decline. It does this 
by demonstrating that the constant government led introspection into the shipbuilding 
industry between 1960 and 1966 delayed investment decisions by companies that were 
uncertain about which direction the government would take or whether it would provide 
funding. This thesis also demonstrates that the Wilson Labour governments’ instruments of 
modernisation and change, the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee and the Shipbuilding 
Industry Board, chose and imposed technical and organisational solutions on the industry 
that did not reflect the prevailing orthodoxy of shipbuilding in competitor nations such as 
Japan and Sweden. This fatally damaged the industry during a time of demand for newly 
constructed vessels; the cheap price of crude oil in the 1960s led to a very high demand for 
very large crude carriers, supertankers, capable of transporting between one quarter and 
one half a million tons of crude oil from the Middle East to the industrial nations of North 
American and Europe. However, as the case studies of the Harland and Wolff and Scott 
Lithgow companies in this thesis demonstrates, British shipyards were ill equipped and 
poorly prepared to take advantage of this situation and when finally the shipyards were 
positioned to take advantage of the situation, the 1973 Yom Kippur War and subsequent 
OPEC oil embargo took away the demand for supertankers. This was when the British 
government dealt the now nationalised shipbuilding industry a fatal blow, subsidising 
supertankers no longer in demand for purchase at a heavily subsidised price by shipping 
lines that would place the vessels into immediate and long-term storage. In short, this 
thesis illuminates the complex relationship between government and industry that led to 
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The rôle of government in the decline of British shipbuilding 
 
The history of the British shipbuilding industry is relevant to the wider debates 
concerning the decline of the United Kingdom’s industrial base in the second half of the 
twentieth century. From being the largest constructor of merchant vessels in the latter half 
of the 1940s; by 1964 Britain had been surpassed by Japan as the nation with the largest 
merchant output. Indeed, British shipbuilders underwent such a stagnation that by 1974 
smaller industries in Denmark and Sweden were producing more tonnage than the UK and 
even individual yards in Japan, such as Mitsubishi Nagasaki, were producing more vessels 
than the entire British shipbuilding industry.1 Using the policy network model of Hugh 
Pemberton based on the work of Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, this thesis will show that 
under the guidance of the Shipbuilding Industry Board, government ministers and civil 
servants agreed a series of publicly funded interventions to modernise British shipyards but 
these did not represent either best practice or the prevailing orthodoxy found in more 
productive shipyards in Japan and Scandinavia. Rather, this thesis will demonstrate that a 
series of compromise positions were created between the wishes of government and those 
of the shipbuilding industry. As such, these modernisation plans hindered rather than 
helped the industry, with short-term gains in output and productivity wiped away, first by 
overseas competition for orders and second by the 1973 OPEC oil shock. This introductory 
chapter contextualises the argument within the theoretical and narrative strands of 
literature dealing with this period and sets out the core hypothesis behind this thesis. 
 
Shipbuilding was a staple industry in the United Kingdom. Constructed in 
shipyards close to areas with a large workforce on the one hand, but also steel and 
engineering facilities on the other, British built ships were used by almost all merchant 
marines globally and many of the Great Power navies. For example the sea battles fought 
by the Japanese and the Russians in 1905 were also between vessels made in Glasgow and 
those made in Newcastle. By the late 1800s, Japan, the United States and Germany were 
also building many merchant and military vessels, but these industries were nowhere near 
as large as that found in the United Kingdom.2 By 1950, after two World Wars had 
provided government orders for military vessels and once peace had created the demand 
for replacement merchant vessels for those lost during wartime, shipbuilding in the United 
                                                
1 Lloyds Register of Shipping: Annual Report. (London: Lloyds, 1950-1981) and Fairplay (London: Fairplay 
International, 1970-1980). 





Kingdom was in the middle of a boom period, producing more tonnage than any other 
nation with 36% of world output.3 However, the reconstruction of damaged industries in 
Western Europe combined with the reinstatement of traditional Japanese admiralty 
shipyards after 1952, with technical and financial assistance from American businessmen, 
led to increasing output in competitor yards that were producing a cheaper product than the 
United Kingdom and were also delivering on time. Indeed, by 1963 the United Kingdom 
was not only experiencing competition from overseas shipbuilders, but also stagnating 
production during a period of rising output with only 16% of the global merchant vessel 
output compared to Japan with 36%.4 
 
This literature review establishes the core hypothesis of this thesis by evaluating 
recent work on shipbuilding and demonstrating that a number of weaknesses exist in the 
accounts and showing that academics have neglected shipbuilding as part of the wider 
debates on the relative decline of the United Kingdom. This is extraordinary as 
shipbuilding industry was emblematic of the decline of heavy industry after 1945 and is 
therefore much more significant than previously demonstrated. Evidence demonstrates that 
British shipbuilding suffered from poor technical infrastructure and was hindered by 
numerous other factors, such as fractious relations in the workplace and the price of steel. 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to dispute work in these areas. However, there is also 
ample evidence demonstrating that management and government were inclined to prevent 
the collapse of the industry in the face of overseas competition from 1960 onwards and 
create a series of action plans to arrest the industry’s decline. The central contention of this 
thesis is that the relationships and interactions between management and government in 
negotiating schemes of industrial rationalisation exacerbated the conditions of competitive 
disadvantage into the causes of a full-blown industrial decline. This thesis, by using 
extensive research into government and corporate archives, will synthesize disparate 
themes into a cohesive theoretical structure, illuminating the rôle of government in the 
decline of British shipbuilding. The following chapter demonstrates that shipbuilding in 
this period acted as an indicator to the causes and consequences discussed in the wider 
‘declinist’ literature that has evolved in the past 25 years and demonstrates the relevance of 
contemporary governance arrangements and how this thesis contributes to a much wider 
set of arguments than those dealing with shipbuilding alone. 
 
                                                
3 Johnman, L. & Murphy, H. British Shipbuilding and the State since 1918 (Exeter University Press: Exeter, 
2002), p. 101. 




The literature on shipbuilding focuses on the technological, institutional and 
political reasons for the industry’s decline. The technological view, argues that British 
shipyards failed to modernise and increase productivity compared to those in Japan, West 
Germany and Sweden.5 The institutional view is that British institutional arrangements and 
relationships were fractious when compared to arrangements found in overseas 
competitors.6 The political economy analysis states that governmental failures exacerbated 
the problems of the shipbuilding industry and did not address the industry’s concerns.7 In 
addition to the themes mentioned above others, such as Atkinson, Burton, Slaven and 
Todd, have written a number of works on the industry.8 Additionally, shipbuilding as a 
subject attracts the attention of enthusiasts of maritime history and as such is the subject of 
a wide variety of publications dealing with the history of the industry as a whole during 
specific epochs and of individual yards, which were famous in their time.9  
 
The contemporary analysis of the British shipbuilding industry started in the 1990s 
with the work of Edward Lorenz and Bo Sträth into the decline of British shipbuilding in 
comparison to overseas competitors. Both emphasised the slow, creeping way in which 
British methods of ship manufacture became technologically less advanced than 
competitor nations, particularly Sweden and Japan. Lorenz focussed on the rationalisation 
of production and manufacturing technology, which reinforces catch-up and reconstruction 
arguments by stating that the post-war rebirth of the West German and Japanese 
shipbuilders benefited from a completely new set of infrastructure replacing one that had 
been destroyed as a consequence of bombing in World War Two. 10 Lorenz also places 
emphasis on an overall low level of technical competency in the UK industry and lack of 
systematic planning and control by management and employees of the shipyards.11 The 
crux of Lorenz’s argument is that shipyard management and labour in the UK could not 
                                                
5 Lorenz, Economic Decline in Britain, pp. 1-23. 
6 Sträth, B. The Politics of De-industrialisation: The Contraction of the West European Shipbuilding Industry 
(Croom Helm: London, 1987). 
7 Johnman & Murphy, British Shipbuilding, p. 98. 
8 Atkinson, R. The Development and Decline of British Shipbuilding (1999), Burton, A. The Rise and Fall of 
British Shipbuilding (1994), Slaven, A ‘Marketing Opportunities and Marketing Practices: The Eclipse of 
British Shipbuilding 1957-1976’, From Wheel House to Counting House: Essays in Maritime Business 
History in Honour of Professor Peter Neville Davies (Memorial University Press: St John’s, 1992) and Todd, 
D. Industrial Dislocation: The Case of Global Shipbuilding (1991). 
9 For example, Walker, F.M Song of the Clyde: A History of Clyde Shipbuilding (1984), Reid, J.M. James 
Lithgow, Master at Work (1964), Pickard, T. We Build Ships (1989), Parker, G. At The Sharp End! A 
Shipbuilding Autobiography (Glasgow, 1992), Hollett, D. Men of Iron: The Story of Cammell Laird 
Shipbuilders, 1823-1991 (Birkenhead, 1992), Johnston, I. Breadmore Built: The Rise and Fall of a Clyde 
Shipyard (Clydebank, 1993) and finally Johnston, I. Ships for a Nation, 1847 - 1971: John Brown & 
Company, Clydebank (West Dumbartonshire, 2000).  
10 Lorenz, Economic Decline in Britain, p. 81. 




effectively comprehend the changing global situation and, therefore, were unable to 
modify production methods and planning until it was too late.12 However, Lorenz neglects 
the subject of this thesis, the rôle of government as an agent of economic decline. 
 
Sträth’s work reinforces Lorenz, but has a much wider emphasis on the rôle of 
institutional relationships between management, government and unions. Sträth compared 
European tripartite bargaining systems in shipbuilding in an attempt to produce a 
comprehensive theory of the political and social interactions generated by the closure of an 
industry.13 Sträth argues that during periods of industrial uncertainty, unions and managers 
take the strongest bargaining position for their interests because of a threat to their very 
existence.14 However, Sträth emphasises that major differences exist between nations in 
their union/management relations and consequently it is these differences that created 
different levels of growth.15 In terms of the UK industry, Sträth stresses that demarcation 
in the early period of post-war growth as restricting the development of higher productivity 
and the use of modern equipment.16  
 
Johnman and Murphy have developed a large body of work dealing with the UK 
shipbuilding industry in the twentieth century.17 In recent years, a Johnman-Murphy 
position has developed, namely that government failure was responsible for the decline of 
the British shipbuilding industry since 1945.18 Both authors broadly agree with the views 
held by Lorenz and Sträth; they place heavy emphasis on management failing to guide the 
industry successfully since 1945 and government failing to provide the correct plan of 
action when intervening in the industry from the late 1960s onwards.19 Whilst there is 
plentiful archival evidence to support this position, this thesis disputes the Johnman-
Murphy view by arguing that it is questionable whether management or government could 
                                                
12 Lorenz, Economic Decline in Britain, pp. 72 – 122. 
13 Sträth, The Politics, p. 220. 
14 Sträth, The Politics, p. 225. 
15 Sträth, The Politics, pp. 227 - 237. 
16 Sträth, The Politics, pp. 116 - 154. 
17 See Johnman, L. ‘The Shipbuilding Industry’, Labour Governments and Private Industry: The Experience 
of 1945-51, (Edinburgh, 1992), Johnman, L. ‘Old Attitudes and New Technology: British Shipbuilding 1845-
1965’, Fruitta del Mare: Evolution and Revolution in the 19th and 20th Centuries, (Amsterdam, 1998). 
Johnman, L. ‘ Internationalisation and the Collapse of British Shipbuilding, 1945-1965’, Global Markets: 
The Internationalisation of the Sea Transport Industries Since 1850 (St John’s, 1998). Johnman, L. British 
Shipbuilding and the State (Glasgow, 1998), Johnman, L. & Murphy, H. ‘A Very British Institution! A Study 
in Under Capitalisation: The Role of the Ship Mortgage Finance Company in Post-Delivery Credit Financing 
in British Shipbuilding, 1951 - 1967’, Financial History Review, 6 (1999), Johnman, L. & Murphy, H. ‘A 
Triumph of Failure: The British Shipbuilding Industry and the Offshore Structures Market, 1960 - 1990’ 
International Journal of Maritime History (2002). 
18 Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding, pp 94-190. 




have developed alternative strategies at the time, or that they were aware of developments 
in other nations. Indeed, even if they were (contemporary trade journals suggests a 
cognisance of developments in shipping and shipbuilding overseas20), there is very little 
suggestion by Johnman and Murphy as to how business strategies at odds with 
contemporary thinking in shipbuilding industries located in Japan and Scandinavia were 
created.21  
 
In addition to the authors mentioned above, there are a number of older and less 
influential studies.22 Slaven wrote a number of works on shipbuilding in the1980s and 90s, 
producing two essays that analysed the failure of British shipbuilding as an industry. 
Slaven states that British shipyards did not relate to the market for shipping in the same 
way as European and Japanese yards and in effect, this led to, in his words, ‘...a failure of 
marketing’.23 Therefore, whilst Slaven mentions the lack of industrial modernisation, 
standardisation and productivity increases, he also states that informal systems of relating 
to the market for shipping by UK yards (developed during the period of British global 
hegemony in shipping and shipbuilding) were inadequate for modern methods of 
procurement.24  This led to overseas shipbuilders gaining the initiative, with standardised 
vessels offered to all clients, reducing the need for extensive negotiations concerning 
product development.25  
 
The literature on shipbuilding highlights various factors, specifically the influence 
of the state, businesses and special interest groups on development of policy. All feature in 
the general literature on the post-war decline of the UK and the British shipbuilding 
industry is contextualised by this literature and the wider political decisions taken in 
Whitehall and Westminster between 1945 and 1979. Consequently, the historiography of 
shipbuilding sits alongside the literature dealing with government industrial policy in the 
1960s, which is intertwined with the wider body of literature detailing the industrial 
decline of the United Kingdom. In the case of the United Kingdom, by the 1960s economic 
growth annually was at a lower rate when compared with competitor nations such as 
Germany and Japan and the perception that diminishing economic power would lead to the 
                                                
20 The trade journal, The Motorship (Reed Business Publishing) had many reports on specific developments 
between 1960 & 1975. 
21 Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding, p 191 - 215. 
22 Hogwood, B.W. Government and Shipbuilding: The Politics of Industrial Change (Saxon House: 
Farnborough, 1979). 
23 Slaven, ‘Marketing Opportunity’, p. 139. 
24 Ibid. 
25 MacDonald, M. Scottish Shipbuilding and the Australian Market, 1901-1971, Unpublished Masters 




end of global influence for the United Kingdom became rife from the mid 1950s 
onwards.26  Many dispute that the UK was experiencing economic decline from 1945 to 
1973. Recent literature argues that although the United Kingdom had slower growth than 
competitor nations in this period, in no way did this represent the nation’s terminal 
economic decline.27 Indeed, whilst manufacturing industry was facing a relative and an 
absolute decline in many instances, industries based on services were growing and 
contributing a larger share to GDP. For example, whilst the average growth rate for GNP 
and industrial output in the United Kingdom per annum between 1950 and 1979 was 
5.56% and 2.69% respectively, when compared to 13.75% and 11.95% for Japan and 
9.78% and 6.04% for West Germany, this was a much slower level of economic growth.28 
As the following tables 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate, Britain was undergoing a relative decline as 
many other nations were growing much faster in this period: 
                                                
26 Supple, B. ‘Fear of failing: economic history and the decline of Britain’ Economic History Review, 47:3 
(1994), pp 441 – 458 and Tomlinson, J. ‘Inventing ‘decline’: the falling behind of the British economy in the 
post-war years’ Economic History Review, 49: 4 (1996), pp 731 – 757. 
27 Booth, A. ‘The Manufacturing Failure Hypothesis and the performance of British industry during the long 
boom’, Economic History Review, 56:1 (2003), pp. 2-6. 




Table 1.1: Annual percentage growth in Gross National Product (GNP) 




Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook / Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Statistics Division (United Nations Statistical Office, New York, 1946-1980) 
  UK Japan FDR USA France 
1950 3.70 16.94 n/a 10.71 15.77 
1951 3.00 22.27 11.89 7.29 12.45 
1952 7.14 10.94 11.01 3.56 13.51 
1953 6.26 10.32 6.36 4.24 2.76 
1954 4.27 9.23 6.15 -0.63 4.73 
1955 5.45 7.69 11.16 6.60 4.70 
1956 4.43 8.35 5.87 1.90 7.21 
1957 2.45 9.36 4.72 1.81 -11.03 
1958 1.72 1.61 4.54 -1.03 11.16 
1959 4.05 9.89 7.11 6.78 -7.50 
1960 4.44 15.40 9.00 2.44 6.74 
1961 6.45 18.15 17.92 2.49 7.12 
1962 2.95 11.15 7.21 5.77 9.43 
1963 5.28 11.70 4.78 4.35 9.95 
1964 6.25 13.37 7.56 5.04 8.29 
1965 6.24 8.93 6.54 6.27 5.45 
1966 1.75 11.21 3.26 6.06 4.82 
1967 2.37 11.88 -1.65 2.44 4.31 
1968 -13.00 12.47 4.13 4.66 3.65 
1969 0.28 11.11 7.60 2.80 3.65 
1970 4.55 10.78 13.87 0.14 -0.55 
1971 9.93 7.29 9.31 3.14 5.87 
1972 8.92 20.56 12.87 5.17 15.21 
1973 7.26 22.26 21.31 5.90 18.22 








  UK Japan FDR USA  France 
1950 3.83 20.51 23.68 13.51 10.08 
1951 2.86 40.43 17.14 9.33 13.33 
1952 -1.39 7.58 9.76 2.44 0.00 
1953 5.63 21.13 6.67 7.14 1.96 
1954 5.33 9.30 12.50 -3.33 9.62 
1955 5.06 6.38 16.67 10.34 12.28 
1956 0.00 23.08 7.94 7.29 7.81 
1957 2.41 18.75 4.41 -0.97 8.70 
1958 -1.18 0.00 2.82 -1.96 2.67 
1959 4.76 21.05 8.22 7.00 1.30 
1960 7.95 21.74 11.39 1.87 8.97 
1961 1.05 21.43 5.68 3.67 5.88 
1962 1.04 5.88 4.30 8.85 5.56 
1963 3.09 11.11 3.09 6.50 5.26 
1964 8.00 17.50 10.00 9.16 7.00 
1965 3.70 4.26 5.45 10.49 1.87 
1966 0.89 12.24 0.86 6.33 6.42 
1967 0.88 20.00 -2.56 2.38 2.59 
1968 5.26 15.15 9.65 6.98 3.36 
1969 2.50 15.79 12.80 5.98 10.57 
1970 0.81 13.64 6.38 -1.03 6.62 
1971 0.81 3.00 2.00 6.22 6.90 
1972 1.60 6.80 3.92 3.90 5.16 
1973 8.66 15.45 6.92 11.74 7.36 
Mean  2.69 11.95 6.04 4.78 5.27 
Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook/Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division 
(United Nations Statistical Office, New York, 1946-1980) 
 
The literature on the role of institutions in the decline of British manufacturing 
plays an important function in determining the theoretical framework for this research and 
the literature on the decline of British shipbuilding as well as the decline of UK industrial 
base shares many common interpretations and themes. Consequently, the recent academic 
debates on British economic and industrial performance in this period are highly relevant 
in developing a contextual historiography for this thesis. 
 
The debates of the past thirty years were initiated by the work of Mancur Olson and 
Moses Abramovitz in the 1980s. Both Olson and Abramovitz deal with separate aspects of 
decline, that of industries and nations respectively. This thesis argues that there is scope for 
a synthesis with more contemporary declinist literature and consequently a brief discussion 
of both authors work is important to the literature review. Abramovitz argued that business 




times. On the surface this conflicts with the Olsonian view that decline (specifically 
applied to nation states) is absolute and intrinsically bound up with institutional 
arrangements. Nonetheless, in the period 1945-79 entire industries collapsed in advanced 
nations despite efforts to adapt to change and consequently the Abramovitz position of 
competitive advantage when qualified by Olson can explain much about the absolute 
decline of industries in the United Kingdom during this period. The current debates in this 
area focus upon whether the United Kingdom was in a period of economic decline, relative 
decline or was in fact undergoing a period of growth during the ‘Golden Age’ of economic 
development between 1945 and 1973.  These debates can be traced to the work of Bacon 
and Eltis, who in the mid 1970s produced a book on the seemingly rapid decline of the 
British economy.29 These authors saw British economic growth being limited by an ever--
increasing state sector demanding a larger and larger share of national resources and 
income.30 This affected the British economy in two ways, in creating an increased demand 
upon industry and commerce to service the state sector and removing resources away 
(either through nationalisation or a growing state sector) from the market sector into areas 
with lower productivity and output. In particular, Bacon and Eltis highlighted the affects 
that increasing public employment and ownership had on inflation and the balance of 
payments in the 1960 and 70s and argue that this created a cycle of recession leading to 
increased government spending.31  
 
The Bacon and Eltis argument was supercharged by the publication in 1986 of a 
series of case studies on British industries brought together by Elbaum and Lazonick.32 
Their thesis differs from that of Bacon and Eltis in that the focus is on the nature of 
industrial organisation rather than the rôle of government. Elbaum and Lazonick put 
forward four propositions (described by Kirby as being based upon the American corporate 
model presented by Chandler33) based on a synthesis of the common themes found in the 
case studies.34 These were the small size of UK companies in comparison to competitors in 
the US and Europe, a highly unionised workforce, an over reliance on competitive 
                                                
29 Bacon, R. & Eltis, W. Britain’s Economic Problem: Too Few Producers (Macmillan: London, 1976). 
30 Bacon and Eltis, Britain’s Economic Problem, pp. 28 – 31. 
31 Bacon and Eltis, Britain’s Economic Problem, pp. 92 – 116. 
32 Elbaum, B. & Lazonick, W. The Decline of the British Economy (Oxford, 1986) 
33 Kirby, M.W. Institutional rigidities and economic decline: reflections on the British experience, Economic 
History Review, XLV-4 (1992), pp. 637 – 660. See also, Chandler, A. The Visible Hand: The Managerial 
Revolution in American Business, (Cambridge-MA, 1977). 
34 In particular, Lazonick’s, The Cotton Industry (pp. 18-50), Lorenz, Edwards & Wilkinson’s. The 
Shipbuilding Industry (pp. 109-134), 1880-1965, Lewchuk’s, The Motor Vehicle Industry (pp. 135-161) and 




practices to define corporate goals and finally a lack of vertical integration and planning.35 
Whilst critics argue that the Elbaum and Lazonick text is too focussed on an American (i.e. 
Chandlerian) corporate perspective, it does illustrate the detrimental effect of the 
government-management relationship upon industrial development.36 In recent years there 
has been an ongoing debate between proponents of the declinist view, Stephen Broadberry 
and Nicholas Crafts, and the opinion of Alan Booth that no decline was evident in this 
period and that British industry was undergoing a period of growth.37 The Broadberry-
Crafts hypothesis states that the inherent characteristics of the relationship between 
management, labour and government (from 1945 onwards) led to low industrial 
productivity and as a result produced slower rates of economic growth in comparison to 
competitor nations by around one percent per annum Secondly, with an already developed 
industrial base and lacking a pool of agricultural labour to recruit into manufacturing, the 
UK did not have the same scope for growth that West Germany or Japan did after 1945. 
Finally, Broadberry and Crafts state that government efforts at increasing productivity and 
producing supply side improvements failed because of the poor information, analysis, 
planning and execution of planned schemes of economic intervention. 38 Furthermore, they 
argue that the post war consensus in the United Kingdom compounded a situation whereby 
outdated UK manufacturing plant and training were not renewed in the 1950s because of 
the potential for industrial strife.39   
 
Alan Booth, however, has developed an alternative view.40 In conjunction with 
Melling and Dartmann, Booth produced a critical analysis that builds upon Olson’s thesis 
that, ‘politically stable societies tend to accumulate collective interest groups over time’ 
which questioned some of the wider propositions of the declinists.41 Booth and his co-
authors stated that the study of institutional arrangement alone cannot predict productivity 
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outcomes and consequently academics must take cultural, political and economic 
differences into account as well.42 In recent years, Booth has challenged the Broadberry-
Crafts hypothesis.43 Booth now promotes a reinterpretation of the Broadberry-Crafts 
hypothesis by stating that the concept of the United Kingdom’s economic decline has a 
long cultural and academic history.44 Indeed, Booth cites work by Tomlinson and Supple 
describing an obsession with the economic decline in British academic, government and 
media circles since the mid 1850s, even when the United Kingdom was the dominant 
hegemonic power.45 The core of Booth’s argument is that whilst British manufacturing 
productivity could have been higher during the long boom, to argue that it could have been 
at the same levels as in nations undergoing heavy post-war reconstruction and that it was a 
symptom of unproductive small British plants in comparison to more productive large 
plants is false. Manufacturing was important, but it was not the only sector within the 
British economy and Broadberry and Crafts have paid scant attention to other sectors such 
as services.46 Booth emphasised that the British economy did experience growth between 
1950 and 1973 and while heavy industries were declining, other sectors were experiencing 
reasonable levels of growth.47 However, most important for this thesis is the assertion by 
Booth that, ‘No one questions the usefulness of ‘flexible specialisation’ and ‘Fordism’ to 
describe production processes of individual companies, but it is difficult to understand how 
they can be ‘scaled up’ to describe national production systems and the assumption that US 
manufacturing was characterised by large plant and British by small has no empirical 
foundation’.48 This is crucial to keep in mind when comparing British shipbuilders to those 
in other nations.  
 
The declinist paradigm has developed over a number of decades is critical to this 
thesis, but whilst the core assertions of the declinist literature are relevant to contemporary 
debates, in the case of shipbuilding there is an added layer of government policy making 
that influenced the industry’s demise. Consequently, a discussion of the ‘governance’ 
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literature that has evolved in the past 15 years is essential before demonstrating the rôle of 
specific government shipbuilding policies in the period 1945-1977.  Indeed, the period 
from the end of the Second World War in 1945 until the election of the Conservative 
government in 1979 has been described as a period of consensus in the UK, and in most 
industrialised nations. This period was also characterised by a high level of state 
involvement in the economy, which took many forms, not least nationalisation, planning 
and the provision of a welfare state, but the level of state involvement depended on the 
government in power and the wider circumstances of the time. This section will show that 
British governments across this period were heavily involved in developing economic and 
industrial policies. While this varied in level and intensity depending on whether a 
Conservative or Labour government was in power, on more than one occasion over the 
course of 35 years governments intervened in the affairs of the economy and individual 
companies. However, there was often a gap between the intentions of governments and the 
impact of their policies, and consequently to assess the rôle of the state we need to consider 
the development of political agendas as a significant influence. 
 
The development of an interventionist stance by the Labour party in owes as much 
to the policy deliberations of the Labour Party in the 1930s as to the development of 
centralised government machinery under Attlee. However, if the influences behind 
Labour’s policy up to 1964 are broken down, three distinct interest groups are at the fore of 
decision-making, starting with the membership of the Labour party, (from general 
members to politicians to unions) playing its part by providing the diorama upon which 
certain policy themes evolved. Indeed, in the 1960s the movement away from 
nationalisation to the promotion of scientific management reflected the prevailing zeitgeist 
of the day, which was also reflected in the flirtation with planning by the Conservatives in 
the late 1950s and 60s (after attempting laissez faire economics under the Chancellorship 
of Peter Thorneycroft), which created a series of bodies to deal with problems of low 
industrial and productivity growth, starting with the British Productivity Council in 1957 
(which grew out of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity) and culminating with the 
tripartite National Economic Development Council (NEDC) in 1962.49 Following the same 
theme, the relationship between academia, the Labour Party and government is important 
in comprehending the development of a Keynesian paradigm after 1945, reflecting the 
influence not just of Keynes but also the influence of academics, such as Nicholas Kaldor 
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at Cambridge.50 Whilst an influential formal relationship existed between government and 
academia, the informal environment is important in illustrating the propagation of ideas to 
the decision-making classes, defining the prevailing economic orthodoxy of the time. 
Indeed, as Hennessey has demonstrated this went hand in hand with the development of a 
large civil service with wide ranging powers during the Second World War that was 
perpetuated by Attlee and the Conservatives. In the context of developing policies that 
advocated and recognised the rôle of state intervention as an economic mechanism, the 
existence of state machinery able to enact programmes from day one of a Labour election 
victory is a powerful factor.51 The relationship between the civil service and academia, on 
the one hand, and academia and the Labour Party, on the other acted, as an axis upon 
which policies of industrial intervention and scientific economic management travelled and 
in 1964 this came to the fore. 
 
One way to connect the literature shipbuilding and work on the rôle of government 
in the economic decline of the UK is through the work of Hugh Pemberton who advocates 
the use of ‘policy networks’ as a way of understanding the interactions behind government 
policy in the 1960s and as an alternative to traditional models of governance based on the 
‘Westminster System’.52 This thesis benefits from the use of Pemberton’s ideas, not least 
because they provide a mechanism to analyse how the relationship between the state, 
shipbuilders and other interest groups shaped national policy towards shipbuilding. 
Pemberton argues that whilst the policy network model of Rhodes (which is described as 
‘sets of interacting and interdependent organisations operating within the power 
dependency network’) has had a modicum of success in defining five sets of networks that 
interact with one another both formally and informally: Policy Communities; Professional; 
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Inter-Governmental; Producer; and Issue Networks. Rhodes’ model lacks an extensive 
typography and has been difficult to integrate with other such models dealing with the 
behaviour of policy makers.53 Pemberton therefore proposes that the Rhodes model of 
policy networks be integrated with work by Rosemary Taylor and Peter Hall on ‘social 
learning’, which categorised change on a series of levels.54 To briefly summarise Hall’s 
orders of change, first order change is the use of an existing instrument to bring about a 
policy change (interest rates for example). Second order change is when an existing or 
created function is executed either by an established or new body, transferring existing 
powers (interest rates from the government to the central bank) or creating new ones 
(environmental agencies in the 1970s and 80s). Finally, third order change is when a 
complete ideological paradigm shift occurs encompassing all state and non-state actors 
within society.55 Consequently, the Rhodes model when modified by the Hall system 
would focus upon the rôle of the five policymaking networks but would make allowances 
for the orders of change that can occur. This thesis makes use of Pemberton’s views by 
demonstrating the shifting rôle of actors within the policy-making process of the Wilson 
government upon which industrial (and therefore shipbuilding) policy was made. 
 
Pemberton makes a number of observations concerning the essential nature of the 
policy-making environment in the 1950s and 1960s and how the context of policy making 
changed once Labour was elected in 1964.56 For example, the economic policy regime of 
the Treasury in the 1950s was Keynesian in nature and reflected the influence of Robert 
Hall in the Economic Section of the Treasury.57 From the late 1950s onwards, there was 
the development of a series of government measures not only for economic controls but 
also for intervention in industry, the start of the so-called ‘Keynesian Plus’ era.58 However, 
Pemberton demonstrates that the previous regime was a reflection of policy networks 
existing along an academia-Whitehall axis and that the evolution of state planning as a 
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policy in the United Kingdom was part of a larger process.59 The adoption of planning by 
the Conservatives in 1962, which was preceded by the creation in 1957 of the Council for 
Prices, Productivity and Income (CPPI) was the result of a system of feedback between 
government and external bodies (such as think tanks, representative institutions and the 
media) and is described in Hall’s terms as a third order change in which the prevailing 
economic paradigm pursued by government shifted.60  
 
Pemberton considers this situation unique to the 1960s, as in other periods of 
British economic history major paradigm shifts are the subject of electoral competition. 
The 1964 Labour manifesto, however, claimed to make a radical break with the 
methodologies of the previous thirteen years and whilst the Conservatives enacted 
economic controls, the programme proposed by Labour at the general election went much 
further than had been attempted previously.61 However, recent work undertaken by 
Pemberton on the rôle of taxation in determining Labour’s programme after 1964 has 
demonstrated that decision making was not well defined nor easy to trace.62 This reflects a 
lack of collaboration between individuals, institutions and government and a refusal by 
some of these bodies to cooperate with one another (the relationship between the Treasury 
and the NEDC being a prime example).63 Consequently, it is debatable whether approaches 
similar to those in Scandinavia and France would have been possible in the United 
Kingdom because the lack of defined policymaking combined with fractious relationships 
between separate power centres.64 Pemberton’s attempts to define decision making 
processes separate but coexisting with the Westminster model has demonstrated a new way 
of approaching the subject matter but this cannot accurately trace policy making 
developments during the 1950s and 60s. Indeed, the dominant view states that Attlee 
government implemented economic controls, but this was mostly a perpetuation of 
wartime controls.65 The Labour Party manifesto for the General Election of July, 1945 
pledged that the, ‘...whole of the national resources, in land, material and labour must be 
employed.’ and proposed the nationalisation of what it termed the ‘strategic industries’ of 
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coal, energy, iron and steel, and transport.66 In addition to these measures, the government 
had a policy of increasing UK exports to generate foreign currency reserves.67 Therefore, 
in terms of a policy network model an analysis of the rôle of the Attlee government in 
creating the economic framework for post-war British lends a greater understanding of the 
1964 Wilson government, not least because many members of that government, served as 
ministers under Attlee.  
 
Richard Toye, Neil Rollings, Jim Tomlinson, and Nick Tiratsoo have all explored 
the development of state intervention under Attlee, detailing the relationship between 
private industry and government.68  Toye’s work provides a chronological reference to the 
development of planning as an ideology in the Labour Party from 1918 onwards and 
examines the characteristics of the system of economic planning put in place by Attlee. 69 
Highlighting the importance of the Keynes’ How to Pay for the War, Toye demonstrated 
that the Labour Party was initially against further bureaucratic measures.70 Nevertheless, 
the perpetuation of wartime controls into peacetime enabled the Attlee government to 
implement its aims, although whether this was the creation of a state controlled planning 
system is debatable. Rather, the Labour government retained wartime controls on pricing 
and consumption as a response to a series of economic crises in the late 1940s. The same 
crisis atmosphere (as well as the wider international framework of Bretton Woods) 
prevented Attlee from implementing a system of planning controls. Therefore, economic 
policy and practice in this period was in constant flux in reaction to external events.71 
Tiratsoo and Tomlinson have shown that the government was fully aware of the condition 
of Britain’s industrial base (with outmoded equipment and a lack of capital investment), 
but that it lacked the powers to force improvements. 72 For the plant owners, it was simply 
a matter of expenditure on new capital equipment versus moderate success using existing 
machinery.73 This all occurred against a background of American initiatives, loans and 
grants for the purposes of reconstruction and a variety of legislation aimed at improving 
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plant performance and productivity.74 Both authors point out that for management and 
employees of industrial enterprises, productivity and production were not directly related 
to their day to day lives and indeed the failure of governmental efforts at improving 
Britain’s economic performance in the 1940s was based in part on its failure to impress 
upon many the importance of the process.75  
 
A populist counterpoint was provided by Correlli Barnett, who attributes the failure 
of British industry in the post-war period to measures imposed by the Attlee government. 76 
His work has drawn unfavourable criticism from a number of economic historians, namely 
Jim Tomlinson (referring to The Lost Victory) and David Edgerton (on The Audit of War), 
Barnett has caused controversy not only for his view that the goals of the Attlee 
government to build a comprehensive welfare state whilst also continuing with global 
military and imperial commitments was unsustainable and has been criticised for his 
reliance on primary research.77 Indeed, it is very difficult to comment upon Barnett’s work 
without being able to refer to his detractors and this paragraph is no exception. Barnett has 
proposed in all his works that the policies of the post-war Labour government were the 
main contributory factor causing the post-war decline of the British economy. This 
includes state spending on the creation of a ‘New Jerusalem’ welfare state at the same time 
as preserving overseas military commitments.78 Additionally, Barnett has criticised British 
industrial performance during the Second World War in comparison to that of Germany 
and states that without Lend-Lease Britain would have lost the war.79 However, Barnett’s 
work suffers from two very noticeable imbalances; it is highly polemical and based almost 
entirely on primary evidence. On the first count, Barnett’s polemical argument that a large, 
centralised state machinery swallowed a disproportionate amount of resources is at odds 
with his criticism that the UK system lacked government controls in over areas, for 
example in the promotion of science or a Bismarkian system of social paternalism.80 
Secondly, whilst Barnett has more than ample archival evidence, he seldom refers to other 
scholars and as a result his analysis suffers from an inadequate theoretical context that 
hampers his interpretation of events. It is on this latter point that Barnett has received the 
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most criticism, which Tomlinson has repeatedly emphasised, particularly the extensive 
methodological shortcomings in The Lost Victory from this omission, which Edgerton is in 
agreement.81 Certain assertions by Barnett, namely that investment in the UK was 
constrained by the need for government to spend money on infrastructure at the expense of 
investment does not hold up in comparison to other nations, particular West Germany, 
which in 1950 spent less on investment in industry and more on social provision than the 
UK.82 Indeed, state expenditure on housing under Attlee, which Barnett attributes as a 
major drain on national resources, was cut after 1947 because of a lower than expected 
income for the government. Again, in 1950 the government in West Germany was 
spending more on housing than the UK (24% as opposed to 19% of domestic 
investment).83 The discussion of Barnett’s work on the Attlee governments provides a 
counterfactual to the argument in this thesis; whilst Barnett is critical of government and 
cites certain policies as playing a part in the United Kingdom’s relative economic decline 
he does so as a lamentation of Britain’s lost past, asking a number of ‘what if’ questions 
rather than studying the evidence presented. This attitude is also found in The Audit of 
War, which questions British economic performance during the Second World War in 
comparison to that of Germany. Edgerton has written that in many ways Barnett had 
merely misinterpreted much of the data concerning the UK and Germany by failing to 
define his terms or understand those used by others and also underestimates a number of 
cultural conditions and local motivations.84 Barnett, however, is driven by polemical 
motivations and his work should be seen in such light.  
In contrast to Barnett, many argue that policy making in the period 1945 to 1979 
was constrained within the boundaries of a ‘post-war consensus’, which accepted a level of 
state regulation and control regardless of the incumbent government’s political 
affiliation.85 Although much of this literature focussed primarily on the Labour 
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government of 1964 to 1970, Neil Rollings provides an overview of the Conservative 
governments from the 1950s to the election of Labour in 1964.86 Rollings has 
demonstrated that the broad use of the term ‘Keynesian’ to describe government fiscal and 
macro economic policy is mistaken and has argued that neither Labour nor the 
Conservatives in the period could be described as full-blooded Keynesians and both used a 
number of different economic approaches.87 Indeed, whereas the Labour Party favoured 
the use of a number of direct and indirect economic controls and a limited use of 
nationalisation, the Conservatives favoured the removal of subsidies, price controls and de-
nationalised the steel industry.88 However, this did not mean that Labour intervened and 
the Conservatives did not; there was as much use of budgetary controls and macro-
economic fine-tuning under the Conservatives as under Labour and the Conservatives also 
flirted with the notion of state planning with the creation of the National Economic 
Development Council (NEDC).89 NEDC is of direct relevance to this work, as the body 
was heavily involved in laying the foundations for what became the Geddes Committee. 
Created in 1962 (although the idea of at least government and industry collaborating in a 
corporatist body was touted by the FBI in the late 1950s) it remained in place until 1992.90 
The primary purpose of the council was to develop policies to encourage economic 
growth, a reflection of the rôle of indicative planning in the faster growing French 
economy at the time. However, Ringe and Rollings demonstrate that the body had few 
actual powers and merely reflected the institutions represented in its composition, a 
continuation of the status quo ante rather than a corporatist body in the Eichengreen 
model.91 This was a by-product of its birth; none of the constituent bodies entered into 
arrangements with the same intentions as those who proposed the body; the TUC did not 
want to be held responsible for government actions, government ministers did not want to 
have powers removed from themselves to an outside body and the Treasury lacked the 
initiative to make the most of the opportunity presented. Therefore, the resulting body 
launched that was in 1961 was much weaker than the one originally envisioned.92  
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It is important to note that accounts of the period after 1951 stress the retention of 
some economic controls by the Conservatives and the retention of most nationalised 
industries. The systems put in place by Labour did not remain unaltered, rather, the 
Conservatives attempted a programme of liberalisation but retained an underlying belief in 
the rôle of the state in the economy; be it through macro economic adjustments or 
subsidies. Indeed, from 1961 onwards the same government flirted with a form of 
centralised planning and centralised policy making that comprised of all the main 
economic actors. Ringe and Rollings demonstrate this differed from the earlier Labour 
policies and had taken a distinct Conservative form. This point is of vital importance when 
discussing the literature concerning the Conservative government of the 1950s and its 
relationship with industry, and has formed the basis for additional work on this subject.93 
Tomlinson and Tiratsoo also demonstrate that the government had an active rôle in 
developing the economy in the 1950s.94 Despite the Treasury’s flirting with restricting 
expenditure and an ‘acceptable’ level of unemployment under Thorneycroft between 1957 
and 1958, the Conservative party favoured state sponsored solutions to growing economic 
problems.95 These covered a number of areas, not least employment, training, R & D and 
regional development, despite concerns about unsustainable government expenditure, 
particularly for defence and agriculture.96  However, Tomlinson points out that the 
Conservative party lacked coherence and direction in the 1950s and did not understand the 
political and economic benefits of improved housing, healthcare and education for 
economic growth (preferring to see these as ‘social benefits’).97 Consequently, due to the 
TUC, FBI and Whitehall creating institutional barriers to economic ‘modernisation’ and a 
lack of a coherent strategy, the economic agenda of Conservative governments in the 
1950s and early 1960s did not go to the same lengths in enlarging state participation as 
either the Attlee or Wilson governments.98 
 
The Labour Party manifesto for the 1964 general election, under the banner of a 
‘New Britain’ promised to introduce reforms aimed at modernising Britain’s industrial 
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base through the use of new technology.99 The primary intention of the Labour Party was 
to introduce a series of planning measures, setting goals for industry and creating 
economic growth based on a programme of industrial expansion.100 Recent work by 
Tomlinson on the economic policy of this government illustrates many of the underlying 
themes of this research, in particular the continued development of a manufacturing policy 
by the Labour party to solve the United Kingdom's balance of trade problems.101 This 
thesis shows that Labour attempted to use planning, industrial intervention and state 
funding to deal with the low capital investment and productivity in British industry. 
Results were mixed because of the failure of the government to adjust economic reality 
and the effect of continual external crises on the British economy.102 For example, the 
Wilson government intended to use planning techniques and intervention to improve the 
productivity, output and growth rate of the British economy. The stated goal of the 
Department of Economic Affairs under George Brown was for a 25% rise in GDP between 
1965 and 1970 utilising the National Plan, which represented a mixture of indicative and 
state planning.103 However, the actual growth rate was 21%. Tomlinson demonstrates, the 
plan had two major flaws from its conception. First, the plan demanded certain outcomes 
without providing any details as to how to do this and second, the five-year time frame of 
its existence was susceptible to changing circumstances. By the time of the fiscal belt-
tightening of 1966 and the subsequent devaluation of 1967, the plan, and the DEA were 
ignored by government and industry.104 Nevertheless, despite the failure of a nationwide 
economic plan the rôle of regional planning as a policy of the Wilson government should 
not be discounted as it became more central to economic life than either the DEA or the 
National Plan. The efforts by government to preserve industrial infrastructure in peripheral 
areas, such as the North East, Scotland and Wales, and to create investment in new plants 
away from traditional areas created many projects, which were funded by subsidies that 
had a profound effect on capital investment in certain areas.105 
 
Productivity was another recurrent theme for governments after 1945 and 
particularly for the Wilson government, which intended to address the low productivity 
rate of the United Kingdom in comparison with competitors.106 The favoured solution was 
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for an expanding use of technology within the economy, modernising traditional industries 
and promoting newer industrial sectors, such as computing. This created a symbiotic 
relationship between the government’s policies on modernisation and productivity growth 
with the consequence that institutions and plans for one invariably had an effect on the 
other.107 The institutional arrangements favoured by Wilson followed a two-strand 
approach, that of the all-encompassing ministry and the government body mandated to 
perform a specific task, the examples in this thesis being the Ministry of Technology and 
the Shipbuilding Industry Board. Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that the relationship 
between agencies and ministries was loosely defined and there were examples of 
overlapping responsibilities or even ministries overriding and marginalising the delegated 
body.108 Indeed, this made the stated goal of bodies such as the Industrial Reorganisation 
Committee harder. Whilst mandated to rationalise disparate companies into larger entities, 
its work suffered from protracted negotiations that more often than not left the same 
industrial structure as before in place under a new corporate identity.109 Tomlinson states 
that, whilst a number of Wilson’s ideas reflected best practice and the soundest possible 
policy for industry, the government itself was constrained in its actions by intransigence 
from labour, management and the City, but also an internal lack of coordination and 
cooperation between competing government departments.110  
 
The view that the economic policies of the Wilson government were a cause of the 
United Kingdom’s economic problems in the 1960s is contested by the work of O’Hara, 
which contradicts many of the positions put forward by Tomlinson (although O’Hara is in 
agreement with Tomlinson on many points).111 O’Hara states that the ‘stop-go’ cycles of 
growth were of concern to companies in the United Kingdom that desired stability but that 
these were a global reality for all companies. In the case of a country like Japan (which 
was highly dependent on the flow of imported resources and exported products), the 
swings from growth to recession were much sharper than those felt by the UK. O’Hara 
points out that the measures used by the UK government up to 1964 had some success in 
mitigating the effects of changes in the global economic environment.112 What is important 
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for the study of the Wilson Labour governments is O’Hara’s notion that the desire to 
impose methods of scientific control over the economy replaced the previous Labour Party 
commitment to nationalisation. Indeed, Wilson was influenced by the notion of 
‘technostructure’ put forward by J.K. Galbraith in which the interests of capital no longer 
mattered in modern corporations as they grew and evolved under the aegis of an impartial 
and scientific management class, which made ‘atomistic’ companies competing between 
themselves irrelevant and consequently government would be in a position to direct and 
plan commercial efforts.113 Therefore, the conversion to planning and central control by 
government from the early 1960s onwards owes less to party ideology and more to the 
zeitgeist of the day. Nevertheless, the failure of planning and state control in this period is 
not attributed by O’Hara to the measures and institutions set up by the government, rather 
the Wilson government’s lack of comprehension about the underlying global economy and 
its affects on the United Kingdom.114 O’Hara and Tomlinson agree about external 
economic constraints placed on the UK by changes in the terms of trade, the weakening 
US dollar and a policy commitment to preserve the Sterling zone. Therefore, the economic 
plans of the government were overwhelmed by external events.115 O’Hara states that 
productivity and GDP growth had grown in the late 1960s faster than in any other period in 
British history and therefore the first two Wilson governments did not fail; rather both 
were constrained by the global economic context of the 1960s.116 O’Hara’s argument is 
persuasive; the narrative of the international economy in the 1960s is one of predicament 
followed by crisis combined with failed initiatives to remedy the causes of economic strife. 
117  
 
Tomlinson and O’Hara’s accounts are complemented by Edgerton’s work on the 
technology policies of the Wilson government and the United Kingdom in general.118 
Edgerton’s work on the Ministry of Technology, complements articles by Richard Coopey 
in the early 1990s dealing with the effects of Wilson’s ‘White Heat of Technology’ and 
therefore a discussion of his work must occur before examining Edgerton’s in more 
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depth.119 Starting from an introductory piece for Contemporary Record in 1991, Coopey 
developed a series of articles dealing with the Ministry of Technology (Mintech) from 
1966 onwards. Coopey focused on the structure of Mintech, the split between research and 
industrial functions and how these developed under the aegis of Tony Benn as Minister for 
Technology from 1966 onwards. The work starts by tracing the development of Mintech 
from 1966 rather than 1964, as the Ministry was smaller under Cousins as minister, who 
had to create a Ministry from scratch whilst undertaking reviews of industrial sectors.120 
From 1966 onwards Mintech started to absorb a number of other ministries and by 1970 
had encompassed responsibility for almost all the nationalised industries, government 
assistance for private industry, research and development and the diffusion of technology 
from research establishments to commercial uses.121 However, Mintech also inherited 
many large industrial projects of unknown commercial potential, such as the Concorde 
airliner (commenced under the previous Conservative government) and the Advanced Gas 
Cooled Reactor (AGR), which swallowed up large amounts of government funding and 
took up all of the Ministry’s time. Coopey emphasises these projects as a causal factor in 
the failure of government industrial policy in the 1960s, but within a context of an 
obsession with creating larger firms and industrial units to compete with those in the 
United States, even as developments in Japan and West Germany suggested that plants 
smaller than the ‘American Standard’ were coming to the fore.122  
 
Edgerton promotes the notion that Mintech made matters worse for British 
industry, and research and development (R&D) in the 1960s when compared to the 
previous decade. Indeed, in Edgerton view, ‘Great Britain was, without doubt, the 
scientific and technological powerhouse of Western Europe: research and development 
spending, whether industrially funded, or government funded, was significantly higher 
than in any capitalist country other than the USA.’123 As Edgerton demonstrates, Labour 
cut expenditure when coming into office, cancelling military programmes and whilst 
civilian research and development increased, military R&D spending decreased by a much 
larger amount.124 The rationale behind these decisions was a belief that state spending on 
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technology and industry should be moved into the civilian rather than military sector of the 
economy (which was one of the main tenets of the famous ‘White Heat of Technology’ 
speech) to improve Britain’s industrial base, balance of payments and terms of trade125 
However, a recurrent theme of Edgerton’s work is the rôle of the state as an agent of 
change in the technical development of British industry from before the Second World 
War up to the early 1970s. Indeed, two of his main texts emphasise that the state played an 
important part in the development of new technologies, specifically the aviation and 
computer industries. The main contention of these works is that, whilst Britain had a much 
larger expenditure on defence procurement and development in the 1950s and 1960s 
compared to France, West Germany and Japan, this military industrial spending also 
contributed to the wider economy and helped develop new civilian technologies.126 In his 
recent book, Edgerton had re-evaluated the notion that all encompassing ministries were 
created during the Second World War and instead emphasises the creation of a number of 
British research laboratories after the First War and during the 1930s as part of the 
development of state-guided military industrial research. He also takes aim at the common 
perception that the Senior Civil Service was populated by classically trained generalists 
and presents evidence suggesting that most of the government-led research establishments 
were populated by highly trained scientific specialists.127  Edgerton therefore states that 
there was a symbiotic relationship between government departments such as the Ministry 
of Supply and Aviation and the wider economy in the 1950s, which was poorly understood 
by the incoming Wilson government in 1964.128 Whilst a number of military projects 
continued, defence spending was cut and although some money was channelled into 
civilian projects (such as Concorde), spending on civilian projects (whilst three times 
higher in 1970 than it was in 1964) was nowhere near the same as the amount lost on 
military projects. Moreover, the UK now purchased many munitions from the United 
States despite efforts to develop a European defence infrastructure in response to those 
who lamented the American domination of high technology manufacture. 129 The work of 
Jon Agar both reinforces Edgerton’s work whilst also providing a counterpoint to some of 
his points; Agar in much of his work still promotes the idea of the civil service generalist at 
                                                
125 Edgerton, ‘The ‘White Heat’ Revisited’, pp. 55 – 58. 
126 See, Edgerton, D. England and the aeroplane: an essay on a militant and technological nation 
(Macmillan, London, 1991). 
127 Edgerton, D. Warfare State: Britain, 1920-1970 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006). 
128 Edgerton, ‘The ‘White Heat’ Revisited’, pp. 65 - 69. 
129 Servan-Schreiber, J.J. The American Challenge (Hamish Hamilton, London 1968) and Layton, C. 




the heart of the bureaucracy, to whom Edgerton scientific specialist refers was ultimately 
subordinate.130 
 
However, where Edgerton’s work is of importance to this thesis, however, is not 
just the government intervention in research and development or defence and aviation, but 
in the wider industrial economy. This is best emphasised by the Industrial Expansion Act 
(1968), which gave government extensive powers to finance industrial schemes using 
government funding and was the Ministry of Technology’s major contribution to 
legislation.131 This Act represented a shift in the government attitude towards state funding 
of industry, moving away from promoting research and development in preference to 
expanding industrial output. Edgerton promotes the idea of the ‘misallocation model’ to 
sum up the attitude of the Wilson government towards science and industry. In short, 
Wilson believed that far too many resources were channelled into defence and pure 
scientific research to the detriment of overall economic and industrial performance. 
However, even with a massive increase in government spending on civilian R&D and the 
promotion of individual projects by Mintech, there was no guarantee that this would have 
any effect on industrial performance. Edgerton sums up his view by stating that whilst 
Wilson may have came to power using the rhetoric of Britain as a nation undergoing 
industrial and technological decline, the opposite was actually true. The United Kingdom 
was second only to the United States in research and development expenditure in 1960 and 
had a higher GDP than either West Germany or Japan. However, by 1970 those nations not 
only out-produced the UK but also spent more on R&D.132 This is not to attribute blame to 
Wilson’s administration, but rather to demonstrate that the image presented in 1964 of a 
technically backward United Kingdom is and was misleading and that the use of 
technology to arrest Britain’s decline was not the panacea it promised to be. 
 
Labour lost the 1970 election to the Conservatives under Edward Heath and then 
won again in 1974 under Wilson. However, this thesis primarily deals with policy 
developments under the guidance of the two Wilson governments of the 1960s. In both 
case studies in the thesis (Scott Lithgow in Scotland and Harland and Wolff in Northern 
Ireland) the events overlap with the Conservative and Labour governments of the early to 
mid 1970s. This section will only have a brief discussion of both governments for two 
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reasons; as yet there has not been the same level of scholarly enquiry into the subject as the 
governments of the 1960s and secondly, because the study of these governments are only a 
small component of the overall thesis. The following will briefly outline the developments 
of the period 1970 to 1975 and explain the motivations behind both governments, relying 
not only upon scholarly texts, but also first hand accounts of the period.133 
 
In June 1970 Heath won the general election and ended up as Prime Minister with a 
31-seat majority.134 The 1970 manifesto (known as the Selsdon Park manifesto after the 
hotel in which its designers met in 1969) proposed a programme of liberalisation and once 
in government, Heath promised less government intervention, more efficient government, 
tax reform, a reduction of trade union influence and joining the European Economic 
Community (EEC) to boost Britain’s trade.135 In the October budget of 1970, Heath’s 
government had proposed reviewing subsidies, winding up the Shipbuilding Industries 
Board, the Industrial Reorganisation Committee and the Land Commission, and ending the 
planning controls implemented by the previous Labour government. However, as with the 
preceding Labour government of the 1960s, Heath’s administration was plagued by a 
series of external events and constraints starting with inflation caused by the demise of the 
Bretton Woods system in 1971, which was following by the 1973 OPEC oil shock and 
ending with the miner’s strikes of 1974.136 The switch from promoting a laissez faire 
system of capitalism to state intervention along corporatist lines became apparent after a 
year in government. Upon their election, the Conservatives championed deregulation and 
the end of planning controls, proposing the return of companies such as Lunn-Poly, 
Thomas Cook and Carlisle Breweries to the private sector, and refused a bridging loan to 
the Mersey docks & Harbours Board (a private company) that was agreed with the 
previous government.137 Within a year, however, the potential failure of a number of large 
industrial companies forced the government to intervene directly into the economy, 
nationalising Upper Clyde Shipbuilders and Rolls Royce aero engines after they had 
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become bankrupt.138 A more notable u-turn came with the Industry Act of 1972, which 
promoted the rôle of government in funding industry through loans and shareholdings on a 
case-by-case basis and completely contradicted the earlier aims of the Heath Government, 
which justified its actions on the grounds of ‘national interest’.139 Many of these actions 
can be attributed to the particular characteristics of Heath’s prime ministership; he was 
known to exercise rigid control over his cabinet and was wont to change his mind often. In 
the view of Martin Holmes, it is the combination of these factors that created the 
Conservatives fluxing policy environment of the early 1970s.140 Many also attributed a 
certain petulant character to Heath, who after experiencing continued problems in Northern 
Ireland decided to hold an early election in the spring of 1974 (after less than 4 years in 
office) asking the question, ‘Who Governs?’141 The answer given by the British public was, 
‘not you, Mr. Heath’ and the Labour party under Harold Wilson returned to office, albeit 
as a minority government.142 
 
During its period of opposition, the Labour party had shifted dramatically to the 
left. However, there was not uniformity between the party’s politicians and membership, 
the shift to the left was driven more by the agitation of the party’s membership by senior 
politicians at conference. At the forefront of these efforts was Tony Benn (the 
aforementioned Anthony Wedgwood Benn - formerly 2nd Viscount Stansgate - announced 
on the BBC in October that he wished to be simply called Tony Benn) who was elected 
Labour Party chairman in 1972 and at the 1973 party conference proposed a motion calling 
for the wholesale nationalisation of Britain’s industrial base, which was subsequently 
passed by the delegates.143 Indeed, Benn had spent his time in opposition developing a 
number of socialist industrial policies through the aegis of his personal think tank, the 
Institute for Workers’ Control, that recommended the creation of a system of Soviet style 
five-year-plans, joint worker management control in factories and nationalisation.144 Once 
back in power, however, the realities of being a minority government during a time of 
industrial and economic strife hit home and, whilst the manifesto commitments put 
forward by Labour were not as extreme as those proposed by Benn, the government could 
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not impose non-consensus policies nor ideology because of its initial lack of a majority 
(and after October 1974) a wafer thin one.145 The Wilson government continued in a crisis 
atmosphere until 1976. During this time, whilst the government had made peace with the 
miners and had some success in reducing the number of stoppages, the economy still faced 
a substantial number of industrial bankruptcies.146 At the same time Wilson did not have 
the mandate nor the political will to cut out or reform the poorly performing sections of the 
economy as he feared not only the consequences of mass unemployment but also the 
realistic potential for a backbench rebellion in his own party.147 Wilson achieved little 
during his second term as Prime Minister and retired just after his sixtieth birthday. In the 
ensuing leadership contest, Benn came ran a high profile campaign promoting an even 
further move to left, but after a short election campaign Jim Callaghan, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, became the next Prime Minister.148  
 
Callaghan did not represent a great change from Wilson; the government still 
having to deal with a series of economic crises and its small majority in parliament. In 
terms of the first problem, Callaghan was a prominent member of the Fabian Society and 
was committed to nationalisation, but the government only managed one large-scale 
nationalisation (the aircraft and shipbuilding industries in 1977) and was hindered by 
having to borrow money from the IMF in 1976 to deal with balance of payments 
problems.149 The aforementioned nationalisation was controversial even within the Labour 
Party and therefore was very difficult to get though Parliament; once the legislation had 
passed the House of Commons the House of Lords invariably refused to vote in its favour 
and the government had to use the Parliament Acts (1911 & 1949) to have the measure 
placed on the statute book. To attempt a measure of stability in Parliament, Callaghan 
curried favour with nationalist parties from Scotland and Wales and entered into an 
agreement in 1977 with Liberal MPs for their support in Parliament during a no-confidence 
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vote.150 Callaghan did have some success with inflation, Northern Ireland and foreign 
policy, but overall his majority was such that the task of governing was undermined by the 
need to retain control of Parliament and avoid an election, something that Callaghan 
managed to do well as the Labour government served the full five years of its 
parliamentary term until its demise in 1979. 
 
The historiography of post-war government in the United Kingdom up to 1979 
describes a series of administrations that had reforming goals but were thwarted by the 
realities of declining imperial power faced with the steady erosion of its industrial and 
economic base in the face of overseas competition. From Attlee through to Callaghan all 
governments had to deal with current account problems and changing terms of trade, 
which limited their ability to implement manifesto pledges and produced an environment 
that was conducive to the continuation of the post-war status quo. Governments proposed 
and attempted economic reforms, not least the Wilson governments of the late 1960s with 
the implementation of strategic planning and the attempted economic liberalisation of the 
Heath government in the early 1970s, but these attempts failed for a multitude of reasons, 
not least the global environment of the late 1960s and early 1970s and the repeated 
opposition sectional interests in the UK. However, the national diorama was not the only 
arena in which policy developments were played in this period and accounts reviewed thus 
far have only focused on the rôle of central government. Therefore, as this thesis shows 
with the case studies of Harland and Wolff in Belfast and Scott Lithgow in Scotland, the 
rôle of regional and devolved government in Scotland and Northern Ireland deserves fuller 
attention, particularly as the policy network approach extends beyond centralised decision 
making. This provides an important comparison with the political context of Northern 
Ireland and its devolved legislative process, illustrating the central argument of this thesis 
that the context of government decision-making acted as an agent of decline in the 
shipbuilding industry. The following details developments in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland from the creation of devolved administrations in the 1880s through to the widening 
of local powers from 1945 onwards to the major development of democratic movements 
and change in the 1970s. 
 
During the 1940s and 1950s, the Gross Domestic Product of Scotland declined as a 
proportion of the United Kingdom total from 9.3 percent of the UK total in 1951, to 8.7 
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percent in 1960.151 The situation had improved from the middle of the 1960s onwards but 
by 1979 Scottish per capita GDP had fallen to 82.3 percent of the UK figure and 
unemployment and de-industrialisation disproportionately affected Scotland more during 
the 1970s than the rest of the UK.152 Correspondingly, the number of unemployed in 
Scotland rose from 3.6 percent to 8.0 percent in 1979, compared to a rise from 1.7 percent 
to 5.8 percent for the UK overall.153 Between 1950 and 1979 the Scottish economy mostly 
lagged behind the United Kingdom, but manufacturing remained an important employer 
and contracted slower than in the rest of the UK. Nevertheless, by 1979 the service 
industry was the largest employer in Scotland, employing 59 percent of the workforce and 
in proportion with the rest of the UK.154 
 
As a counterweight to the real (and perceived) inequality between Scotland and the 
rest of the United Kingdom, per capita government spending was higher in Scotland. From 
the foundation of the Scottish Office in 1885 until 1945, the formula used to calculate the 
block allocation of government resources to Scotland was called the ‘Goschen Formula’ 
(after the Chancellor of the Exchequer at time who calculated Scotland’s share of United 
Kingdom GDP as in 11 percent 1885).155 However, as the economic fortunes of Scotland 
waned during the 1920s and 1930s this figure no longer represented the true relationship 
between Scotland and the United Kingdom. In 1948 the Attlee Labour government 
introduced a system of negotiation between the Scottish Office and central government to 
determine the size of Scotland’s annual block allocation of resources. Scotland still 
received a larger allocation than the rest of the UK and the incumbent Secretary of State 
for Scotland tended to bargain over Scotland’s share of large national infrastructure 
projects.156  Consequently, the government approved a series of controversially large 
Scottish budgets and so in (to avert further criticism) Westminster introduced the Barnett 
formula in 1978 (named after the Chief Secretary of the Treasury), which allocated 
resources to Scotland, England and Wales on a ratio of 10/85/5 respectively.157 Northern 
Ireland, being still technically (although not in actuality) self-governing, received income 
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in direction proportion to the tax collected in the province, minus obligations to the UK 
government.158 
 
From the Treaty of Union in 1707, the political context of the Scottish remained 
different from that of England and Wales, but since the creation of the Scottish Office in 
1885 the country had undergone a process of ever increasing administrative devolution.159 
From its inception under Gladstone, the primary responsibility of the Scottish Office was 
public education and appointed boards ran the majority of the remaining government 
functions.160 Reflecting the separate judicial system north of the border, the Scottish Office 
assumed control of law and order in 1887 and over the course of the following 4 decades 
the office gained responsibility over more areas until 1939, when it took over the appointed 
boards’ responsibilities. At this point, the Scottish Office had four departments dealing 
with agriculture, health, education and home affairs.161 In 1945, the Attlee government 
gave the Scottish Office additional responsibilities for planning and certain economic 
functions.162 
 
During the 1950s the economic focus was on both foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and the development of industry, based upon a number of Scottish Council (Development 
and Industry) reports.163 From 1957 under the aegis of Jack Maclay, the Scottish Office 
was instrumental in developing many new industries (such as electronics and vehicle 
manufacture), which were not traditionally part of the Scottish industrial base.164 Notable 
examples were the location of large nuclear power-plants at Chapelcross and Dounreay, 
automobile plants based in Bathgate and Linwood, a strip steel mill in Ravenscraig, and 
finally a large paper-mill near the Highland city of Fort William.165 However, because of 
this focus on foreign direct investment and new industry, the Scottish Officer all but 
ignored older industries, particularly the subject of this thesis, shipbuilding. In 1963, 
building upon the recommendations of the Toothill Report, the creation of the Scottish 
Development Department (SDD) introduced both indicative and centralised planning to 
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coordinate the economic development of separate industries in Scotland.166 With the 
election of a Labour administration in 1964, the SDD further enhanced its responsibilities 
with the creation of the Scottish Economic Planning Board and in 1965 developed a wider 
corporatist body encompassing all government departments, the Scottish Economic 
Planning Council (SEPC).167 This reflected government policy found in the Industrial 
Development Act (1966) to promote Development Areas in impoverished regions, which 
applied to most of Scotland during its rapid industrial decline.168 The appointment of 
Willie Ross as the Secretary of State for Scotland led to an increased advocacy rôle for the 
Scottish Office and he succeeded in persuading the national government to base large scale 
projects in Scotland.169 In the 1960s, FDI increased by almost 70 percent as a number of 
large North American multinationals opened their European factories and offices in 
Scotland.170 However, some argue that the methods of Ross, whilst promoting of Scottish 
interests at a national level, hindered the survival of established industries and lead to a 
focus on large industrial schemes rather than developing existing companies.171  
 
In 1973, an important change occurred under the Heath Conservative government. 
In the context of the exponential growth of the North Sea oil industry and the high profile 
failure of companies in 1971 (such as Upper Clyde Shipbuilders and Rolls Royce Aero 
Engines) the government created a fifth branch of Scottish Office, the Scottish Economic 
Planning Department, to promote growth and inward investment.172 Empowered by the 
Industry Act (1972), the new department had a wide range of responsibilities and used 
grants and tax allowances to promote industrial investment.173 Indeed, the government 
could have gone further. In 1968 Heath expressed publicly in a speech in Perth the desire 
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for Scottish devolution, and appointing the Kilbrandon Commission that recommended in 
1973 the creation of a Scottish assembly. 174 However, the OPEC oil crisis and coal 
miners’ strikes of late 1973 and early 1974 followed by the loss of a general election by 
Heath superseded any plans for devolution in Scotland. 
 
The Labour governments of 1974 to1979 also had a devolution policy, but the main 
development in Scotland in this period rested in the economic sphere with a massive 
increase in powers for the newly created Scottish Planning Department. Yet again the 
official policy was to promote foreign direct investment to counter the demise of 
traditional industries by promoting labour intensive modern factories.175 As a result of this 
emphasis on Scotland’s economic problems and related social conditions, the Labour 
government founded the Scottish Development Agency (SDA), which assumed all 
responsibility for inward investment, industrial governance, urban renewal, and the 
development of North Sea oil.176 By 1979, the Scottish Economic Planning Department 
had responsibility for nearly all economic functions, from industry and the Scottish Office 
had increased its powers to include a planning and coordinating function, playing a pre-
eminent rôle in developing new industries and managing the decline of the old. 
Nevertheless, despite the development of wide-ranging planning and economic powers, 
very rarely did the Scottish Office influence the development of shipbuilding policy or 
indeed the shipbuilding industry. This was down to two important reasons: a prevailing 
paradigm within the Scottish Office of replacing older, established industries with newer 
high tech ones overshadowed legacy industries, with the result that the government spent 
many millions of pounds on new industrial projects with dubious longevity and secondly 
when individual shipyards failed (such as Fairfields in 1965 and UCS in 1971) the rescue 
and development of the industry invariably happened on a national level, from the Geddes 
Report and Shipbuilding Industry Board to the eventual nationalisation of the industry in 
1977.177 The Scottish Office was involved in national decisions, but the main interface 
between Whitehall and Edinburgh was at a political level in the form of Willie Ross in 
cabinet and numerous Scottish ministers and members of parliament at a lower legislative 
level. 
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This contrasts sharply with developments in Northern Ireland, where the devolved 
local parliament and government assisted the local shipyard, Harland and Wolff.  Indeed, 
in the late 1960s local politicians in Northern Ireland worked actively with the 
Shipbuilding Industry Board in developing a reconstruction programme for the shipyard. 
This was not the case for Scott Lithgow in Scotland, whilst the country had a devolved 
administrative structure politically controlled from London, the Secretary of State for 
Scotland held powers akin to a colonial Viceroy, able to use the prerogative organs of state 
to enact policy. Whilst the Scottish Office was rarely directly involved with Scott Lithgow 
in this period, it is relevant in light of the local political context, particularly in comparison 
with the later chapters in this thesis concerning Harland and Wolff and the Northern Irish 
Government.  
 
Northern Ireland was created in 1921 as a bastion of pro-union Protestants carved 
into the northern corner of Ireland. For the first thirty years of its existence the population 
was predominately Unionist in opinion and pro-British in outlook but was never 
homogenous, with Roman Catholics a substantial minority and the Protestant community 
split along Presbyterian and Episcopal lines. Indeed, it is important to emphasise that the 
religious composition of Northern Ireland, whilst following a crude Catholic/Protestant 
split, is actually more complex than the dichotomy suggests. In the 1961 census, Roman 
Catholics comprised 34.9 percent of the population of Northern Ireland, with members of 
the Anglican Church of Ireland, Presbyterian Church and Methodist denomination making 
up a further 29, 24.2 and 4 percent respectively and minor protestant groups or non-
Christian religions comprising the final 2 percent of the population.178 Therefore, whilst 
conventional political wisdom states that the Roman Catholic population of Northern 
Ireland should be the predominant group, the majority protestant population is 
heterogeneous and only came together in the 1920s through a shared allegiance to the 
United Kingdom and opposition to a unified Irish state. In 1921 they formed the Ulster 
Unionist Party, which dominated Northern Irish politics from the inception of Stormont in 
1921 to its eventual demise in 1972.179 
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From Northern Ireland’s inception, the Ulster Unionist Party forced an intense 
programme of entrenchment, (labelled by the majority of commentators as ‘Protestant 
Triumphalism’) onto Northern Irish political landscape to guarantee Protestant hegemony. 
This happened by basing Northern Ireland on the six counties in the north of Ireland with 
the largest Protestant population (65 percent Protestant as opposed to the nine counties of 
the traditional province of Ulster that had a smaller Protestant majority of 55 percent) and 
progressively excluded the Roman Catholic population from local government and 
Stormont by changing the electoral system and franchise. From the foundation of Northern 
Ireland, a rolling programme replaced proportional representation and Single Transferable 
Vote (STV) with First Past The Post (FPTP), and electoral boundaries were gerrymandered 
to favour the Protestant population and guarantee a Unionist majority in Stormont.180 
Despite substantial differences existing between the Presbyterian, industrial working class 
and the Church of Ireland ‘Anglo-Irish’ establishment, the common cause of unionism and 
protestant entrenchment worked to unite these two groups in excluding the Catholic 
population from economic and political life.181  
 
This was the natural conclusion of economic and demographic developments since 
the early 1800s. The industrialisation of Ulster was the start of the differentiation between 
the Catholic southern provinces of Ireland and the Protestant north and by the early part of 
the twentieth century over 95 percent of the employees in engineering and manufacturing 
in Belfast, (particular shipbuilding) were from a Presbyterian protestant background.182 
Indeed, the rapid creation of a linen industry in Ulster from 1820 boosted industrial 
economy of Northern Ireland and led to a rapid development of other types of 
manufacturing. At first Belfast appeared to be an unlikely candidate for rapid industrial 
expansion; there were no local deposits of coal or ore required for modern manufacturing. 
However, cheap labour with the advantage of being able to import raw materials (other 
than coal which had to come from the UK) from the cheapest source boosted the creation 
of the linen industry throughout the course of the 1800s.183 Diversification came in the 
form of engineering and food processing (particularly in the field of brewing and 
distillation) and with a corresponding development of an advanced banking sector.184 
                                                
180 Buckland, P. A History of Northern Ireland (Dublin, 1981) and Lyons, F.S.L Ireland since the Famine 
(London, 1972) p. 756.  
181 Wilson, T. Ulster: Conflict and Consent (OUP: Oxford, 1989). 
182 Tonge, J. Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change (Harlow, 2002) p. 9 and Farrell, M. Northern Ireland: 
The Orange State (Macmillan: London, 1980). 
183 Ollerenshaw, P. ‘Industry, 1820 - 1914’, in An Economic History of Ulster, 1820 - 1940,  ed. by Kennedy, 
L. & Ollerenshaw, P. (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 1985), pp. 66 – 85. 




However, up until the end of the First World War, the economy of Northern Ireland 
remained strong but due to  the disruption of the Irish economy after partition in 1921, the 
economic prospects of Northern Ireland waned and diverged greatly from the rest of the 
United Kingdom.185 With an average unemployment rate of 23 percent between 1920 to 
1939 and reliance upon a few large industries employing thousands, the economic 
downturn of the 1930s hit Northern Ireland harder than either the rest of the United 
Kingdom and the palliative care of government intervention (being the responsibility of 
Stormont as opposed to Westminster) was unforthcoming.186 
 
Northern Ireland experienced the post-war economic boom and between 1950 and 
1973 the economy grew at an average rate of 3.43 percent compared to a UK average rate 
of 3.13 percent. This became pronounced during the 1960s; the economy of Northern 
Ireland grew at a rate of 4.2 percent compared to a UK average of 3.5 percent and, 
superficially at least, the Northern Irish economy was recouping the losses of the 1920s 
and 1930s.187 However, two factors are very important in explaining this growth. First, 
between 1950 and 1965 Harland and Wolff and Shorts Aviation Limited (the two major 
employers in Belfast and employing over 15 percent of Northern Ireland’s working 
population) were heavily dependent on military expenditure and suffered losses because of 
the cuts in defence procurement, research and development enacted by the Labour 
government after 1964. Second, a series of regional development programmes initiated by 
Stormont between 1930 and the 1960s brought forth an influx of government grants, loan 
and tax breaks to encourage industrial development. For example, the New Industries 
Development (Northern Ireland) Act 1932 and Industries Development (Northern Ireland) 
Act 1945 created a variety of ways that a company based (or wishing to relocate to) 
Northern Ireland could claim government funds and assistance.188 Nevertheless, public 
spending in Northern Ireland for the duration of the 1960s was marginally less than 98.2 
percent of the UK average, although there was an exponential rise in public spending in 
Northern Ireland during the 1960s, rising from 88 percent of the UK figure in 1959/60 to 
109 percent in 1968/1969.189 
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The primary instrument of government industrial policy in Northern Ireland during 
the 1950s and 1960s was the Ministry of Commerce.190 The Ministry dominated many 
aspects of economic life in Northern Ireland, and in the 1960s and after social security, 
received the second largest allocation of NI government expenditure.191 Recent work only 
highlighted the close relationship between the Ulster Unionist Party and the business elite, 
showing that a substantial proportion of the Stormont cabinet held substantial business 
interests. Indeed, in a recent article, Brownlow has stated that the close relationship 
business, the UUP and Stormont, combined with the government policy of financial 
support to preserve the industry base, created a system of rent seeking in the Northern Irish 
economy, which guaranteed, ‘...that politically well-connected enterprises received grants 
rather than more efficient firms’.192 The autobiography of Terrance O’Neil, Northern Irish 
Prime Minister from 1963 to 1969, supports Brownlow’s hypothesis, as he states that he 
was, ‘in the fortunate position of being the only member of the cabinet who had no 
business interests...’193 Indeed, from 1921, the economic and business elite of Northern 
Ireland sitting in Stormont, (with 35.76 percent of Ulster Unionist MPs between 1921 and 
1969 either owning or having directorships in large companies) were complicit in a 
Gramscian hegemony whereby the Anglican elite guaranteed the position of the industrial 
Presbyterian workforce in exchange for their support in preserving the status quo.194 With 
the umbrella organisation of the Orange Order, (whose membership represented the 
majority of the adult male Protestant population of Northern Ireland) by the mid 1960s any 
challenge the unionist hegemony in Northern Ireland was unthinkable. However, a number 
of economic and political changes that culminated in the late 1960s threatened not only the 
status quo within Northern Ireland, but also the very nature of its existence. 195 
 
By the middle of the 1960s, with rising Protestant migration to the United Kingdom 
and a high Roman Catholic birth rate, pressure increased on the Northern Irish Parliament 
at Stormont castle to bring about the inclusion of the Roman Catholic community. Indeed, 
the Premiership of Terry O’Neill heralded a change in thinking about Northern Ireland’s 
Roman Catholic population, at least within the very highest echelons of the statelet. Before 
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the appointment of O’Neill as Prime Minister in 1963, the previous incumbent (Sir Basil 
Brooke) remained as Prime Minister for twenty years and symbolised a period when 
Protestant rule in Northern Ireland was normalised and entrenched.196 From the outset, 
O’Neill followed a steady programme of reforms and reconciliation with Eire to the south 
and with the Catholic Nationalist community in Northern Ireland. The first indication of 
O’Neill’s intentions came with a message of condolence to Archbishop Cardinal Conway 
(who was based in Armagh, the traditional seat of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland) 
on the death of Pope John I in June of 1963, an event which made frontline news in 
Northern Ireland. O’Neill also met with the Taoiseach na Eire (Prime Minister of The 
Republic of Ireland), Sean Lomass, who made an unannounced visited to Stormont in 
January 1965.197 Many within Northern Ireland found the latter a provocative act and it 
signalled the rise of the firebrand Free Presbyterian Minister Ian Paisley as a political 
force, who staged a number of protests during the Taoiseach’s visit.198 
 
O’Neill believed that it was the responsibility of Stormont to ensure that the Roman 
Catholic population of Northern Ireland was no longer marginalised, although by believing 
that if Catholics were treated, ‘...with due consideration and kindness, they will live like 
Protestants’. His attitude was not entirely enlightened.199 However, the premiership of 
O’Neil coincided with the rise of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland. 
Discrimination stemmed from the restriction of the electoral franchise, with prejudice in 
private sector employment stemming from a preference for industrial investment to be in 
Protestant locales in eastern urban areas at the expense of the predominately western and 
rural Catholic population.200 With employment in the state sector there was further 
discrimination, the security services actively discouraged Roman Catholic applicants, (who 
were seen as disloyal) and unionist controlled local authorities generally only employed 
Protestants. For example, in Derry in the mid 1960s, despite have a majority Roman 
Catholic population only, 32 of the 177 council workers came from Catholic 
backgrounds.201 Furthermore, the Northern Irish Senior Civil Service employed only 46 
Catholics out of a workforce of 694 that was 94 percent Protestant in its composition.202  
Unfortunately for O’Neill, his premiership coincided with a rising awareness of injustice in 
the Nationalist community. This led to the creation of institutions promoting civil and 
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human rights for Roman Catholics, starting with the Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ) in 
1964 and culminating with the creation in 1967 of an umbrella organisation for the civil 
rights movement, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA). As Northern 
Ireland was created as the homeland for a radicalised Protestant minority in Ireland, many 
considered lobbying to improve Catholic circumstances a highly provocative act.203 
 
In 1968, NICRA issued a series of demands for fair treatment that requested the full 
integration of the Catholic minority in the affairs of Northern Ireland. In response to the 
unofficial priority given to Protestants over Catholics in the allocation of public housing, 
NICRA organised a series of civil rights marches in August 1968. However, with 
increasing Protestant opposition to the civil rights movement and the threat of civil 
disturbance, the Stormont Home Affairs minister, William Craig used the dormant Special 
Powers Act (1922) to reroute and cancel marches, which the Catholic population noticed 
never prevented the annual Orange parades in Catholic areas.204 NICRA and the wider 
Catholic community continued to oppose these measures throughout the winter of 1968 
and 1969, despite a number of civil rights marches coming under attack from loyalist 
elements, the majority of which appeared to be off-duty members of the police reserve, the 
‘B’ specials, which had an almost entirely Protestant membership.205 By August 1969, and 
the traditional Orange marching season, the level of sectarian violence between the two 
communities increased to such a level that the British government ordered the Army into 
Northern Ireland to restore order.206 However, misjudgements by Reginald Maudling, who 
took over as Conservative Home Secretary in 1970 (and who saw Northern Ireland as a 
part of the United Kingdom and therefore the Nationalist complaints as a security 
problem), led to an escalation of sectarian violence by January 1972, which is represented 
best in the public consciousness by the Bloody Sunday massacre in Derry during the same 
month.207 London paid scant attention to the situation in Northern Ireland when these 
pressures were contained across the Irish Sea. However, when the social and economic 
problems of Northern Ireland erupted into sectarian violence that had the potential to affect 
the United Kingdom as a whole, the politicians in Westminster took notice. In the second 
half of the 1960s the situation in Northern Ireland was developing and it was not until the 
final years of the decade that the potential for an eruption of civil violence on an 
unprecedented scale influenced government economic policy in new directions. 
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After a series of reports into the failures of the security forces in dealing with the 
sectarian violence (considered a whitewash by the Catholic community), London was of 
the opinion that the statelet was unable to govern its own affairs. As a result, on the 24th 
March 1972 (using a clause designed for such an eventuality in the Ireland Act 1949) the 
government suspended Stormont for a period of one year. To undertake the work of 
Stormont, the government in London established a Northern Ireland Office with a 
Secretary of State and a small team of ministers based in London and Belfast to oversee 
the administration.208 Needless to say, the move was met with widespread Protestant 
condemnation, particularly as radical political parties (such as the Protestant Unionist 
Party, Vanguard and the Democratic Unionist Party) were gaining electoral advantage over 
the Ulster Unionist Party. These parties proposed a series of measures from the 
disenfranchisement of the Catholic population with its citizenship transferred wholesale to 
Eire to the independence of Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom.209 However, the 
British government, unprepared to return to the old Stormont regime and institutionalise 
the differences between the Protestant and Catholic populations, proposed Northern Irish 
devolution in a 1973 white paper that emphasised the continuing sovereignty of the United 
Kingdom (unless Northern Ireland demanded otherwise) but stating that any devolved 
legislature would share executive functions between the Unionist and Nationalist 
communities.210 Despite such efforts, the failure of the 1974 power-sharing executive and 
legislature created by the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973, (because of the non 
participation and intransigence of political parties from the extremes of both communities), 
led to London exercising two and a half decades of direct authority.211  
 
The economic focus for Conservative and Labour governments in the 1970s, was to 
prevent the wholesale collapse of the Northern Irish economy, in the face of growing civil 
disturbances and an obsolete industrial infrastructure.212 Certainly, without immediate 
intervention the manufacturing economy of Northern Ireland faced a sudden demise. 
Between 1970 and 1975, for the 52 government-supported factories that opened, 39 of a 
similar size shut down.213 The Conservatives (at the time loath to recommend direct 
intervention in the economy) promoted a continuation of the policies of Stormont as a way 
of alleviating Northern Ireland’s problems. This government supported the continuation 
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and expansion of Stormont’s industrial development policy led by the Local Economic 
Development Unit, (LEDU) by creating of the Northern Ireland Finance Corporation 
(NIFC), which lent support to new industries starting up in Northern Ireland and created a 
major programme of retraining workers for these industries.214 By 1975 the number of 
training places available in Northern Ireland was ten times the amount per person found in 
the rest of the United Kingdom, but unemployment and closures remained high and as a 
result, the government increased the number employed by the state to compensate.215 
 
After its election in 1974, Labour pursued a fundamentally different policy to that 
of the Conservatives, preferring direct intervention and for the state to perform an active 
economic rôle. The development of economic policy concerning Northern Ireland by the 
1974 to 1979 Labour government overlaps the case study of the Harland and Wolff 
shipyard (which covers developments within the shipyard over a nine-year period between 
1966 to 1975) and therefore it is important at this stage to focus on two Labour party 
manifesto commitments made in 1974. First, in both the February and October manifestos 
of that year the party committed itself to nationalising the entire UK shipbuilding industry 
and, second, to a United Ireland by consensual, democratic and non-violent means. Both 
had wide implications for Harland and Wolff and influenced the judgement of politicians 
and civil servants working in Whitehall. However, with the lack of a functioning devolved 
government in Northern Ireland, governing the province was undertaken using executive 
orders from the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and as a result the government in 
London imposed policies on Northern Ireland without recourse to a democratically elected 
assembly. 
 
This introduction has linked this thesis with the literature on the rôle of government 
in creating an environment leading to economic decline. The very different nature of 
government (and governance) in Northern Ireland and Scotland during the twentieth 
century is part of this argument, both areas had extensively devolved government powers 
but only one, Northern Ireland, had (admittedly flawed) local democratic accountability 
and the other, Scotland had wide ranging powers but without any explicit process of local 
accountability. Both had local authority, but this thesis will demonstrate that whilst the 
Northern Irish parliament at Stormont Castle was intrinsically bound up with the workings 
of Harland and Wolff for political reasons based on demography and religious allegiance, 
the Scottish Office had very little involvement with the shipbuilding industry in Scotland, 
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as its focus was on developing newer, higher technology industries using Foreign Direct 
Investment. This thesis illustrates the importance of government bodies in both Scotland 
and Northern Ireland in the 1960s and 1970s and demonstrates that regional systems of 
government, whether devolved or otherwise, have distinct local institutions and interest 
groups. However, despite these differences, it must be emphasised that an interrelationship 
also existed between the local and national policy networks. 
 
It has also shown that discussions of the decline of the shipbuilding industry in the 
United Kingdom is bound up with the arguments concerning post war economic decline 
and the British government’s responses. Shipbuilding was only one of a experienced 
increased overseas competition and were unable to adapt to changing circumstances.  From 
the start of the Second World War, central government, (regardless of political affiliation) 
incrementally increased its influence of the national economy and introduced a series of 
measures designed to influence both the supply and demand sides of the economy. 
However, with the election of Howard Wilson’s Labour administration in 1964 the 
government promoted economic planning as a panacea to cure the nation’s ills. Two 
ministries were set up by Labour in 1964, the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) and 
the Ministry of Technology (Mintech) which were at the forefront of efforts to improve the 
fortunes of the British economy. Designed to coordinate the economy, the DEA replaced 
(in reality competed with) the Treasury in many areas that were it's traditional 
responsibility and produced a series of documents setting out economic goals, the National 
Plan being most prominent example.216 The Mintech initially did not have an all-
encompassing remit but it soon turned into a large economic ministry. Through subsuming 
responsibility for industrial strategy and reorganisation, military research, development and 
procurement, civilian research and by 1969 the economic planning responsibilities of the 
DEA, the Mintech became a ‘super-ministry’ with a wide ranging set of responsibilities 
and powers. For the purposes of this thesis, the rôle of Mintech in promoting and 
organising industrial restructuring and rationalisation is important, as it had direct bearing 
on the fate of the British shipbuilding industry and acted as the final decision maker for 
many of the decision made in the 1960s concerning the industry. 
 
Heavy industry in the United Kingdom was the subject of government intervention 
and review in the late 1960s. The 1964 manifesto committed the Labour party once in 
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government to instigate reviews of major industries to improve their commercial 
prospects.217 Two prominent examples were the Plowden Committee on Aviation and the 
Geddes Committee on Shipbuilding set up in Labour’s first year in office.218 Indeed, many 
bodies were set up to instigate change, the most prominent of which was the Industrial 
Reorganisation Committee, mandated to bring about productivity improvements and to 
merge smaller companies into larger, more efficient entities.219 As will be discussed in 
chapter two, the Geddes Committee took over a year to produce a report into shipbuilding 
and recommended the creation of the Shipbuilding Industry Board (SIB) to bring about the 
rationalisation and modernisation of the industry through mergers and government 
financed capital expenditure. In its report published in 1966, the committee proposed that 
individual shipyards merge into large regional groupings and that the government provide 
grants and loans for shipyards to pay for the modernisation of infrastructure. Despite 
mentioning developments in Japan or Sweden in the report, Geddes discounted any 
advantage these countries had in terms of better construction methods and preferred to 
focus instead on practices (such as cheap government loans for shipping), which Geddes 
considered unfair or biased towards local industry. Consequently, the SIB was not aiming 
to bring about a wholesale reconstruction and create modern yards analogous to those 
found in Japan, but rather to combine smaller shipyards into larger companies. In theory at 
least this was a simple process, but each and every decision to assist a shipyard during the 
five-year lifespan of the SIB was subject to intense negotiation and with the political 
ramifications of reduced naval expenditure and increased regional assistance, these 
negotiations involved a number of ministers of state as well. In effect, whilst the Mintech 
had the final say over the fate of individual shipyards, the Shipbuilding Industry Board was 
at the centre of the policy network created by the Labour government and developed by 
Geddes. 
 
This should have been a successful time for British shipbuilders. Bolstered by a 
boom in demand for crude oil tankers of over 250,000 tons capacity, shipyards in the 
United Kingdom received numerous orders after 1967 and received substantial grants and 
loans from the SIB to facilitate these orders. Despite this, a number of shipyards continued 
experiencing financial difficulties as industrial disputes, expensive supplies of steel and 
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energy and an unfavourable foreign exchange regime conspired to prevent many shipyards 
turning a profit. Even after the mandate of the SIB ended in 1971, the Heath government 
still had to intervene in a number of shipyards to prevent mass unemployment and in 
response to political pressure in the case of Northern Ireland.220 With the 1973 OPEC 
crude oil price rises and embargo in response to the Yom Kippur war between the Arab 
states and Israel, the bottom fell out of the market for large tankers and the corresponding 
fall in global trade depressed demand for conventional vessel types for the rest of the 
decade. Shipyards globally faced financial ruin, but in the United Kingdom shipyards were 
saddled with speculative contracts for tankers no longer in demand. Nationalised by the 
Callaghan government in 1977 as British Shipbuilders, shipbuilding in Britain never 
returned to its previous levels and the following decade led to the closure of so many 
companies that today, excluding a small of military work, shipbuilding in the United 
Kingdom is no longer an important industry.221 
 
This thesis demonstrates that intervention in the shipbuilding industry by the 
Wilson government and the Shipbuilding Industry Board rather than being a panacea was a 
cause of terminal decline. The hypothesis is a simple one, from being mandated to execute 
the provisions of the report of the Geddes committee, the Shipbuilding Industry Board 
actually created a policy network that resulted in a compromise based upon the conflicting 
desires of management and politicians rather than best practice and the prevailing 
orthodoxy found in shipyards across the world. With these negotiations lasting in some 
instances almost four years as managers sought exemptions from the provisions of Geddes 
that they believed did not apply to their particular case, the commercial imperative was lost 
as shipyards remained in uneconomic limbo oblivious to developments in competitor 
nations. However, the SIB and the Mintech were fully aware of developments overseas and 
an increasing sense of exasperation was felt as the anticipated modernisation failed to 
occur. From the first attempts to address the problems of shipbuilding in 1962 until the 
foundation of the SIB in 1967 to the final implementation of development schemes at large 
shipyards, a period of eight years elapsed. The following figures illustrate the failure of 
Geddes and the SIB in achieving their aims: Japanese shipbuilding had increased its output 
by 341% percent compared to the United Kingdom’s 20% over this period of 8 years.222 
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This thesis will unfold in the following way. Chapter two outlines the development 
of government policy and intervention in the shipbuilding industry from 1962, providing a 
contextual narrative of policy developments on how the recommendations of the Geddes 
committee came about and how government created the Shipbuilding Industry Board. 
Chapters three and four present a case study of the Scott Lithgow shipyard in Greenock, 
Scotland. The case study will not only describe the relationship between the shipyard, SIB 
and government but it will also illuminate the particular circumstances of the shipyard’s 
hinterland, a de-industrialising Scotland which was the focus of government regional 
development policies and an important electoral battleground for the Labour Party. 
Chapter five, six and seven discuss the redevelopment of the Harland and Wolff shipyard 
in Belfast during the 1960s, which was under the aegis not only of the Westminster 
government in Whitehall but the devolved Northern Irish government at Stormont Castle. 
Harland and Wolff was also at the centre of rising sectarian civil strife in Northern Ireland 
and with the shipyard being the state-let’s largest employer, the fear of mass disturbance 
and de facto civil war was very real in the imagination of civil servants and politicians in 
both London and Belfast. Chapter eight concludes the thesis by discussing the rôle of 
government in the decline of shipbuilding as an industry and demonstrating that the 















As the hypothesis stated in chapter one, it is suggested that the relationship between 
government and shipyards in the period 1964-1970 was a cause of, rather than, a reaction 
to, the decline of shipbuilding as an industry in the United Kingdom. Split into two 
interwoven components, the hypothesis presented the rôle of government intervention as 
an agency of an industry’s decline in this period. Firstly, it was contextualised within the 
many declinist arguments, which states that post-war institutional arrangements created the 
environment whereby factional concerns hindered industrial modernisation and 
consequently performance. Secondly, it placed emphasis on government responses 
constrained within policies based upon negotiated compromises between these opposing 
factions. This hypothesis is intrinsically linked to policy developments within government 
at the time that were a reflection not only of party political concerns, and also a wider set 
of relationships between government, industrialists and organised labour, with additional 
input from academia and civil service departments responsible for expenditure and 
commerce.  
 
This chapter will outline the development of the relationship between shipbuilding 
and government in the period 1960 - 1966 prior to the creation of the Shipbuilding Industry 
Board (SIB) and its involvement with the Scott Lithgow shipyard, Greenock, (Scotland) 
and the Harland and Wolff shipyard in Belfast, (Northern Ireland). Part one will discuss 
the increasing efforts of the Macmillan and Douglas-Home Conservative administrations at 
inquiry and intervention in the industry, from a number of inquiries under the aegis of the 
British Productivity Council (BPC) and National Economic Development Office (NEDO) 
to the direct intervention of a credit financing scheme. Part two will discuss the 
development of a shipbuilding policy under the auspices of the newly elected Wilson 
government of 1964 and will show the motivations behind not only the setting up of the 
Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee (Geddes Committee) under the chairmanship of Reay 
Geddes, but also the research methodology of the committee and its relationship with 
politicians and civil servants in Whitehall. Part three will outline and discuss the 
conclusions, provisions and recommendations of the Geddes Committee in the context not 
only of government opinions, but the views of the shipyard management, trade journals 
and the wider print media. Part four will weave the separate strands of the chapter together 





The Conservatives and shipbuilding: 1960- 1964  
  
 
The development of state planning in the economy was not an innovation 
attributable solely to the election of a Labour government in 1964, but had undergone a 
piecemeal evolution under the guidance of the preceding Conservative government from 
the creation of the British Productivity Council in 1957 onwards.223 This is not to state, 
however, that the government put a coherent set of prescriptive policies in place. Rather, 
this section will demonstrate that, whilst a series of reports commissioned by government 
and trade associations for the shipbuilding industry argued that the industry was hindered 
by outmoded equipment and practices, the end result was that the government preferred to 
make cheap finance available, creating a short-term competitive gain for the industry at the 
cost of its long-term development and future. 
 
During the 20th century, ministerial responsibility for shipbuilding had traditionally 
been with the Admiralty and in general government policy towards shipbuilding focussed 
upon military rather than commercial needs.224 While the Royal Navy was still a major 
customer of shipyards in the United Kingdom this was not an issue. Nevertheless, with a 
surplus of vessels left over from the Second World War and with a requirement for fewer 
modern vessels, the military focus of shipbuilding in the United Kingdom placed most 
shipyards at a disadvantage when compared to overseas yards building simple merchant 
vessels for export.  In 1959, in an attempt to focus more on civilian matters and merchant 
shipbuilding, the industry came under the patronage of the Ministry of Transport and the 
Shipbuilding Advisory Committee (SAC).225 However, the Ministry of Transport saw 
shipbuilding within the context of serving the strategic transportation needs of the United 
Kingdom, rather than an export industry and was therefore unaware of many of the 
problems the industry was facing.226 Indeed, as was demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
the perennial problem for any government that attempted to address and rectify the failings 
of the industry were the relationships between the management of shipyards, unions and 
the government. Whilst competition from Japan was gaining the attention of the 
government and shipbuilding industry, leading to concern in some (but far from all) 
corners, the management of British shipyards did not see overseas competition as a serious 
                                                
223 O’Hara, G. From Dreams to Disillusionment: Economic and Social Planning in 1960s Britain 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007). 
224 Lorenz, E.H. Economic Decline in Britain, p. 28. 
225 The Shipbuilding Advisory Committee was founded in 1946 to promote the export of British built vessels. 




threat. Rather, they believed that they were developing shipyards to an improved standard 
and that any competition was the result of an unfair advantage on the part of the 
Japanese.227  
 
Despite this failure of the management in British shipyards to comprehend the new 
reality of shipbuilding, from 1960 onwards the Shipbuilding Advisory Committee slowly 
started the process of government inquiry, but it was difficult for the SAC to persuade the 
Ministry of Transport that such a process was necessary and the ministry insisted upon the 
participation of the shipyards. In most cases, this was not forthcoming; many shipyards 
saw commercial matters as no one else’s business but their own.228 However, after 
attempting to introduce cooperation between shipbuilders and in response to their reticence 
to address their own problems, in February 1960 the chairman of the SAC, Sir Graham 
Cunningham, resigned in disgust.229 As a result of this event the government initiated a 
series of reviews into specific aspects of shipbuilding with the hope that any 
recommendations would be taken onboard by the shipyards to improve the prospects of the 
industry.230 Whilst the eventual reports did not represent a comprehensive view of the 
industry in the same way as the Geddes Report in 1966 or the Booz Allen and Hamilton 
report of 1972, each provided a comprehensive view of a particular aspect of the industry 
in 1960 - 61 and were in some respects more perceptive in addressing the problems of the 
industry than the later reviews. 
 
The first report released in December 1960, Research and Development 
Requirements of the Shipbuilding Industries, was written by the Department of Scientific 
and Industrial Research. It addressed the underlying level of technical competence in the 
industry.231  The report’s conclusions were wide ranging and addressed many of the causes 
of technical backwardness in the industry, namely that the UK industry had no technical or 
economic advantage over competitor nations and had very little organised research into 
shipbuilding methods and technology.  As a consequence, the report recommended that 
government and industry should work hard to improve the overall level of technology 
within the industry, but in particular with regards to improving production techniques as a 
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way of reducing costs and improving productivity. A report on conditions in Swedish 
shipyards reinforced this by reporting a higher level of technology when compared to the 
United Kingdom, with the use of prefabrication and standardisation, a 45-hour working 
week and no government subsidies.232 Another report into orders placed overseas for new 
vessels by British ship-owners stated that better (i.e. cheaper) prices, guaranteed delivery 
dates and credit facilities made ordering from foreign shipyards attractive and as a result, 
these yards were taking an ever increasing proportion of work that was traditionally 
undertaken in British shipyards. The SAC decided to act by collating all the reports into a 
larger document released in April 1961 in an attempt to bring shipbuilders together to 
address the industry’s problems.233 Consequently, the main trade associations involved in 
shipbuilding created the Joint Industry Committee to investigate further the issues 
presented by the government reports and to address the issue of poor productivity within 
the industry.234  
 
The government and the Joint Industry Committee issued a further, and final report 
towards the tail end of 1961, which presented a full and detailed audit of the industry, 
rather than merely reiterating the previous government reports. The picture, presented in 
comparison with shipyards in Europe was poor, with criticism of the outdated equipment 
and working practices found in the shipyards, particularly in terms of cutting, welding and 
fabrication, but also in the areas of planning, budgeting and design.235 Shipyards in 
Western Europe, however, not only had modern equipment and methodologies that created 
a higher level of productivity than found in the UK, but also engaged in detailed and 
advanced planning, managing every aspect of a vessel’s construction to time and on 
budget. Moreover, whereas shipyards in the United Kingdom relied on slipways to launch 
a ship into the water, an increasing number of European yards floated vessels out of a dry 
dock, a less time consuming and safer process.236 The report’s recommendations were 
quite simple; British shipyards needed to adopt not only modern construction technology 
and equipment, but also to create an environment whereby through the use of better 
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planning and management the shipyards could undertake tasks with less effort and fewer 
impediments than was currently done in 1960.237 
 
Despite the reports from civil servants and the umbrella bodies for the shipbuilding 
industry mentioned above, the government rejected a number of proposed intervention 
schemes, namely fixed government orders and subsidising a ‘scrap and build’ scheme to 
replace existing vessels.238 By 1963, however, with numerous media reports stating that 
unless urgent intervention was taken shipbuilding in the United Kingdom would no longer 
exist by the end of the decade, the government took action.239 The response by government 
was to provide cheap credit for the shipbuilding industry; the Minister for Transport 
announced the Shipbuilding Credit Scheme in May 1963.240 The scheme was initially to 
run for a year and provide £30 million for ten-year loans to ship-owners to cover eighty 
percent of the cost of a newly built vessel, but due to the ever-desperate condition of the 
industry the government actually provided a total of £75 million through this scheme, 
which contributed to the construction of 67 vessels representing 892,000 gross tonnes.241  
 
How, therefore, can the policy of the Conservative government towards 
shipbuilding in be summarised? In two distinct ways, firstly by stating that prior to 1960 
ample orders and an adequate performance fuelled the complacency of government and 
shipbuilders and secondly, by reiterating that even after government and industry 
mandated bodies had conclusively demonstrated that the industry was not only losing 
orders in 1959 - 61 because of overseas competition, the sector was unable to regain lost 
ground because of the entrenched disadvantages of obsolete equipment and outmoded 
working practices in British shipyards. With no prospect of change mandated by either the 
shipbuilding industry or government, the future prospects of shipbuilding in the United 
Kingdom were bleak. In the first instance, British shipbuilding, whilst in a dominant 
position globally from the early 19th century was in an even stronger position after the end 
of the Second World War in 1945, as competing industries in Germany, Japan, France and 
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Italy were severely damaged and the newly developed merchant shipyards of the United 
States were hindered by an overvalued dollar. Consequently, during the period 1945 to 
1955, whilst shipyards faced a severe drop in the number of warship contracts (based on a 
surplus of vessels left over from the war) and lost orders for small vessels because of a glut 
of ‘Liberty Ship’ merchant vessels on the market, the demand for raw materials in growing 
economies, particularly crude oil and iron ore gave an impetus to British merchant 
shipyards. However during this period of steady output in the shipbuilding industry, 
incentives for shipyards to improve working methods, renew equipment and change 
working practices was rarely present in the minds of shipyard managers or workers on the 
shop-floor. Indeed, the potential for disruption to a model that was known to work during a 
period with steady growth acted as a disincentive to shipyards when it came to improving 
productivity and production, it was only when increased overseas competition affected the 
performance of shipyards in the United Kingdom, that questions were raised about the 
performance of the industry.242 However, as the following tables demonstrate, British 
shipbuilding had faced a slow decline over the course of the 1950s, some of which can be 
explained by the re-emergence of traditional competitors after end of the Second World 
War: 
                                                




Table 2.1: The difference in growth rates between the UK and World 
shipbuilding output in gross tons, 1947 to 1963 
 
Year World UK Difference in % Growth Rates UK as % of the world 
1947 100 100 0% 57 
1948 110 100 -10 51 
1949 148 108 -30 41 
1950 167 108 -19 38 
1951 171 108 -5 37 
1952 210 108 -38 30 
1953 243 108 -33 26 
1954 252 117 -1 27 
1955 252 117 0 28 
1956 319 108 -75 21 
1957 405 117 -77 17 
1958 443 117 -38 15 
1959 414 108 20 16 
1960 400 108 14 16 
1961 376 108 24 15 
1962 395 92 -36 13 
Source: Lloyds Register of Shipping and Johnman & Murphy, British Shipbuilding, p. 101. 
Table 2.2: Percentage share of world export market for shipping, 1948 
– 1960 
 
  UK Japan West Germany Sweden France Netherlands 
Others (incl. 
USA & USSR) 
1948-
1950 35% 2% 0% 18% 0% 6% 38% 
1951-
1955 22% 11% 15% 13% 2% 9% 29% 
1956-
1960 7% 32% 21% 12% 6% 6% 17% 
 Source: Johnman & Murphy, British Shipbuilding, p. 103. 
 
To conclude, the response of the government between 1959 and 1961, a period of 
concern for shipbuilding, speaks volumes about attitudes towards the industry in this 
period. First, shipbuilding was not under the supervision of a ministry dealing with either 
production or exports until 1964 and the election of the Wilson Labour government. Prior 
to this, shipbuilding had traditionally been under the remit of the Admiralty, which saw 
shipbuilding capacity in the United Kingdom as serving a mainly military purpose. In 
1959, responsibility for shipbuilding moved to the Ministry of Transport and whilst this 
was a ministry with a primary (if not exclusively) civilian purpose, it had only a minor 




and government departments in the early 1960s, the government chose to implement a 
scheme of cheap credit for the sale of vessels rather than providing similar aid or finance 
for shipyards to improve their facilities. Whilst the cheap credit for the consumers of 
merchant vessels did create a short lived boom in shipbuilding output, what it did not 
address were the underlying causes of the relative decline of British shipbuilding. Indeed, 
to all extents and purposes the Shipbuilding Credit Scheme prolonged the period of time 
the industry continued with outmoded and uncompetitive equipment and techniques. As 
Lorenz states, the intervention of the British government in the shipbuilding industry was, 
‘comparatively tardy’, certainly when compared to the rôle of the state in industries in 
Europe and Japan.243 
 
                                                




The election of a Labour government and shipbuilding, 1964 - 1966 
 
 
The election of a Labour government in 1964 ushered in a new age of state 
intervention in the economy. From a promise to, ‘…energise and modernise our industries 
- including their methods of promotion and training - to achieve the sustained economic 
expansion we need’ the reality was one in which the first two years of the government 
were taken up by a series of high profile inquiries into large industries.244 This section will 
focus on the development of the Shipbuilding Industry Committee (SIC) and the 
subsequent relationship between this body and government departments, ministries and 
agencies as the government developed the Shipbuilding Industry Board. Although this 
precludes a detailed study of the machinations of the committee as it moved from research 
to publishing its report, it will illuminate the rôle of government in the decision making 
process for shipbuilding. Specifically, this section will demonstrate that whilst a cognitive 
awareness of the industry’s problems and developments overseas existed within Whitehall 
and Westminster, a combination of official indifference and sectional interests influenced 
the SIC to recommend a set of proposals at odds with the prevailing trends of the industry 
worldwide. However, only three ministries presented detailed evidence, the Ministry of 
Labour, the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Defence, while the Department of 
Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Technology were uncertain as to what contribution 
they could make to the inquiry. 
 
After being the responsibility of the Ministry of Transport for the previous five 
years, responsibility for shipbuilding moved to the Board of Trade in 1964 under the 
guidance of Roy Mason, the recently installed Minister of State for shipping and 
shipbuilding. Mason was involved with the industry at a high level and early in 1965 
visited modern shipyards in Japan. The subsequent report, Japanese Shipyards, released in 
the middle of 1965 was an important document in providing the impetus to the government 
in creating a board of inquiry into shipbuilding.245 However, it also demonstrates that the 
minister responsible for shipbuilding was aware of developments overseas. This document 
allows for the extrapolation of two points; First, that the minister and therefore anyone who 
read the subsequent report was fully aware of the new fabrication techniques employed in 
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Japan and secondly, that many Japanese shipyards were already operating at a higher level 
of productivity than their British equivalents, as the following table demonstrates.246  
 
Table 2.3: Comparative productivity of selected Japanese supertanker 
constructing shipyards compared to Harland and Wolff and Scott 
Lithgow in the United Kingdom, 1964 
 
Yard Employees Dwt Launched No of Ships  dwt ton per employee 
Aioi 4240 770,000 11 182 
Sasebo 2100 290,000 6 138 
Nagasaki 5370 770,000 12 143 
Tsurumi 2500 274,000 11 110 
Kobe 4160 201,000 5 48 
Harland & 
Wolff 11681 123,000 4 11 
Scott Lithgow* 
17700 95000 6 5.4 
Source: Board of Trade. Japanese Shipyards: A report on the visit of the Minister of State 
(Shipping) in January 1965, p. 24 and Lloyds List (1964). *This is the combined output of 
the separate Scotts and Lithgows shipyards, prior to merger. 
 
However, despite a series of high profile reports over the space of half a decade and with a 
dedicated minister for the industry, the relationship between the Shipbuilding Inquiry 
Committee and the government was such that once the report was released, the SIC put 
forward a set of proposals at odds with the prevailing shipbuilding orthodoxy found in 
Japan and Europe. 
 
On the 20th November 1964 a committee of inquiry into the shipbuilding industry 
was announced.247 The terms of reference for the committee were simple; it had to 
establish the adverse factors affecting the performance of the industry and then prescribe a 
series of measures to remedy these problems. However, the proposed composition of the 
committee was notable for the expressed desire not to have any individual representing, or 
having worked within, the shipbuilding sector or indeed trade union officials, as it was felt 
that this would inhibit shipyard owners and management from releasing confidential 
information.248 The proposed membership, as outlined with the terms of reference for the 
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committee, was a retired industrialist as chairman who could give 75% of his time to the 
committee, a vice chairman with experience of industrial engineering, an economist, an 
accountant, a ship-owner and a scientist, all of whom would give around 85 days service to 
the committee over the course of 1965.249 In reality, as announced to Parliament on the 2nd 
of February 1965, the chairman was a serving industrialist and chairman of the Dunlop tyre 
company, Reay Geddes, and the remaining members comprised one accountant, two 
managing directors of medium sized industrial firms, two academics and a trade unionist, 
Charles Smith, the General Secretary of the Post Office Engineering Union.250 
Consequently the committee had no members who had previously worked within the 
shipbuilding industry and its membership did not exactly meet the criteria set by the terms 
of reference. Indeed, the board member who was employed as a trade union official was 
not a representative of a shipbuilding trade union, and having a union member as part of 
the committee certainly went against its terms of reference. 
 
After its official foundation early in spring 1965, the Shipbuilding Inquiry 
Committee sent letters to all government departments asking whether they wished to give 
evidence during the course of the inquiry.251 However, government departments responded 
in many ways. The Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) and the Ministry of 
Technology had a distant relationship with the committee, despite the government 
heralding the rôle of these bodies in the management of the economy. Indeed, despite 
having a remit to deal with all the strategic aspects of economic planning within the UK, 
the DEA declined to give evidence to the committee, because in its view, ‘We are not in a 
position to offer useful guidance to this Committee which is engaged on a factual inquiry 
into changes needed to make the Shipbuilding Industry more competitive.’252 Nevertheless, 
this was not the end of the relationship. Geddes felt strongly that shipbuilding was an 
important industry in terms of generating foreign exchange and therefore should be 
included in the national plan.253 The letters were discussed much within the DEA, many 
were of the opinion that as the development of the national plan was by this stage in its 
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final phase it would be difficult to include further references concerning shipbuilding.254 
Intriguingly, there was an undercurrent of opinion within the DEA that shipbuilding as an 
industry was in dire straights. Certainly in July 1965, the Director General of Economic 
Planning at the DEA, J.A. Jukes, stated that he considered the position of shipbuilding in 
the United Kingdom, ‘depressing’, in comparison to the growth of competitor industries in 
Japan and Germany.255 In the end, the DEA remained with its original wording concerning 
shipbuilding as part of the chapter on engineering and allied industries. A larger section 
was not developed and the request for greater participation of the DEA by Geddes was 
seen as a minor irritant to the overall business of the department, with Jukes stating in a 
memo that, ‘It would, however, be quite wrong to give the impression to Mr. Reay Geddes 
that we could add anything that would create much impact’.256 
 
The Ministry of Technology (Mintech) did not share the Department of Economic 
Affair’s reluctance towards its involvement with the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee and 
gave extensive evidence to the committee in December 1965. However, this was not the all 
encompassing Ministry of Technology of the late 1960s under Tony Benn, but rather the 
smaller ‘Frank Cousins’ incarnation that focussed on industrial innovation. The evidence 
of the Ministry of Technology, presented in document and oral form on 8th December 
1965, focussed on the industry’s competency and discussed the scale and pace of 
modernisation.257 Commencing with a description of the Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research (DSIR) reports from the early 1960s, Mintech stated that its interests in 
shipbuilding rested with the research and development function entrusted to it by the 
Science and Technology Act (1965). This was through national bodies such as the National 
Physical Laboratory’s Ship Division and British Ship Research Association (BSRA), 
which spent £2.9 million in grants supporting R&D in shipbuilding, although this was 
mostly on ship technology rather than shipbuilding methodologies. The ministry presented 
a similar narrative to that of the DSIR and shipbuilding industry reports of the 1960s 
discussing the lack of rational construction methods, modern equipment and trained staff 
prevalent in British shipyards during this period. It is with the last point, however, that 
Mintech made a sharp distinction between practices in the United Kingdom and shipyards 
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in other countries. Indeed, the tradition in UK shipyards was for the management to be 
sourced from the shop-floor, with only those in specific trades, such as engineering or 
accountancy receiving formal higher education, whilst in continental European and 
Japanese shipyards the management were usually educated to degree standard in the 
subject of shipbuilding or at the very least industrial management. Combined with a lack of 
qualified engineers and scientifically trained staff members, Mintech considered the 
education level within UK shipyards stifled creativity and restricted the development of the 
industry. 258 
 
There was, however, a dissenting view from the Ministry of Technology in the 
form of a supplementary memorandum from Miss P.K. Piercy, (Under Secretary in the 
Economic and Statistics Division) and E. Tyrrell, (Senior Principal Scientific Officer, 
Research and Developments Contracts Branch), which Mintech emphasised did not 
represent its official view.259 In their submission, the two officials stated that the main 
problem with shipbuilding in the United Kingdom was the large number of small 
shipyards. Whilst this offered the production flexibility to meet the demands of ship-
owners, it was inflexible when predicting the future direction of the market for new 
vessels. Both stated that British shipyards were good at building what the customer wanted 
now rather than predicting what might be needed in ten or twenty years time.260 
Furthermore, the large numbers of small shipyards in the UK were unable to reap the 
benefits of modernisation, as even when re-equipped with modern plant they were too 
small to see improved economies of scale. Therefore, in the view of Piercy and Tyrrell, the 
entire industry in the United Kingdom had to undergo some form of all encompassing 
rationalisation, not only creating larger shipyards able to compete effectively with those in 
Sweden and Japan but also developing a series of coordinated national bodies to pursue 
ship design, market research and purchasing on a larger scale, to prevent the replication of 
intensive and time consuming ship designs in response to a tender by shipyards.261 
Effectively, this memo mirrors many of the conclusions of the eventual Geddes Report. 
 
In addition to the DEA and Mintech, the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee had an 
intense relationship with the Ministry of Labour concerning working conditions in the 
British shipyards and how improved working practices could increase the overall 
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competitiveness of the industry. After receiving a statement of interest in response to the 
letter sent requesting information, the SIC wrote to the Ministry of Labour requesting 
information concerning labour conditions in British shipyards, specifically, the labour 
structure, earnings and wage rates, fringe benefits, negotiating procedures and working 
conditions.262 This heralded the start of a productive relationship between the SIC and the 
Ministry of Labour, with the latter engaging in an in-house process of information 
gathering and dissemination.263 Both the committee and the Ministry of Labour had mutual 
concerns over the fractious relationships between labour and management found in 
shipyards and the effect this had on productivity and output. Certainly, before the creation 
of the SIC, the Ministry of Labour had already set up a working party in 1961 to look into 
labour practices within the shipbuilding industry, to break what the ministry described as 
the ‘vicious circle’ affecting labour relations in the industry.264 Therefore, whilst the cost 
of labour was only about 20% of expenditure in a shipbuilding company, the potential for 
improvements in output from improved working practices leading to higher productivity 
were such that the SIC and the Ministry of Labour took the subject very seriously. As a 
result, the Ministry of Labour presented both oral and written evidence to the committee on 
17th December 1965.265 
 
Whilst the discussions with the Ministry of Labour focussed about industrial 
relations and the conditions of the workforce, the evidence of the Board of Trade, (which 
was the ministry that the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee operated under) focussed firstly 
on reducing the industry’s capacity to reflect changing market conditions and secondly on 
shipbuilding as an export industry. In the first instance, it was the view of both the 
Shipbuilding Conference and the Shipbuilding Advisory Committee that a number of 
shipyards were in existence that, in the face of increasing productivity and foreign 
competition, would end up being closed. As a consequence of this position, the Board of 
Trade was considering a scheme whereby the state financed a controlled run down of the 
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industry.266 The main argument was whether such a scheme was compatible with 
legislation that gave tax relief to an industry for the closure of redundant plant leading to 
optimal operating conditions, as the proposed redundancy scheme would significantly 
reduce the size, scope and output of the industry.267 Secondary to this argument was the 
role of state funding to cover costs and provide compensation to those who would have to 
either lose their businesses or lose their employment, although this was a subject given far 
less attention than that of the tax rebates. Nevertheless, this was a minor debate compared 
to the role of shipbuilding as an exporting industry.  
 
The Board of Trade was concerned with the inability of the shipbuilding industry 
not only to increase tonnage output in line with global trends since 1955, but also by the  
large number of vessels imported by shipping companies that traditionally purchased 
vessels within the UK.268 Certainly shipbuilding in the United Kingdom had undergone an 
absolute as opposed to a relative decline when compared to competitor nations. In 1963 the 
output of British shipyards was only 70% of that produced in 1953, despite an increase in 
global production of 67%.269 With the percentage of British registered vessel sourced from 
overseas increasing from a negligible amount in 1953 to around 178% of those exported 
from UK shipyards by 1963, concerns increased as to how to halt this decline. However, 
the question asked by the Board of Trade was whether the production of ships was the best 
use of resources; could another industry with a better export record use the resources to 
improve the balance of payments?270 The argument presented was simple; whilst exporting 
ships contributed to the balance of payments, with much lower levels of productivity 
compared to other industries, shipbuilding was a poor way of adding value to a completed 
product. Effectively, the Board of Trade’s evidence stated that even during a period of high 
demand in the 1950s, shipbuilding grew at a slower rate than industry in general and the 
growth in profits and output in the early 1960s was influenced by the Shipbuilding Credit 
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Scheme, rather than structural improvements.271 When it came to the subject of whether 
resources were best employed in shipbuilding or another industry, the Board of Trade’s 
evidence stated that whilst a rundown of the industry would inevitably lead to higher 
unemployment in the areas where most shipbuilding companies were based, the fact that 
the majority of shipyard workers were trained, skilled labourers suggested that eventually 
they would find employment in other industries.272 Therefore, the evidence of the Board of 
Trade, rather than focussing upon ways to increase the industry’s output, outlined concerns 
about whether or not the industry should survive in its current form and if not, how would 
the government plan the process of reducing spare capacity and reallocating resources. 
 
As previously stated, government responsibility for the industry traditionally rested 
with the Admiralty. However, since 1959 responsibility had passed between Whitehall 
departments, culminating with the Ministry of Technology in 1966.  Shipbuilding had 
become a predominately commercial activity since the end of the Second World War and, 
with a diminishing imperial presence and technical changes in the very nature of naval 
warfare, from the late 1950s the Royal Navy underwent radical changes in its composition 
and size. In terms of the size of the Royal Navy, a surplus of vessels constructed during  
the second world war provided the backbone of the fleet up until the mid 1960s, with many 
cruisers and aircraft carriers serving up until the 1980s with modern weapon systems.  
Rendered obsolete by the early 1960s because of guided missile technology and nuclear 
powered submarines, the Royal Navy replaced the majority of its frigates and destroyers 
with smaller vessels incorporating new technologies.273 These changes had a profound 
effect on the relationship between shipbuilders and the Royal Navy; whilst there was 
always a demand for a number of general fighting vessels, the uncertainty over new orders 
for replacement aircraft carriers, landing ships and cruisers after the election of the Wilson 
government combined with the increasingly high technology used in frigates and 
destroyers, limited the number of shipyards able to tender for Royal Navy orders. The 
evidence from the Navy Department at the Ministry of Defence to the Shipbuilding Inquiry 
Committee reflected these trends and as such was not only realistic about the prospects of 
shipbuilding in the United Kingdom, but also provided comprehensive evidence to the 
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committee concerning all its requirements and desires. In comparison to the submissions 
from other government ministries, this evidence is unique in its scope. 
 
The Navy Department of the Ministry of Defence submitted written evidence to the 
committee on the 26th April 1965 in the form of an internal Whitehall memo (concerns 
over confidentiality within the ministry made the submission of a formal document 
extremely time consuming and difficult).274 The evidence stated directly that as the very 
nature of modern warship construction was more complicated than even ten years 
previously and as the Royal Navy required fewer but more advanced vessels, it was 
important to reduce the number of shipyards designated as warship builders from thirteen 
to around three, maybe four, shipyards.275 Because of these developments the Navy 
Department stated that shipyards involved in the construction of warships had to have 
higher standards than merchant yards, as even though in tonnage terms the number of 
vessels was very small, the complexity was such that a single frigate would require as 
many man hours to build as a large oil tanker and those man hours would be for complex 
engineering as opposed to assembly tasks. Consequently, it was in the Navy’s interests to 
have a small number of highly specialist shipyards with higher standards of technology, 
management and construction techniques designated as warship building shipyards rather 
than a system of competitive tendering to a larger number of generalised shipyards for the 
cheapest possible price.276 With the value of naval orders put at £275 million since 1955 
and with a further £45 million from overseas navies, the Navy Department made a balance 
of payments case as well, promoting specialist naval yards as export earners. However, 
despite advocating a small number of specialist naval shipyards, in an oral submission to 
the SIC on the 3rd June 1965 the Naval Department stated that the Royal Navy wanted to 
keep the same number of Royal Dockyards, which were advanced ship repair centres set 
up as de-facto shipbuilders in time of war. This was a contradictory stance; developing a 
small number of specialist shipyards was an economical use of resources, but the retention 
of four specialist navy run shipyards of a high technological standard serving a very small 
client base, was not.277 
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The majority of evidence given by government departments to the SIC was from 
the ministries mentioned above, but additional evidence was also received from the 
Treasury in conjunction with the Board of Trade. This evidence is significant; the Treasury 
in this period was intensely concerned with the balance of payments and promoted 
increased exports as a source of foreign currency.278 The Treasury did not contribute much 
to the inquiry and was therefore somewhat conspicuous by its absence, but in its one 
contribution the Treasury did presented data relating to the different state guaranteed 
export loan systems for newly built vessels in competitor nations, in particular the interest 
rates and duration of funding.279 However, this was a pyrrhic exercise, as nearly all the 
countries provided guaranteed export loans of 8 to 10 years duration (barring exceptional 
cases involving national interests) and even though some nations had lower bank rates than 
the UK, the guaranteed export rates were very close at an average of 6.1 percent: 
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Bank Rate % Medium Term % up to five Years 
Long Term % over 5 
years 
UK 6.0 5.5 5.5 
Japan 5.8 5.4 6.5 
France 3.5 4.8 5.6 
Germany 4.0 7.3 6.3 
Italy 3.5 5.9 5.9 
Netherlands 4.5 7.0 6.5 
Denmark 6.5 7.5 7.5 
Norway 3.5 6.5 6.5 
Sweden 5.5 6.8 6.8 
Spain 4.6 4.5 4.5 
Mean Average 4.7 6.1 6.2 
Source: TNA BT 186/26 SIC/Evidance/78 'Supplementary Evidence by the BoT and the Treasury', Annex, 
dated 9th February 1966 
 
Therefore, the Treasury concluded that the UK state guaranteed credit facilities were 
competitive in comparison with competitor nations and that there was very little scope for 
improvement.280 This was the extent of the dedicated evidence from the Treasury. Its 
contribution was tied up with that of the Board of Trade and whilst increasing exports was 
a Treasury theme in this period, when it came to SIC this view was bound up with the 
evidence of other ministries. 
 
Almost as narrow in its extent was the evidence from the Scottish Office, which 
despite the concentration of shipyards in Scotland claimed that it only had a limited rôle to 
play in the industry. It stated that it had no direct authority in the affairs of shipbuilding; it 
was interested in the continued success and development of the industry and could develop 
strategies for the improvement of essential infrastructure such as roads, housing, education 
and social provision.281 Effectively, the Scottish Office focussed upon improving the 
support for shipbuilding in Scotland and not on the particular problems of shipbuilding as 
an industry. However, it must be noted that economic functions were not transferred from 
Whitehall to the Scottish Office until 1975 and therefore it did not have the industrial 
problems of shipbuilding within its remit. Additional evidence was given by the Church of 
Scotland Home Board, which focussed upon the socially corrosive effect of working 
                                                
280 Source: TNA BT 186/26 SIC/Evidance/78 'Supplementary Evidence by the BoT and the Treasury', 
Annex, dated 9th February 1966, p. 3.  
281 TNA BT 186/25 SIC/Evidence/64 ‘Some general reflections on the industry, its image and its 




conditions in the shipyards as well as the lack of adequate management and skills 
development in the workforce.282  
 
One interesting facet of the evidence presented to the SIC was that few individual 
shipyards submitted documents to the committee, certainly neither Harland & Wolff, 
Scotts or Lithgows submitted any.283 Instead, a body, the Shipbuilding Conference, 
represented the shipbuilding industry to the committee and gave evidence concerning the 
overall technical and commercial nature of shipbuilding.284 The information presented by 
the Conference reinforced much of the evidence given by government ministries, that 
British shipbuilders were beset by problems concerning productivity, labour and raw 
material costs, to name but a few. Additionally, the conference discussed the future of 
large vessel construction, namely that of crude oil tankers over 150,000 tons deadweight, 
but only 5 shipyards responded to the Conference’s inquiry and none believed that a vessel 
over 150,000 tons would be built within the next decade. Barring the John Brown shipyard 
at Clydebank, none of the shipyards could see the benefit of constructing a building dock, 
which most had considered, but had discounted because in their view the benefits were 
outweighed by the construction costs.285 Indeed, John Brown’s gave additional evidence 
separately to the SIC that proposed a brand new shipyard on the Clyde on Newshot Island, 
which would be created by straightening the river into a single larger seaway and building 
a causeway upon which a shipyard capable of building three vessels of over 500,000 tons 
simultaneously would be built. However, Brown’s understood that the eventual fate of the 
shipyard would rest upon the outcome and recommendations of the committee.286 
 
The Shipbuilding Conference evidence also cast doubt upon the recommendations 
and stipulations of the Ministry of Defence, particularly the plan to reduce the number of 
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warship yards from twelve to three. Data presented by the conference on the size of the 
order book in British shipyards demonstrated conclusively that the industry relied upon 





Table 2.5: The value of orders in UK shipyards in March 1965 (£ 
millions) 
 
Type of Vessel Non Warship Group £ millions Warship Group £ millions 
Industry total £ 
millions 
Merchant 143 154 297 
Government 
auxiliary 2 40 42 
Warships for the 
Royal Navy 1 147 148 
Warships for export 
4 15 19 
Total 150 356 506 
Source:  TNA BT 186/20, SIC/Evidence/7, 'Value of ships on order and under construction in UK Yards, 
March 1965' 31st March 1965 
 
Indeed, the warship group was responsible for (in monetary terms at least) over 70 percent 
of the orders in UK shipyards, of which roughly 57 percent were vessels ordered for the 
Royal Navy, overseas navies and auxiliary vessels. Overall, military and government 
construction accounted for 41 percent of the outstanding orders in UK shipyards in 1965. 
Consequently, the concentration of military work into three designated shipyards 
potentially removed a vital source of income from the remaining nine yards and as a result, 
the shipyards would have to develop products for merchant customers which they had little 
experience of building.  
 
To summarise the evidence presented to the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee by the 
government departments was varied in detail and content, but did it influence its eventual 
decision? Even before the government instituted the Geddes committee, a variety of 
reports provided a context upon which the board could base its decisions, not least the 
report of the visit by Roy Mason to Japan that outlined in detail why that country was 
achieving success as a major shipbuilder. However, this is not to state that government 
ministries influenced the board in a coherent fashion; even with the Wilson Labour 
government encouraging inter-departmental coordination, civil servants and politicians 
gave a wide range of divergent and conflicting views to the board.  Two factors were 
important in influencing the provisions of the Geddes Report, both of which were at the 
heart of the problems experienced by shipbuilders in the late 1960s. First, the Royal Navy 
had provided shipbuilders with a steady number of orders for many years, in effect giving 
shipyards regular work that evened out the peaks and troughs of the global market for 
shipping. Therefore, when the Navy Department requested that military shipbuilding be 




required) it was cutting off the hand that regularly fed the order books of British 
shipbuilders. Second, the relationship between management and labour within shipbuilding 
companies, (being of a highly fractious nature) was brought to the attention of the 
committee by the Ministry of Labour and much of the eventual report focussed on 
reducing the friction between these two groups. Both issues were a distraction for the 
committee and even with the context of previous government and industry reports (and a 
surplus of available evidence concerning technical developments in other nations) the 
committee went onto to make recommendations that did not reflect the prevailing 






The Geddes Report 
 
 
In the opening statement of the Geddes Report, the members of the Shipbuilding 
Industry Committee admitted that (despite an in-depth analysis of data, evidence and 
statistics during the lifetime of the body) ‘much of our work has been done informally by 
discussions with groups and individuals’.287 Continuing into the preamble, the members 
adopted a philosophical tone; questioning the very nature of the industry and asking 
whether there was any genuine reason that the United Kingdom should continue to have a 
large shipbuilding industry. This was discussed from the view of two camps, those who 
saw shipbuilding as an important part of British economic power (the demise of which 
would emasculate the nation state) and those who saw any ocean going vessel as an 
uncomplicated piece of machinery on a par with an agricultural tractor and therefore fit 
only for construction in the economies with the cheapest possible labour.288 The committee 
took neither view at face value and pronounced that regardless of any reasons for the 
continued existence of an entire industry, if shipbuilding was competitive, profitable and 
did not end up a drain on national resources, then its continued existence was perfectly 
justifiable. If this ceased to be the case, however, then ‘it might well be better to let the 
industry decline’.289 Nevertheless, the panel saw the shipbuilding industry in the United 
Kingdom as a test case because the construction of merchant ships (or vessels for the 
Royal Navy) involved a wide range of industries, from steel for the construction of hull to 
precision engineering equipment. Sold and exported on an open unprotected world market 
for vessels, vessels completed in UK shipyards had to reflect global prices and trends. 
Consequently, the committee saw the industry as a pit shaft canary, indicating the real 
health of the British economy, for if shipbuilding was profitable and competitive then so 
would be the industries feeding into the shipyards.290 This statement, however, was 
tempered by the fact that if the industries feeding into shipbuilding remained 
uncompetitive, then it would be foolhardy to attempt to improve the prospects of an 
industry that had no single ‘natural’ comparative advantage in comparison to the same 
industry’s competitor nations. 
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The first chapter of the report covered the familiar territory found in previous 
reports (such as the Joint Industry Committee report of 1962), of a failing industry using 
outmoded production and suffering from endemic poor industrial relations. The difference 
between the focus of Geddes and previous reports was the emphasis on the commercial 
prospects of the industry and in this an important point was made concerning the true 
significance of shipbuilding in comparison not only with other industrial sectors, but 
individual companies as well. Indeed, out of a total output of £25,576 million for British 
manufacturing industry in 1963, shipbuilding and repairing industry was valued at £412 
million, or 1.61 percent of the total. Moreover, the mandate of the Shipbuilding Industry 
Committee (SIC) covered only those shipyards that built vessels over 5000 deadweight 
tons, whose total output in 1963 was valued at £159 million, or 0.62 percent of the United 
Kingdom’s industrial output. This paled in comparison to the performance of even the top 
300 companies in Britain; well known large corporations such as Distillers, Courtaulds, 
ICI and the British Motor Corporation recorded higher turnovers than the combined output 
of the shipyards selected for review by the SIC and in the case of some large industrial 
conglomerates, more than the entire British shipbuilding and repairing industry.291 The 
report continued by stating that within the context of a growing demand for newly built 
vessels globally and with an ever increasing demand for large vessels to transport crude 
oil, the British shipbuilding industry was missing out on a growth market to nations that 
could provide vessels at a lower cost and to time. 292 Contrary to the views of many, 
therefore, the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee saw the industry as having no distinct 
national or patriotic reasons for its continued existence and could only justify the industry 
and government intervention in its affairs through commercial (rather than geo-political) 
reasoning.  
 
The report, therefore, advised shipyards to reduce costs through a fundamental 
change in the structure of businesses, although the committee also admitted that solutions 
within the shipyard would only contribute a part of the planned reductions and that the 
industry was beholden to the economic and industrial fortunes of the British economy.293 
Indeed, the report stated firmly that as steel made up twenty percent of the cost of a vessel, 
a reduction (estimated by the report’s authors at ten percent) in the price paid by shipyards 
was essential to the survival of the shipbuilding industry and also of the steel industry that 
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had a symbiotic relationship with shipbuilders.294 Nevertheless, the primary remit of the 
SIC was to recommend a programme of reorganisation to improve the industry’s prospects 
and this was achieved with a prescriptive set of recommendations concerning the corporate 
structure of the industry. However, before outlining these recommendations, it is important 
to note that the report discounted many developments and trends in competitor nations as 
being unworkable, irrelevant or too complicated and expensive for the needs of British 
shipyards.  For example, the committee stated that a reduction in hull construction costs 
depended upon a faster throughput of steel in a controlled and tightly scheduled 
environment and yet also discounted large ‘green-field’ or extensively redeveloped 
shipyards constructed around a building dock.295 The reasoning was based on realistic 
estimates of future orders held against the cost of building large docks; the committee was 
deeply critical of the cost of such docks, seeing the improved utilisation of current 
equipment and techniques as a better use of resources.296 This view was justified by the 
committee on the grounds that even with a number of new, modern shipyards built in 
Sweden and Japan there still remained a majority of older yards analogous to those in the 
United Kingdom, a reasoning contradicted by the older (but heavily modernised) shipyards 
such as Stord in Norway, or Mitsubishi Nagasaki in Japan, which in the 1960s centralised 
production facilities around building docks.297 
 
The recommendations of the SIC focussed around creating large regional 
conglomerates, comprised of a number of shipyards specialising in a multitude of fields 
and different vessel types, a process labelled ‘grouping’ by the SIC.298 The intellectual 
impetus behind the idea of grouping was the notion that a number of shipyards within a 
group would specialise in particular vessel types, S (‘sophisticated’) yards building 
advanced warships, M (‘merchant’ or ‘multi-deck’) yards building general cargo liners and 
B yards (‘bulk carriers and tankers’) building larger vessels. The group would share a 
single central management and other similar institutions and as a result reduce 
overheads.299 The regional basis of such groups reflected, firstly, a view that a wide 
geographic separation between the management, administration and design side of the 
business would lead to inefficiencies and separate management centres, and secondly that 
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the existing regional basis of the industry lent itself to the creation of regional 
conglomerates.  Once the mergers were completed, or at least once the process of merger 
was underway, a process of rationalisation and re-equipping shipyards under the aegis of a 
government body would bring about an improvement in productivity and working 
practices.300 This was a single option strategy; the committee gave no genuine alternative 
to grouping, as, in its opinion, for shipbuilding to continue in its current guise would lead 
to the eventual demise of the industry in the space of a few years.301 
 
The proposals for government action contained within the Geddes Report focussed 
upon the state as agent of change. In short, the recommendations were simple, if the 
industry or even an individual shipyard was not willing to change its ways, then the 
government must not provide assistance and should only do so if there was consensus 
within the industry that the government proposals were the way of the future.302 To bring 
about these changes, the committee proposed the establishment of a government body to 
manage reorganisation and fund infrastructure improvements, the Shipbuilding Industry 
Board (SIB). The remit given to the board by the SIC was to control government financial 
assistance to shipyards as they entered into a grouping arrangement and use its resultant 
powers to merge the industry in Geddes’ image. Three main aims were set out. Consultant 
services for the planning and creation of a newly merged group, capital assistance through 
loans and grants for modernisation and development, and finally working capital to cover 
the costs of any disturbance to production that a process of redevelopment might create.303 
With a planned lifespan of five years, the intention was for the board to complete its work 
and allow a reorganised and developed industry to continue towards a more successful 
future, the SIB was not intended to be a long-term arrangement and was not a precursor to 
nationalisation.304 Additionally, whilst the intention behind the report was to create a series 
of large shipbuilding groups, it also allowed shipyards outside a grouping scheme to apply 
for assistance, if it were unlikely that the shipyards in question would join a merged entity. 
The Geddes report the inspiration behind the creation of the SIB and government plans in 
the 1960s, but it must be emphasised that this was tempered by a lack of clear direction as 
to the correct course of action.  
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The task fell to civil servants and politicians to develop the report into a concrete 
plan of action. Initially, the Department of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of 
Technology promoted the idea that the Industrial Reorganisation Committee (IRC) was to 
act as the government’s agent for executing shipbuilding policy rather than the 
Shipbuilding Industry Board, but the industry was resistant to such views. Nevertheless, 
the biggest advocate for the reorganisation rôle going to the IRC was George Brown at the 
Department for Economic Affairs, who undertook a heated debate in a series of letters in 
the spring of 1966 with Douglas Jay, the President of the Board of Trade. However, Brown 
finally conceded that the creation of a separate board for shipbuilding (working closely 
with the IRC) was the best route for government intervention in the industry. The 
discussions were brought to an end in an interdepartmental meeting held immediately after 
the announcement on 16 June 1966 that government responsibility for the shipbuilding 
industry would change from the Board of Trade to the Ministry of Technology.305 Rather 
than engaging in a further process of debate (as some members of the government wanted) 
civil servants decided to implement the proposals given to them by the Geddes Report, a 
view encouraged two months later by the Prime Minister’s office.306 The consequence of 
this decision was that the resulting legislation implemented the recommendations of the 
Geddes Report verbatim and any revisions were the result of fine-tuning the report’s 
proposals as opposed to radical changes.307 Indeed, the view of the Treasury Solicitors 
Department was that the legislation could be rushed through in haste as the prescriptions of 
the Geddes Report left very little undefined and although there were some minor doubts 
about the financial provisions, these could be dealt with as a statutory instrument under the 
aegis of the Shipbuilding Industry Board and not as primary legislation.308 
 
To conclude, the report of the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee produced little 
controversy or public interest and as a result, Parliament passed the subsequent legislation 
with little fuss in a short period of time. Indeed, attempts by the Board of Trade to gauge 
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the reaction in overseas markets demonstrated the lack of interest globally, the research 
produced no information of note and was a failure with the report barely mentioned in the 
media of major European shipbuilding competitor nations and the Japanese were distinctly 
uninterested. Certainly efforts by the President of the Board of Trade to gauge the reaction 
in Norway during an interview with Norwegian journalists concerning a separate topic in 
March 1966 ended in acrimony, as the latter felt their time in the meeting was wasted 
talking about Geddes.309 However, although the report presented a number of ideas that did 
produce an increase in productivity when enacted, these did not reflect the prevailing 
orthodoxy of ship manufacture in countries with larger shipbuilding industries than the 
United Kingdom. Combined with the proviso that measures to save the industry could only 
be enacted in tandem with a commitment by the shipyards to support radical structural 
change, the stipulations of the report became law without opposition or criticism by either 
the shipbuilding industry or within government. The process that began in 1961 with the 
many reports on productivity that culminated in 1966 with the Geddes Report was 
contextualised against an international background of an ever-increasing demand for crude 
oil fuelling the demand for large vessels to carry the oil and therefore creating the need for 
large modern shipyards in countries such as Japan and Sweden. Nevertheless, the British 
shipbuilding industry was outside of this boom for most of the 1960s and the Geddes 
Report discounted many of the developments that were producing exponential increases in 
output in Japan with the result that even after the Geddes process ended, the industry 
would not have a guaranteed future. 
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This thesis hypothesises that the relationship between the British government and 
the shipbuilding companies in the period 1964 - 1970 was a cause of  (rather than a 
response to) that industry’s decline. Whilst this argument is contextualised by the declinist 
theories of the past three decades, the previous chapter emphasised that government policy 
was dependent upon negotiated compromises between opposing factions. This chapter has 
presented a detailed narrative of the development of government shipbuilding policy 
during the first Wilson Labour government of 1964 - 1966 and demonstrated how the 
administration’s work in this area was built upon previous reports and inquiries into the 
industry under the aegis of the Macmillan and Douglas-Home Conservative governments 
of the early 1960s. An increasing cognisance of the impending failure of an entire industry 
by trade unions, the civil service and the economic media was not found within the 
management of shipbuilding companies nor the higher echelons of the government (be it 
Conservative before 1964 or Labour afterwards) and as a result, the belated efforts by the 
state to save shipbuilding industry were detached from the industrial reality of 
shipbuilding, particularly in competitor nations.  
 
The Conservative regime of 1951 inherited an increased role for the state (and 
indeed the nationalised industries) from the Attlee Labour government but was averse to 
using direct industrial controls. Nevertheless, as Edgerton and Agar demonstrate in many 
industrial sectors (such as in aviation, computers and power generation), and indeed 
particularly in relation to the procurement of military or civil technology, the government 
played a full and pivotal rôle as customer and developer. However, the government 
focussed upon macro economic, infrastructural and technological concerns and the 
development of new industries, with the result that there was a lack of intervention in 
established and mature industries. Even after the publication a series of reports detailing 
the structural failings of the shipbuilding industry, the government ignored the growing 
problems of the industry and only provided cheap finance when the situation demanded a 
response, which merely deferred the industry’s failure for a few years. 
 
The Labour government elected in 1964 rode to victory upon a rhetoric infused 
zeitgeist condemning the failure of a reactionary and backward Conservative 
administration to modernise Britain, promising to bring the nation into line with other, 




promised an immediate change to the fortunes of the economy under the aegis of the 
Department of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Technology, the actuality was inquiry 
and introspection for the first two years of the government. For the shipbuilding industry, 
despite a number of conclusive and detailed reports from a couple of years earlier, this 
meant enduring the two-year duration of the Shipbuilding Inquiry Board under the 
chairmanship of Reay Geddes. The board, from its proposed composition to the way it 
undertook research, acted with a casual manner (and admitted as much in its report), with 
the consequence that government ministries and departments gave as much evidence as 
they saw fit rather than being required to do so.310 Indeed, the committee’s members 
focussed upon evidence concerning military and labour concerns when it was the case that 
these areas, (while important to some extent) were not the major causes of the industry’s 
decline. As a result, the Department of Economic Affairs decided shipbuilding was not part 
of its remit and the Ministry of Technology focussed solely on the development of 
maritime technology, despite dissenting views from within its ranks concerned about the 
industry’s future prospects.  
 
Therefore, the relationship between the committee and the institutions that gave 
evidence coloured the recommendations of the eventual report of the Shipbuilding Industry 
Committee, (known as the Geddes Report). Uncontroversial and able to improve the 
economic viability of the industry to some extent when implemented, the report’s 
recommendations did not reflect the prevailing orthodoxy of ship construction found, for 
example, in Japan and consequently could not create the same levels of productivity, 
constraining the potential of shipbuilding in the United Kingdom. This, however, was not 
the whole story, for the committee’s off-spring, the Shipbuilding Industry Board, created in 
1967 to bring about the recommendation of the Geddes Report, was constrained by the 
same report, which was taken further by the government’s desire to bring about mergers, 
and modernisation through a process of negotiation rather than compulsion. As the 
following two case studies, of the Scott Lithgow shipyard in Greenock (Scotland) and 
Harland and Wolff in Belfast (Northern Ireland), demonstrate the flawed proposals and 
views of the Geddes report and the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee were soon submerged 
beneath the changing desires of shipyard managers and politicians, as government failed to 
bring about a positive change in the fortunes of an entire industrial sector but instead 
succeeded in speeding up its eventual demise. 
 
                                                




Chapter Three  
 
 
Two large Scottish shipyards become one: The creation of Scott 











This thesis argues that the relationship between government and shipyards in the 
period 1964-1970 was one of the major causes of the decline of shipbuilding as an industry 
in the United Kingdom. However, the hypothesis is intrinsically linked to policy 
developments within government at the time that were a reflection not only of party 
political concerns, but also of a wider set of relationships mainly between government, 
industrialists and organised labour, with additional input from academia and civil service 
departments responsible for expenditure and commerce. The previous chapter 
demonstrated these relationships existed on a multitude of levels in cabinet, parliament and 
the civil service, and as a result contextualised and influenced the creation and 
development of bodies set up to remedy the ills of the shipbuilding industry.  For example, 
the relationship between the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee and the institutions that gave 
evidence influenced its eventual recommendations, which did not reflect the prevailing 
orthodoxy of ship construction found in competitor nations. Indeed, the Shipbuilding 
Industry Board was constrained by the recommendations and was further compromised by 
the government’s desire to negotiate rather than compel individual companies to merge.  
 
To show this process in action, this chapter utilises a case study of the Scott 
Lithgow shipyard in Greenock (a town in the West of Scotland situated on the lower 
reaches of the River Clyde), to demonstrate the core hypothesis that the uncertainty created 
by the extended process of consultation under the aegis of the Labour government (from 
the public inquiries of its early years to the negotiations with companies concerning state 
aid from 1966 onwards) discouraged capital investment, restricting efforts at introducing 
modern working practices and equipment into British shipyards. Scott Lithgow exemplifies 
this process, from being the first two companies to propose a merger, Scotts Shipbuilding 
and Engineering Company Limited and Lithgows Limited entered into a protracted process 
of negotiation, using a variety of tactics to gain concessions that either were not in the 
powers of the Shipbuilding Industry Board to give or on offer from the government. Whilst 
a wider context of industrial strife, demarcation, obsolete manufacturing techniques and 
equipment plagued the shipbuilding industry across the United Kingdom and particularly 
on the Clyde, this chapter will demonstrate that the agency of management when dealing 
with central government firstly hindered and then effectively nullified attempts by central 
government to rescue the industry from an oft predicted demise. Scott Lithgow was a 




the government in London and that the influence of the Scottish body politic came from 
the shipyard’s relationship with the local Members of Parliament and the Scottish trade 
union movement, not from any formal relationship with the Scottish Office. Finally, the 
main body of this chapter details the negotiations between Scott Lithgow and the 
Shipbuilding Industry Board, and government bodies between 1967 and 1971, illuminating 
the subsequent relationship that the company had with both until 1973. The focus is on the 
merger of the two shipyards and the subsequent efforts to become a major player in the 
supertanker market, but as ever this is contextualised by the negotiations between Scott 




Scotts, Lithgows and the creation of Scott Lithgow, 1966 – 1973 
 
 
The Scott Lithgow Company that was created in the 1960s was the result of a bid 
by the Greenock based shipyards of Scotts and Lithgows to create a second grouping on 
the river Clyde separate from the yards based on the Upper Clyde in Glasgow. Although 
the Geddes report made no specific mention of the need for two separate groupings on the 
Clyde, the Shipbuilding Industry Board (SIB) reacted positively to the proposal, realising 
that Greenock and Glasgow had different wage structures and proximities to suppliers. 
However, the creation of Scott Lithgow and its subsequent failure as a shipbuilding 
company is not a reflection of a lack of ambition on the part of either the shipyards or 
government, but rather a lack of cohesive management and ambition. 
 
Both shipyards were successful in the mid 1960s, with Scotts building conventional 
submarines for the Royal Navy and export customers and Lithgows large bulk and crude 
oil carriers. Both yards had re-equipmed to use more modern methods of steel handling 
and construction and both were modern yards that could compete in a global market 
place.311 Therefore, when a merger was proposed at the very beginning of the 5 year 
existence of the SIB in 1967, the subsequent government enthusiasm lent a great deal of 
attention to the opinions of the yards’ management, specifically the appointed Managing 
Director of Scott Lithgow, Ross Belch and its chairman, Sir William Lithgow. However, 
the intentions of the SIB and of Scotts and Lithgows were highly divergent, the negotiating 
techniques employed by both Belch and Lithgow hindered the attempts at formulating a 
government funded plan within the 5-year lifetime of the SIB. Although a company 
entitled Scott Lithgow was set up in 1967 and changes made to the structure of both Scotts 
and Lithgows reflecting the intention to merge, these remained little more than token 
companies, Scott Lithgow (1967) had a notional value of £100 shared 50:50 between 
Scotts and Lithgows. The actual creation of a merged entity would take much longer. 
 
Scotts and Lithgows merged in actuality on the last day of 1969 four years after 
merger was first proposed and it was only then that the company received funds to 
modernise the shipyard and deliver on Ross Belch’s proposal to produce large VLCC 
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supertankers for the burgeoning market created by the exponential rise in the demand for 
crude oil by industrial nations after 1945. However, whereas in the Far Eastern and 
European shipyards that specialised in such vessels building docks and taylorised 
production methods were the norm, Belch proposed using the existing facilities of the 
Scott Lithgow shipyard in updated form to build these large vessels in two halves. These 
methodologies appeared to be successful, Scott Lithgow received many orders for such 
vessels and by 1973 had already delivered two vessels and had two more in the latter 
stages of construction and slowly the company was decreasing its losses and returning to 
profitability.  The following section details the negotiations between Scott Lithgow and the 
Shipbuilding Industry Board and government bodies between 1967 and 1971 and the 
subsequent relationship that the company had with central government up until 1973. The 
focus is on the merger between the two shipyards and the subsequent efforts to implement 
the shipyard’s stated goal of being a major player in the supertanker market, in line with 
the Geddes Report proposed merger of existing shipyards into larger regional entities that 
would be extensively modernised with new equipment, funded in the main by central 
government.312  However, in reality, the corporations created by the mergers were little 
more than financial holding companies; the pre-merger shipyards remained as separate 
entities. In the case of Scott Lithgow, despite the physical proximity of Scott’s of 
Greenock to the yard of Lithgows, the two yards remained distinct entities throughout the 
life of Scott Lithgow.  
 
The discussions between Scotts’ and Lithgows commenced almost immediately 
after the publication of the Geddes report. Scotts’ was the oldest modern shipyard in 
existence in the UK; it dated back to 1711 and produced a full range of vessels, but by 
1962 it was specialising in submarines and small passenger ferries, with an annual 
production capacity of 45,000 tons. Lithgows specialised in large merchant vessels of 
around 80,000 tons and had already undertaken a programme of modernisation giving it an 
annual capacity of 125,000 tons by the early 1960s.313 As noted above, the physical 
proximity of the two yards in Greenock encouraged a merger, with all major facilities 
concentrated in a one-mile radius of the James Watt dock, alongside the route of the A8 
trunk road. Moreover, being on the south west tip of the Clyde and in close proximity to 
the steel producing centres to the south of Greenock, the two yards shared many common 
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suppliers.314 Therefore, the agreement to merge signed on 12th September 1967 (which 
was at the beginning of the Shipbuilding Industry Board’s lifetime), was an apparent sign 
of the two shipyards’ already close relationship.315  




Source: GUAS GD 320/3/25 ‘Interim Report on the Possible Redevelopments of Scott-Lithgow Facilities’, 
Lithgows Limited, September 1968, Appendix. 
 
However, the correspondence between the SIB and Scott Lithgow suggests a 
different story. Firstly, Scotts and Lithgows did not actually merge into a single entity in 
1967, they created a joint stock company of only a small nominal value, Scott Lithgow, 
based upon the recommendations of Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths & Co, chartered 
accountants from whom both yards requested a proposal for a post merger management 
structure.316 Secondly, even when the companies formally merged as a single company in 
1969, the two shipyards remained as separate entities, referred to as Scotts (1969) and 
Lithgows (1969). Thirdly, the yards undertook three years of discussion with government 
about the amount of money needed for redevelopment and whether or not Scotts would be 
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in line for Admiralty warship contracts.317 The benefits of the merger as promoted by both 
companies in a joint memorandum sent to the chairman of the Shipbuilding Industry 
Board, were efficiencies and economies of scale by the use of joint purchasing, steel-
working, engineering and infrastructure, and creating a culture of labour mobility within 
the yard.318  
 
Both companies wrote to the SIB declaring their intention to merge in September 
1967.319 This letter was enthusiastically received by the SIB, who responded by stating that 
they required detailed specifications of any plans to be made by Scott Lithgow and once 
this had been undertaken, they would consider any demands for finance on its merits.320 
The first business (both parties had previously spoken to Sir William Swallow, 
informally321) meeting between representatives of the shipyards and members of the SIB 
occurred on 28th September 1967 and despite no specific mention of the need for two 
groups of shipyards on the Clyde in the Geddes report, the initial enthusiasm for the 
creation of Scott Lithgow was still apparent, if for no other reason than that the difference 
in wages between Glasgow and Greenock would make it difficult to create an integrated 
single corporate entity on the Clyde. The nature of the naval business of Scotts and its 
place within a larger Scott Lithgow’s was already an issue, on which the SIB required 
further clarification. Therefore, Scotts’ wrote to the SIB in October 1967 and stated that 
naval orders would be an important component of the merged company.322 However, the 
Geddes report recommended that surface fighting naval craft, frigates and destroyers (at 
this point aircraft carriers were considered obsolete by the Healey defence review323) 
should be concentrated in two or three specialist yards, which in 1966 already existed as 
dedicated military shipyards.324 
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The SIB board agreed that as an institution it did not have the power to grant any 
conditions concerning naval work with Scott Lithgow and stated that there were not 
enough naval orders to justify concentrating the work in more than four yards. 325  
Moreover, the Royal Navy itself was not of a high opinion of Scotts’ work and did not 
believe that they had the technical abilities to produce modern sophisticated warships, 
particularly submarines. Although a speciality of Scotts’ they were not of the same level of 
sophistication as the modern nuclear attack craft constructed by Vickers in their Barrow in 
Furness shipyard and these were of little interest to the Royal Navy.326 The viewpoint of 
Scotts was different, not only did they continue to request the right to tender for Naval 
craft, but also that at no point in the future would they be blocked from bidding for naval 
work. Indeed, by November 1967 they were stating that the continued success of the 
merger depended on the inclusion of naval work: 
 
A long and wide ranging discussion ensued. The following were the 
main points, which emerged. 
 
1. The Scotts/Lithgow Merger depended upon two vital factors: 
 
(a) that Scott’s Cartsburn Yard would be designated as an ‘S’ Yard for all types 
of sophisticated naval surface vessels, and 
(b) that there would be no insistence by SIB or H.M.G. on a single Clyde 
group, at any rate until the Upper Clyde Group had become viable and a 
merger was clearly seems to be in the interests of the Lower Clyde.327 
 
This was neither the view of the government nor that of the SIB, which was that 
including Scotts in the naval tender process was a waste of time and resources.328 For Scott 
and Lithgows to make their merger conditional upon becoming a designated warship yard, 
despite their lack of experience beyond conventional twin screw diesel submarines 
(already of an obsolete design in 1967) was contrary to the accepted military view at that 
time, which was that warships had become technologically more advanced than merchant 
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vessels and therefore required specialist manufacturers.329 Consequently, and after much 
discussion between the Ministry of Technology and the SIB, the government announced 
that while Scott Lithgow would not be restricted when it came to tendering for naval work, 
the Cartsburn yard was not an official warship yard and that it was unreasonable for Scott 
Lithgow to request this be the case.330 Accordingly, in January 1968, the SIB wrote to 
Scotts’ Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd stating that the issue was now closed. The 
SIB attempted to draw to both shipyards’ attention the restricted lifespan of the body in an 
attempt to move matters along: 
 
We are now making progress with the examination of other applications 
and the Board would therefore emphasise the need for you to make detailed 
application for the assistance the Lower Clyde merger may require.331 
 
In other words, in the eyes of the SIB any further discussion of warship building at a 
merged Scott Lithgow was irrelevant as this was outside its remit and was not in 
concordance with the provisions of the Geddes Report. Despite this reluctance of the SIB 
to discuss warship building and indeed their forceful articulation of that policy, Scott 
Lithgow refused to drop their plans and indeed promoted warship building as essential to 
the survival of the yard.332 Therefore, they continued presenting letters and documents to 
the SIB outlining the reasons why they had to tender for naval contracts and remain as a 
yard designated for naval construction. Indeed, Sinclair Scott (a member of the senior 
management at Scotts) whilst conceding that negotiations had to proceed regardless of the 
naval construction issue, stated that naval work was an integral part of their merger plans 
and should be taken into account and without this, the plans would not be able to proceed. 
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333 In short, Scotts and Lithgows continued along the same path concerning military work, 
regardless of the statements to the contrary from the SIB. 
 
Although negotiations were about to commence concerning the funding required 
for the merger and the redevelopment of Scott Lithgow, the SIB was concerned and it was 
starting to believe that its involvement with Scott Lithgow would be little more than a 
pyrrhic exercise.334 Certainly, in an otherwise un-noteworthy and routine letter to Bayliss 
at the Ministry of Technology, B. Barker of the SIB opened with the line; ‘Indeed, the 
story of the Lower Clyde is a sorry one’ and went on to state, ‘I cannot help feeling myself 
that Scotts, like the lemmings, are marching their company straight into the sea’.335 After 
repeated correspondence from Scotts concerning naval work, despite the best efforts to 
persuade Scott Lithgow otherwise, the SIB tried to resolve these issues by calling a 
meeting on 17th April 1968.336 This was an exercise to no avail; Scotts and Lithgows both 
continued to state the need to retain naval work as a precondition of their merger, even in 
the face of opposition from the SIB. In particular, the SIB chairman Sir William Swallow 
questioned whether there would be enough naval work in the future to justify even the 
Geddes designated naval yards and doubted whether the figure given by Ross Belch that 
Scotts’ and Lithgows combined had over 50 percent of their work from naval sources was 
correct.337 As the meeting progressed, Swallow strongly emphasised that any assistance 
would be based on commercial criteria and that guaranteed orders from the Admiralty did 
not fall into this category, a point taken by Ross Belch as an invitation to open a debate on 
funding. In response, Ashton of the SIB considered that this ‘was starting from the wrong 
end: one needed to start from knowledge of what the proposed scheme amounted to, since 
what the SIB could do would depend on this.338‘In an already disastrous meeting, the coup 
de grace was issued by Sir William Lithgow, who presented the redevelopment plans for 
Scott Lithgow on 20ft sheets of tracing paper. These were highly fluid and the particular 
details of the plans depended on the amount of funding the SIB was willing to provide to 
the company. Lithgow asked for a figure of ‘...the order of  £6 1/2 m might be needed, i.e., 
£3 1/2 m for Capital Expenditure and £3m for Working Capital’ but despite Lithgow’s 
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presentation, Swallow doubted whether any of the ideas presented would make Scott 
Lithgow competitive in a few years time, if ever.339   
 
After this meeting, there was little sympathy towards the merger of Scotts and 
Lithgows. Indeed the Minister of Technology, Anthony Wedgwood Benn was certainly 
cooling to the idea of a lower Clyde merger, at least the one proposed by Scotts and 
Lithgow’s. In a letter sent after the meeting, Barnes stated his view of the situation to 
Barker: 
 
I do not know how you feel about the discussion this week. Personally I 
have no doubt that it was wise to start this examination of their proposals, 
putting to one side their stupidity about ‘S’ yards. But I found their 
performance and their proposals pretty pathetic. The more I listened, and not 
least to questions put by you and your Board, the more doubtful I became as to 
whether this constituted a Group which could be supported at all.340 
 
To which Barker responded: ‘I don’t think my board were very impressed with the 
presentation.341  
 
Despite the pessimism at the SIB and the vague demands of Scott Lithgow, Ross 
Belch clarified the shipyards’ aims by letter in May 1968. The letter avoided mentioning 
the pre-conditions for a merger and explained the post-merger layout and redevelopment of 
the yard in realistic and practical terms.342 Whilst not discounting naval work, Scott 
Lithgow was now stating that the ‘S’ yard would be for all kinds of technically advanced 
vessels, not just naval ones. This was progress, which was combined with a favourable 
report from a visit made by an SIB official to the two yards in Greenock. As a result of 
this, the SIB decided to ask the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Technology to 
formulate a government policy concerning warship building in non-military shipyards.343 
In August 1968, the Ministry of Technology informed Scott Lithgow that it could bid for 
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naval contracts, but not on a preferential basis.344 Consequently, the SIB was of the opinion 
that the merger must proceed and requested that Scotts and Lithgows inform the board of 
any progress made since the application for redevelopment funds in July 1968.345 
However, it was not until a meeting occurred between representatives of the two shipyards, 
the SIB and ministers from the Ministries of Technology and Defence and the Scottish 
Office in October 1968, that both Scotts and Lithgows accepted the government’s position. 
Even then, Ross Belch continued to attempt to negotiate the point, until being firmly, but 
politely reminded by those present that the lifetime of the SIB was limited by statute to 5 
years and that assistance would not be available forever. Indeed, the Minister of 
Technology had to be even more forceful, ending the meeting by stating that  ‘The 
assurances sought by Mr. Scott (chairman of Scotts) were unacceptable to the 
government.’346. A point that had to be reiterated once more in November of 1968 by Benn 
in a letter to Belch.347  
 
Efforts to complete the merger progressed almost immediately thereafter and by the 
end of the year the two companies were now working to complete their merger.348 The 
ultimate form of the merger, however, was not an integrated company, but rather a jointly 
owned holding company that itself owned the assets of the previous two entities. In other 
words, Scott Lithgow was owned 50:50 by the two yards, which themselves had separate 
shareholders, as the following diagram demonstrates: 
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Diagram 3.1: The Planned Structure of Scott Lithgow’s after 1969 


































Source: TNA FV 37/21 ‘Report to Mr. B Barker on present position of Grouping on the Lower Clyde under 
Scott Lithgow Limited’ Letter from Scotts’ Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. Ltd to SIB, dated 24th March 
1969 and GUAS GD 320/3/16 ‘Scott Lithgow Merger - Accounting Arrangements: Notes for Meeting - 
4/11/69 at 2.15’. 
 
It is uncertain whether Scotts and Lithgow’s ever intended to create a single, 
vertically integrated corporation, or merely a corporation that would allow them to take 
advantage of the finances of the SIB without actually losing their identity or independence. 
Certainly, this was the impression that was starting to form at the SIB. Swallow believed 
that any large-scale expenditure by Scott Lithgow should not be financed through large 
grants, but loans and any funding considered by the SIB would have to be backed up by 
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firm proposals.350 After two years of negotiation and three after the Geddes Report, there 
was little genuine progress towards a merger, certainly not as originally envisioned by the 
SIB.  
 
By the time Scott Lithgow became a legal entity on 31st December 1969, the 
company was no further in receiving funds from the SIB and did not do so until March 
1970.351 By this time, the trials and tribulations of the merger on the Upper Clyde was 
taking more of the government’s and SIB’s attention. Certainly, the problems at John 
Browns and Fairfield’s leading to the creation of Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS) were 
widely discussed in Parliament. Quite simply these yards had more local Labour MP’s in 
the government than further down the Clyde in Greenock.352 Ross Belch was also at this 
time involved in a failed bid for the Yarrow military yard at the invitation of its chairman 
Sir Eric Yarrow.353 Indeed, because of the potential for lucrative and relatively easy to 
obtain (when compared to merchant vessels) military contracts, Yarrow had suddenly 
become attractive for Belch, despite his earlier opposition to a single merged Clyde entity. 
Like many of Belch’s proposals, the merger did not happen, but it is indicative of the 
constant prevarication and changes of position by Belch that influenced the eventual 
outcome for Scott Lithgow; for even in the case of merger with Yarrows, Belch was not 
prepared to make a bid without government assurances354. Murphy and Johnman state that, 
‘Scott Lithgow paid a heavy price for the protracted nature of its merger’.355 This was 
indeed the case, but the convoluted narrative of the merger of the Scotts and Lithgow 
shipyards is merely the prologue for the story of the attempt by Scott Lithgow to produce 
large vessels for the global merchant marine, which is the focus on this case study. 
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The ‘modernisation’ of Scott Lithgow 1969 - 1973 
 
 
The protracted, drawn out creation of the Scotts Lithgow group meant the SIB and 
Scott Lithgow did not discuss the companies’ modernisation plans to construct larger 
vessel until the latter half of 1969. Indeed, as has been demonstrated, there was little 
progress until almost half way through the planned lifetime of the SIB and as a result, there 
was a very limited space of time for Scott Lithgow and the SIB to work together to 
formulate a development plan for the shipyard. The situation was complicated further by 
Scott Lithgow taking an order for a vessel of 250,000 tons before the two precursor 
companies had merged. Indeed, this was also before Scott Lithgow had the facilities to 
construct a vessel of that size and in April 1969 Belch wrote a letter to the SIB, stating that 
as Lithgows had already been asked to build a supertanker, the government should make 
development funding available as soon as possible.356 This is highly relevant in light of 
Scott Lithgow’s attempts at modernisation. As demonstrated in the previous section, Scott 
Lithgow was not prepared to discuss detailed development plans or even the merger until 
assurances of the amount of government money were given, including whether the 
shipyard would be allowed to continue with naval construction. That the SIB at this stage 
continued negotiations with Scott Lithgow despite an apparent lack of progress is 
demonstrative of the relationship that developed between the government, an institution set 
up by that government and the Greenock company.357 The modernisation of the Lithgows 
Kingston yard to build VLCC tankers, illustrates this point. For although the SIB was to 
act as facilitator in the rationalisation of British shipbuilding, in its relationship with Scotts 
Lithgow it would become the principal subsidiser of an unchanged and un-rationalised 
concern.  
 
In a paper published in 1970, Belch laid out the options available when 
modernising the Kingston yard.358 He describing the changes in the shipping market over 
the course of the 1960s, namely that the closure of the Suez Canal combined with an 
increasing demand for petroleum was leading to larger vessels designed to provide 
radically improved economies of scale. For a shipbuilder not to have entered this market 
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(which in 1970 appeared to be growing at a sustainable rate) would have been a serious 
mistake: 
 
 Our capacity at that time already to build vessels up to about 150,000 
tons deadweight. Our yards were modern by most standards and our ability to 
keep going reasonably comfortably in this medium sized market was not 
seriously in doubt. To have confined ourselves to this field would have 
involved, at most, the general updating of facilities which has been a matter of 
routine for most yards for many years. However, at the time the continued 
buoyancy in the medium-size ship market was unforeseen. In fact, it was 
becoming generally accepted that the 100,000 tonners were only intermediate 
size vessels with a limited market demand. The big ships of the future certainly 
appeared to be ones of over 200,000 tons dwt and the fact that there has arisen 
a demand for the intermediate size vessels of 100/150,000 tons dwt was 
unpredictable, as are so many developments in the shipping world.359 
 
Belch, supported by the Geddes notion of a diverse product range, stated that as a large 
grouping of six shipyards on the Lower Clyde, the Scott Lithgow group should have a 
wider range of vessel types for sale and therefore the construction of large vessels over 
200,000 tons was a logical development for the business. Indeed in Belch’s view, 
constructing large vessels on the Lower Clyde made sense because of the proximity of a 
trained workforce, steel and engineering facilities and a viable deep-water harbour.360 
Consequently, the development of large vessel construction to enter the market for these 
ships was inevitable, according to the reasoning of Belch. There was, nonetheless, one 
important proviso:  
 
However, one thing was determined at the outset - we were not going to 
create a massive new shipbuilding complex costing many millions of pounds, 
involving us in large borrowings which might at the end of the day have such a 
crippling effect on us financially as to destroy the viability of our whole 
group.361 
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In effect, Belch was of the opinion that the financial after-effects of large scale investments 
in a new, or rebuilt shipyard would mitigate against any productivity improvements gained 
from new shipbuilding methods.  Therefore, any adjustments to the Scott Lithgow yard had 
to cost as little as possible.362  
 
The first admission made by Belch was that sub-assembly; the prefabrication of 
vessel sections joined up on a slipway or in a building dock was the only way forward for a 
modern shipyard.363 Certainly, looking at the 1969 Scott Lithgow Group Development 
Plan, the emphasis was on increasing the productivity of metal working and developing the 
prefabrication of steel sections.364 The consideration for Belch was, therefore would the 
sections join up on a slipway or in a building dock?365 There had been launches of large 
vessels on slipways before; Swan Hunter launched vessels over 250,000 tons deadweight 
on the Tyne, positioned so they would avoid the opposite bank of the river. Belch noted, 
however, that the risk insurance premium for launching vessels increased substantially for 
vessels over 75,000 tons (unspecified as to whether this is gross or deadweight tonnage) 
and consequently launching very large vessels from slipways added ‘about £25,000 on a 
vessel of 250,000 tons deadweight’.366 
 
Building docks, as used by Harland and Wolff and discussed by John Browns (in 
the case of the Newshot Island project367), provided an open platform close to production 
facilities in a layout taking into consideration the optimum construction process.368 Belch 
noted that in Japan, the building dock was the successful method of construction, which 
brought many practical benefits and was in use by Harland and Wolff and many European 
yards as their method of final construction.369 Nonetheless, Belch also noted that building 
docks were capital intensive, inflexible if future needs changed and required further 
investments in cranage and infrastructure. Moreover, Japanese shipyards, (modernised or 
green-field) involved a production line, whereas shipyards in Europe or on the Clyde had 
evolved over time and did not have a layout complementary to the process of production.  
In the case of Scott Lithgow, because of geographical and geological features particular to 
the United Kingdom (namely higher tide levels than mainland Europe and having to cut 
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through clay and bedrock to construct any dock), Belch was acutely aware of the costs of 
any large infrastructure projects.370 Moreover, there would be the cost of fitting the dock 
out with the appropriate machinery, which would take an initial cost of £7.5 million to £15 
million. A scheme to convert the James Watt dock situated in Greenock, (even though an 
existing dock was in place) was proposed, potentially costing over £17 million, because the 
existing infrastructure and tooling of Scott Lithgow could not be re-used.371 Another 
option, hydraulic rams to lift a vessel, (despite being developed by Scott Lithgow) as used 
by the Pascagoula yard on the Mississippi River in the United States was also discounted, 
again because of construction and maintenance costs.372  
 
The financial conservatism advocated by Belch is at first hard to comprehend, 
particularly in light of loans from the SIB of £13.42 million, which were received by 
September 1971. 373 However, it should be noted that Scotts and Lithgows also had 
between them £2.5 (million) equity capital and also £2 million loan capital from Scott 
Lithgow; the group therefore started life with a comparatively low amount of equity 
capital. With both companies’ past financial record, this situation was unlikely to 
improve.374 It is not unsafe to assume, therefore, that Scott Lithgow would have to 
demonstrate caution when considering any spending on large infrastructure projects, even 
if the finance came from government loans. Indeed, as was noted by the SIB in May 1969, 
during a visit to Scott Lithgow: 
 
Before deciding upon this expenditure, however, they were in a 
dilemma as to whether or not to proceed with their much broader scheme of 
development covering the entire group, and to press ahead as possible with 
that...In discussing the question of assistance from the SIB, Mr Belch stressed 
the necessity for grant aid as opposed to loans, and that the extent of this would 
determine in a very real sense the extent to which their development would 
proceed. In consideration of a full scheme, expenditure of up to £6 M. for the 
group would be considered, and they were most averse to saddling themselves 
with the servicing of such large amounts of capital. I made it clear that whereas 
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grants might be available in respect of such headings as transitional losses, 
workers amenities, and certain other possible matters, these would be limited 
in comparison with the total sum envisaged.375 
 
In light of the reluctance of Ross Belch and Scott Lithgow to spend more than strictly 
necessary on infrastructure, a solution had to be selected that used the existing facilities of 
the Kingston yard to full effect and allowed for the construction of vessels of more than 
250,000 tons dwt. The chosen solution was joining afloat: constructing and launching two 
large vessel sections on slipways, then welding both together alongside an outfitting quay. 
Belch chose to explain his reasoning by stating that the initial costs of providing the 
equipment to join two halves of a supertanker when afloat were substantially lower than 
the costs involved in creating a large building dock. Moreover, Belch emphasised that such 
a system would allow Scott Lithgow to utilise existing facilities and potentially be able to 
build vessels of almost, ‘unlimited size’. Nonetheless, the main motivation for Belch was 
cost; the proposed system would involve a substantially smaller outlay than any other 
method of constructing a large vessel. 376 Ross Belch concluded by stating that the 
difference between Japanese and UK shipbuilding was not one of where the vessels were 
constructed, but of how, citing the Japanese advances in production technology, quality 
control, and productivity had increased output reduced the workload.377 Therefore, the 
modernisation of Scott Lithgow’s Kingston yard would go ahead but the existing layout of 
the yard would remain. Whichever plan was chosen, the cost had to be minimal if for no 
other reason than the prejudices of Ross Belch alone.  Intriguingly, the method of 
launching ships in two halves was developed as a response to size restrictions in small 
shipyards, the most prominent example being the NSDM Shipyard in Amsterdam that had 
to deal with the size limitations of the North Sea Canal.378 This was not the case in 
Greenock; there was enough space to launch a VLCC (and even with the limitations of 
having a trunk road on the shipyard’s southern perimeter) and certainly enough space to 
construct a building dock. 
 
Belch’s paper of 1970 was merely the public announcement of a policy that had 
been evolving since the merger of the shipbuilding yards on the lower Clyde. Upon 
consulting the 1969 Scott Lithgow development plan the inherent fiscal conservatism is 
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again apparent as an underlying philosophy of the strategic planning of the group. The 
document, prepared for the Shipbuilding Industries Board to request funds for 
redevelopment and modernisation, starts with a pronouncement of intent regarding the 
level of investment desired by Scott Lithgow: 
 
We have been very conscious of the fluctuations in shipbuilding demand 
over the years and, although at the present moment the market is reasonably 
firm, historically our industry is subject to violent fluctuations and therefore we 
realise that difficult times may well be not far ahead. For this reason, it has been 
decided that our capital expenditure must be of a relatively modest nature to 
ensure that we do not incur debts which it may be impossible for the group to 
service in the future.’ 379 
 
This was not merely symptomatic of a reluctance to invest in the modernisation of 
the company; rather it reflected the corporate ethos of producing a wide variety of vessels 
rather than specialising on a particular type (which Belch saw as rendering the shipyard 
vulnerable to market fluctuations).380 As noted above, the Geddes Report came to the same 
conclusion and the shipbuilding industry traditionally dealt with fluctuating demand as a 
matter of fact. However, even with a marketing report stating that the demand for shipping 
between 1971 and 1975 was in the region of 13 million gross tons per annum and with a 
projected global demand for around fifty 250,000 deadweight ton VLCCs per year, Scott 
Lithgow preferred to manufacture a range of vessels in separate yards, with a number of 
30,000 to 60,000 tons deadweight bulk vessels being constructed in their East Yard and 
250,000 ton supertankers limited to a refitted and expanded Kingston yard.381  Compared 
to the Japanese yards at the time, these decisions reflect a poor understanding of the 
modern methodology of ship construction and its relationship with the market for new 
vessels. Certainly after 1965 the demand was for larger tankers and that was where the 
profits were made.382 Indeed, modular and prefabricated construction methods allowed 
yards to produce more than one vessel type in one yard on one set of equipment, but in the 
Scot Lithgow group specific sites constructed specific vessels and nothing else. The almost 
immediate move by Japanese yards into bulk carrier construction after 1975, a move not 
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witnessed to the same extent in any UK yard, demonstrates the flexibility of prefabricated 
and building dock based construction methods.383 
 
The appendix to the 1969 development plan contains a number of costings for the 
various options. No mention was made of the option chosen a year later of building two 
separate halves of a large vessel and joining them together afloat. Rather, in appendix B, 
which outlined the ultimate plans the yard had for reconstruction, there is a consideration 
of improving and developing the current launching berths into a large ‘construction mat’ 
upon which prefabricated sections of finished vessels could be welded together and then 
joined by moving completed sections down the line384. The role of improved methods of 
fabrication, improved metalworking, layout and technology was illustrated in Appendix F 
of the same document. 385 Whilst these methods reflected a number of best practices used 
elsewhere, not one option presented by Scott Lithgow in its development plan was similar 
to the complete reorganisation of existing shipyards or the construction of completely new 
facilities found in other nations, particularly Japan. Rather, Scott Lithgow was looking at 
ways to develop and improve its existing facilities for the smallest financial commitment 
and with the least disruption possible.  
 
Although none of the plans proposed the construction of building docks, they did 
not explicitly mention the construction of vessels in two halves either. Nonetheless, Scott 
Lithgow provided a range of options for modernisation from a ‘basic’ plan to an ‘ultimate’ 
plan, dependent on the funds received from the Shipbuilding Industries Board.  However, a 
year later in March 1970 it produced a proposal to use the James Watt Dock in Greenock 
to weld the two finished halves of VLCCs together at low tide and eventually turn it into a 
building dock. It is not clear, however, whether any serious planning was undertaken into 
the potential for the construction of a large dry building dock.386The company barely 
mentioned this plan in its documents and there were no technical drawings and little 
discussion of the topic at hand. The SIB were of a view that although the could see the 
merits of both the Kingston Yard scheme and the James Watt building dock scheme, it 
appeared that no cost estimates had been made of the two options versus one another, at 
least not at the time of its visit to Scott Lithgow in May 1969. Although outwardly Scott 
Lithgow was having problems deciding which scheme to adopt, it seemed to the SIB that 
the decision would be made on financial criteria alone and the amount of funding the 
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company would receive from the government, not on the actual merits in terms of 
productivity between the two schemes.387 Indeed, Belch had admitted as much to his 
colleagues at Scott Lithgow on more than one occasion.388  Certainly, these suspicions 
caused much concern at the SIB, which was reluctant to divulge any information on the 
amount of money it was prepared to give Scott Lithgow, without detailed information on 
the shipyard’s requirements.389  It appears therefore that the motivation of the owners of 
Scott Lithgow was to modernise the Kingston yard using the minimum amount of financial 
resources necessary and joining hull sections up whilst afloat was only advocated by Belch 
in mid 1968, but only once all other more costly developments were discounted.390 
 
When compared to the position taken by Scott Lithgow’s international competition, 
the decisions taken by the company were very conservative; building docks and well laid 
out shipyards were being constructed in Japan, Germany and Holland and were already in 
existence in Scandinavia, specifically Sweden. However, in the UK, building docks and 
extensive reconstructions were not advocated or pursued by either government or 
management. Nevertheless, the Geddes report in section 13 and a TUC document 
presented to Geddes in December 1965 shows that it was not the case that institutions in 
the UK did not know of developments in the rest of the world.391 However, Geddes 
discounted building docks and modern shipyards, considering them too specialist and 
expensive, whilst the TUC took the opposing view and proposed constructing green-field 
shipyards constructed around a building dock. These shipyards would have been of the 
same type as those eventually built in Japan and Korea, which were successful in terms of 
output and profits since their inception and have only recently have been under pressure 
from similar shipyards based in China with cheaper labour. 392  
 
After the initial drawn out negotiations over what the company was entitled to were 
completed, progress was swift towards providing Scott Lithgow with government funding. 
From September 1970, the total money advanced to the yard by the Shipbuilding Industry 
Board was £14,969,812 of which £1,550,000 was for loans made under section 4(1) of the 
Shipbuilding Industries Act 1967, which provided funds for the acquisition of shares 
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required for the merger and £13,419,812 under section 4(2), which were the loans required 
for the reconstruction of the shipyard.393 These amounts grew to £14,083,604 by 16th 
February 1971 and £14,255,000 by 2nd August 1971 respectively.394 However, it was not 
even close to making a profit and therefore still required government money to provide 
working capital.395 
 
Table 3.1: Scott Lithgow Revenue, Profit and Loss, including vessels 
built and Gross tonnage, 1967 - 1973. 
 
Year Number of Vessels Gross Registered Tonnes  (x 1000) Profit ( £ x 1000) 
Profit/Loss 
per gross ton 
(£) 
1967 8 128 312 2.44 
1968 6 107 129 1.21 
1969 8 166 -206 -1.24 
1970 13 172 -1550 -9.01 
1971 12 149 -262 -1.76 
1972 11 132 662 5.02 
1973 10 212 -1,809 -8.53 
TOTAL 68 1066 -2724 -2.56 
Source: British Shipbuilding 1972, A report to the Department of Trade and Industry by Booz-Allen & 
Hamilton BV, Cmnd 4942, HMSO, London, Chapter 17 ‘Finance and Accounting’ pp. 174- 186 and Lloyd’s 
List Appendix and Maritime Guide, 1980-1990. 
  
As table 3.1 demonstrates, Scott Lithgow was profitable and in the opinion of a 
number of merchant bankers advising the SIB, any further injections of finance were 
unlikely to improve the company’s financial position.396 Moreover, despite some naval 
work for foreign governments, namely conventional diesel submarines of the ‘Oberon’ 
class for Australia, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, it was unlikely that Scott Lithgow would 
receive any orders for the most recent types of naval vessel, the Type 41 destroyers and the 
Type 21 and Type 22 frigates.397 As the demise of the SIB came near, the SIB 
recommended further loans of unallocated money to keep Scott Lithgow afloat, a move 
that provided some short term relief, if not any actual improvement in the condition of the 
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company.398 Nevertheless, the future for Scott Lithgow was far from assured and both 
government and the shipyard’s management would continue to have a close relationship 
for many years to come. 
 
                                                





Scott Lithgow in 1973 
 
 
In 1972, Edward Heath’s government created the Industrial Development 
Executive (IDE) to provide assistance and support to nationalised and private industry. To 
investigate the case of shipbuilding, the IDE commissioned a report from the American 
management consultants, Booz Allen and Hamilton to look into the prospects for British 
shipbuilding. Released in 1973, the report was critical of the amount of money spent by the 
SIB on shipbuilding and demonstrated that most of the funding did not pay for the 
renovation of shipyards, but rather it was used to cover the losses experienced by the 
companies at the time. Scott Lithgow was singled out as a company that had not undergone 
an extensive development of its facilities and had ‘achieved little integration’.399 In 
comparison with the problems of Harland and Wolff and in light of the upsurge in 
supertanker construction globally in 1973 (from which Scott Lithgow would benefit) Booz 
Allen and Hamilton were of the opinion that the company’s situation would improve as the 
decade continued.400  
 
What was the real situation of Scott Lithgow at the end of 1973? Even with £90m 
worth of merchant vessels and four submarines on order the company was still not making 
a profit and it was unlikely to do so in the short term. That the company attempted to offset 
this with a predicted profit of £3.45 million on future orders (at a time unspecified) not 
only worried the auditors who refused to verify the company accounts, but also appeared to 
be completely unrealistic in the light of huge losses on fixed price orders received in the 
late 1960s. Certainly, although the SIB was willing to lend further money to Scott Lithgow 
prior to its demise, it could not ask for the loans to be secured against any assets; Scott 
Lithgow only had £2.5 million in equity capital and £2 million in loan capital and simply 
could not secure any loans it would receive. Therefore, all the government could offer was 
that existing loan repayments would be deferred until 1975 at the earliest and that prior to 
receiving a further £1.5 million in loans, Scott Lithgow should issue reassurances about 
liquidity to the government.401 This money was released on the 23rd December 1971, 
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bringing the total amount of money advanced to Scott Lithgow to, £1,550,000 under 
section 4(1) of the Shipbuilding Industry Act (1971) and £17,002,950 under section 4(2) or 
in total £18,552,950.402 Intriguingly, despite the extensive aid given to Scott Lithgow by 
the SIB, William Lithgow was of the opinion that the future for Scott Lithgow’s was 
perilous and that the government should make further provisions to ensure the company’s 
survival and wrote to the Prime Minister stating as much.403 However, in a meeting 
arranged between the Prime Minister, Edward Heath and Lithgow on 26th April 1971 to 
discuss the dire position of the shipyard, Lithgow instead offered his own solutions to 
problems facing British companies in general, namely liquidity and cash-flow shortages 
and inflation.404 Therefore, despite the genuine problems encountered by Scott Lithgow in 
the early 1970s, members of the management continued to squander opportunities to 
request assistance from the highest level in government. The Prime Minister’s response 
was polite, but entirely non-committal.405 
 
By 1973 (excluding the aforementioned loans from the SIB) Scott Lithgow had 
received a £2.3 million loan for redevelopment, a grant of £1.4 million to cover capital 
costs and transitional losses and a further £1.5 million unsecured loan to prevent closure. 
Additionally, Scott Lithgow had received local authority grants of £1.7 million for further 
redevelopment.406 The combined figure of £6.9 million rose to £12.9 million, by factoring 
in construction grants for new vessels under section 3 of the Shipbuilding Industry Act 
(1967), which represents £6 million spread out over five years from 1972.407 The figure of 
£5.246 million, as given in the ‘British Shipbuilding 1972 ’ report by Booz Allen and 
Hamilton International BV, excludes these amounts and is based merely on the grants 
issued by the Shipbuilding Industry Board.408 In short, the company had not made a profit 
on shipbuilding since 1969, despite increasing revenues and deadweight tonnages 
constructed. Indeed, after record losses of £1,550,000 in 1970 the losses for 1971 were 
lower at £262,000 recorded against a background of increased capital expenditure, which 
had risen from £285,000 in 1968 and £378,000 in 1969 respectively to £1,991,000 and 
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£1,927,000 for the years 1971 and 1972. Nevertheless, despite a profit recorded for 1972 
of £662,102, based on the proceeds of the sale of the East Yard for development not on 
shipbuilding revenue, the yard went on to show a record loss for 1973 of £1,809,132.409 
 
To conclude this chapter has demonstrated that from 1966 to 1973 Scott Lithgow 
did indeed increase its tonnage output and raised the size of its revenues. This was 
accompanied by large government grants and an increased amount of investment in fixed 
assets, which suggests that the company was improving its capital stock. However, it must 
be stated that the company was making year on year losses and there was an ongoing 
reduction in the value of company assets as well as working capital. All this happened 
during a period of  high demand for the main type of vessel Scott Lithgow produced, large 
bulk carriers and supertankers. The so-called ‘supertanker’ boom of the period 1950 to 
1973 was based on an exponential rise in the demand for crude oil for power production in 
the developed industrial economies of North America, Western Europe and Japan and the 
need for larger and larger vessels to reduce transport costs per tonne to an acceptable level. 
The Yom Kippur War between the Arab nations and Israel brought this to an end in 1973. 
The subsequent quadruple price hike and embargo (for the US and the Netherlands) by the 
oil producing nations of the OPEC cartel ended for good the days of supertankers and large 
annual rises in the output of shipbuilders. The following chapter will demonstrate that just 
as Scott Lithgow was unable to benefit as the good times rolled for shipbuilders across the 
world before 1973, it certainly was not able to once the boom had become bust in the late 
1970s and there was very little demand for the products it offered. 
 
                                                

















As the previous chapter demonstrated, even after an injection of government capital 
in the late 1960s, Scott Lithgow was heavily indebted and suffering losses, living a 
precarious existence on marginal contracts with negligible profits. With the global 
economic collapse of 1973, which was compounded in the United Kingdom by the 
protracted coal miners’ strike later in the year, Scott Lithgow faced the cancellation of the 
majority of the orders. This was not a consequence of the economic collapse per se; rather 
it was the case that the majority of the shipyard’s orders were for crude oil carrying 
vessels, (‘supertankers’ are vessels that carry over 100,000 tons of cargo) which were no 
longer in vogue with shipping lines of the world as the demand for crude oil dramatically 
fell in the industrial nations. Additionally, as exports were halted by Arab nations to the 
United States and Holland, ship-owners placed vessels of less than 5 years old along with 
the newly manufactured into long term storage. Many were never used again with most 
going to a premature demise less than a decade later. 
 
Many accounts state that nationalisation was the story of Scott Lithgow in the 
1970s; indeed nationalisation entailed a change in ownership for the shipyard and a 
protracted battle by the Labour Party for the legislation to pass through Parliament (finally 
succeeding in 1977 through the use of the Parliament Act) but not any substantive changes 
in the operation or functions of the shipyard. 410 Rather, Scott Lithgow’s battle to finish and 
sell vessels no longer required by their owners, (which in many cases had undergone 
bankruptcy or just disappeared off the scene) is the genuine story of the shipyard in the 
1970s and represents a period when the shipyard’s actions reflected neither commercial 
reality nor independence of action as it came to rely on government assistance more and 
more.  Indeed, the government was complicit in the entire process, promising Scott 
Lithgow funding to finish vessels for owners that would only take delivery if the UK 
government provided assistance, effectively (once all the subsidies had been taken into 
account) a free vessel. However, fear of unemployment was a great motivator for the 
Labour government in the late 1970s (as the following chapters on Harland & Wolff in 
Belfast will demonstrate) and the many millions of pounds spent on Scott Lithgow were 
seen as a holding pattern until normal economic business could be resumed. 
 
                                                




This chapter discusses the activities of Scott Lithgow and the government in 
regards to the cancellation of orders from its two largest customers, the Greek 
Angelicoussis family, (which had a number of ventures under a number of different 
names) and Maritime Fruit Carriers, an Israeli shipping company. In both cases there is 
ample evidence to suggest that both orders were speculative in nature (taking advantage of 
the rising demand for supertankers) and yet there is also further evidence to show that 
Scott Lithgow and the British government did not follow (their own) procedures correctly, 
to make sure that these orders were placed in the United Kingdom. As the following pages 
demonstrate these orders were plagued with uncertainty from the first inquiries by these 
shipping lines to their final collapse. However, the attempt by the shipyard and government 
to find new purchasers is indicative of a lack of commercial caution on the part of Scott 
Lithgow and a failure by the government to comprehend not only the consequences of 
supporting risky ventures in the name of encouraging exports, but also the consequences of 
pouring more state aid into a failed enterprise to encourage employment. This chapter will 
argue that in the period 1973 – 1980 normal commercial cause and effect did not operate at 
Scott Lithgow, because the ongoing financial support from the government (regardless of 
the situation within the shipyard) effectively meant that the company did not have to live 





The Angelicoussis cancellations, 1973 - 1976 
 
 
The cancellation of orders for crude oil tankers in 1975 by the Anangel shipping 
company (which was part of the Angelicoussis Ship-holding Group) illuminates the demise 
of the market for new build supertankers and the effect this had upon Scott Lithgow. 
Angelicoussis was a Greek family owned and run business, with most of their vessels 
sailing under Panamanian and Liberian flags of convenience. Scott Lithgow had some 
difficulty because of this situation when trying to recover its costs from the cancellation of 
the contract, as the ownership of the tankers was by individual companies set up for each 
vessel.411 This section will demonstrate that, whilst the government (particularly when it 
came to guaranteeing export credit) was willing to bend the rules to make sure Scott 
Lithgow received the orders from the Greek company it was Scott Lithgow itself that had 
to take remedial actions to recover its costs. Therefore, the following pages provide an 
important contextual counterpoint to the case of the Maritime Fruit Carriers’ cancellation 
discussed later in this chapter, illuminating further the argument contained within this 
thesis concerning the rôle of government in the demise of shipbuilding in Britain. 
 
Indeed, the very nature of the Anangel company that ordered the two vessels from 
Scott Lithgow provides an important insight into the supertanker market of the early 
1970s. Although the eventual ownership of Anangel Grace and Anangel Fame, the two 
tankers Scott Lithgow was constructing for Angelicoussis, was never in doubt, because of 
creative accounting procedures used by the owners in the 1970s the actual name of the 
corporation that had possession of the vessels was uncertain. Three distinctive names crop 
up repeatedly in the archives; Anangel being the prefix given to all Angelicoussis vessels 
(even though in effect these were all separate companies under the ownership of Mr A.J 
Angelicoussis,) which were themselves brokered for charter by the Agelef Shipbrokers 
situated in London  (also owned by Mr. A.J Angelicoussis) and finally Angelicoussis as 
the owner of the aforementioned entities. Therefore, the label 
Anangel/Agelef/Angelicoussis (AAA) applies to these entities in this thesis, reflecting not 
only the different roles of the Angelicoussis companies, but also the common ownership. 
This is not unusual in itself, as the average supertanker in the 1970s would have been 
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owned and managed by a smaller family concern, funded by mortgages guaranteed using 
existing vessels and backed up by agreed 5-10 year charters from established oil 
companies.412 Registration of these vessels was as single corporate entities in the most 
economically convenient nation possible, Panama, Bermuda and Liberia being prominent 
examples.413 Consequently, the owner of one of these vessels could build it where 
cheapest, register it where the regulation costs were lowest, and man it with crewmembers 
from the cheapest possible country.  
 
However, the details of the contract between Scott Lithgow and AAA were atypical 
of orders placed for crude oil tankers at the waning stages of the supertanker boom. Firstly, 
the parties agreed the contracts in September 1973 and these were signed a month later 
during the first period of price increases and embargo by the OPEC cartel and secondly, 
the deadweight of the vessels at 134,000 tons was much smaller than the average size for a 
tanker in this period. Although supertankers, these were not VLCCs or ULCCs.414 The 
vessels were the first crude oil tankers ordered for the Anangel group and, with the 
Western economies feeling the first effects of the OPEC oil shock at this time, it  therefore 
appears that AAA took a cautious approach by ordering smaller vessels. Certainly, the 
OPEC price rise commenced on 17th October 1973 must have had an influence upon the 
decision of AAA. Conversely, the oil price rise did not reach its zenith until the 18th 
March 1974 and there was no indication that the rises would be a permanent feature of the 
global oil market when the tankers were ordered.  Nevertheless, the actions of 
Anangel/Agelef/Angelicoussis appeared to operate with reference to the specific condition 
of the oil tanker market at the time.415 
 
Even before the cancellation of the contracts, there were many complications,  for 
example with the Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD), the guarantor of a bank 
loan covering 80% of the vessels’ construction costs. Therefore, Scott Lithgow and AAA 
had to fulfil numerous government requirements before the approval of finance for the 
vessels.416 The main problem in concluding the financial agreements was finding an 
Overseas Bank Guarantor acceptable to the ECGD. The negotiations over this point 
continued until the ECGD’s approval of the financial contract in April 1974, even though 
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by this date AAA had still not yet nominated an Overseas Bank Guarantor (OBG).417 
Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether ECGD’s decision to provide a guarantee for a loan 
from a financial institution not yet nominated diverged from the accepted norms of 
financial best practice at the time.  
 
With the original agreement to purchase the vessels signed on 26th September 1973 
and with the actual contract for construction on 24th October 1973, the intention of 
Anangel/Agelef/Angelicoussis to purchase the vessels and the decision to proceed with the 
contract spanned either side of the OPEC decision to raise crude oil prices.418 
Consequently, the preparations for construction commenced from the end of October, with 
the pre-ordering of steel and specialist components and by January 1974,  £2,535,375 had 
been paid by AAA to Scott Lithgow’s in instalments to cover these costs.419 What occurred 
between Anangel/Agelef/Angelicoussis and Lithgows between April 1974 and February 
1975 when the cancellation or conversion of the orders was discussed at a meeting in 
London, is undocumented, but some uncertainty over the contract’s completion can be 
seen in correspondence between Scott Lithgow’s and the engine manufacturer, Kincaid 
during 1974 in which the shipyard asks for a year’s delay in paying for the two tankers’ 
diesel engines.420  
 
In February 1975, after a further rise in the price of crude oil of ten percent by the 
OPEC nations, Anangel/Agelef/Angelicoussis asked whether it could cancel the contracts 
or convert both vessels into bulk carriers, although it appears that the second option was 
not a serious consideration. However, Scott Lithgow had already ordered the majority of 
the steel and components, leaving the shipyard with a number of debts to contractors. 
Nonetheless, AAA believed that, as the contracts would be unfulfilled (in as much as the 
vessels would not be finished), there was the possibility of a rebate. With the work already 
advanced, Scott Lithgow knew this was not the case and with no contractual provisions for 
the costs of cancellation, aaa would still be liable for further payments.421 This point of 
view was again confirmed in a meeting held in London on 30th April 1974 with AAA, 
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where the patriarch of the Angelicoussis family, A.J and his son, J.A, requested the 
suspension of work on the orders pending a decision. Additionally, Ross Belch received a 
letter from the shipping company the following day enquiring about the price of two 
41,500-ton bulk carriers under negotiation, stating that for the price quoted it was unclear 
whether the ships were economical to purchase.422 In light of the crude oil tanker market 
and indeed the likelihood of AAA purchasing the tankers, negotiating for further vessels 
appears to have been part of the cancellation strategy of the ship-owners. On 8th March 
1975 Belch wrote to the AAA group reminding it that any suspension of work or the 
cancellation of the contracts would result in further costs to cover the loss of income for 
Scott Lithgow.423 The confirmation of the contract’s cancellation came in a response to 
Belch’s letter, sent on behalf of AAA by Agelef Shipping Co. (London) Ltd, (also owned 
by the Angelicoussis family), the letter dated 22nd May 1975 demonstrates that the 
shipping company would not be able to find productive use for the tankers nor would they 
be able to trade them on the open market. 424  A further indication of the financial condition 
of the shipping company at this time is a request for the return of the instalments already 
paid towards the vessels, namely £1,186,500 and £1,348,875 for vessels 1187 (Anangel 
Fame) and 1188 (Anangel Grace) respectively.425 However, the letter concluded with the 
proviso that “The law does provide certain discretionary powers for you to be compensated 
for expenses incurred by you in pursuance of the Contract...”426 Unfortunately for Anangel, 
the actual amount already ordered and spent by Scott Lithgow and its subcontractors 
already exceeded the amount paid by Anangel in their instalments, as Ross Belch 
forcefully stated in response.427 
 
Scott Lithgow started from this point to work towards recovering its costs by 
informing contractors that their contracts were cancelled and that steps were underway to 
resolve any disputes that might arise. However, Anangel/Agelef/Angelicoussis would not 
accept that the tankers were in fact cancelled nor would they accept that they owed monies 
to any of the companies involved in the construction of these vessels. Indeed, in a rambling 
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response to Belch’s letter of the 26th May 1975, C. Tsapralis of AAA stated that the 
contracts were not cancelled, but rather the term he used was that the “contract is 
frustrated”. Moreover, Tsapralis was of the opinion that the delay and cancellation of the 
contract would be to the advantage of the suppliers, making it possible for them to take on 
additional work.428 However, this was not the case. Belch reminded AAA that Scott 
Lithgow relied on a number of subcontractors and specialist parts manufacturers and that it 
was already liable to hand over quite large sums of money in payment for components 
already ordered.429 As the construction of the tankers never commenced in any substantive 
way, by April 1976 AAA had only paid instalments to the value of £2,783,704.20. Of this 
amount, £634,126.10 (22.77% of the claims) was agreed as valid and £54,078.23 was paid 
outright, but using a debtor’s ledger from the same date, we can see that from a contract 
price of £15,937,921.11, even with a total of £5,297,894.93 (33.24%) in claims settled at a 
zero rate (presumably because the contractors involved never actually commenced work), 
there were still £9,929,014.35 outstanding.430 Therefore, by subtracting the amount already 
paid in instalments (£2,535,375) from the amount claimed by April 1976 (£2,783,704.20) 
it can be seen that Scott Lithgow was actually owed a further £248,329.20.431 Indeed, the 
cancellation of the tanker orders affected the profit and loss statement of Scott Lithgow, 
with an estimated loss in revenue and profit running into many millions, with a loss of 
income for Scott Lithgow (based on potential outlays during contraction and including 
money already paid out) of £13,468,447.50; £6,228,447.50 for vessel 1197 and £7,240,000 
for 1198.432 Furthermore, in a letter to the solicitors acting for Scott Lithgow (Neill, Clark 
and Murray, Greenock) Mr. A.G. McNeilage of Scott Lithgow states that if sundry 
expenses of £54,078.23 and the aforementioned claims, (agreed and not agreed) of 
£2,783,704.20 are included, the actual loss of revenue and profits stood at £16,306,229.93 
on these contracts.433  
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Anangel/Agelef/Angelicoussis were persistent in demanding the return of the 
money they had paid Scott Lithgow, employing solicitors to pursue a refund and mitigation 
of outstanding costs.434 Nevertheless, Scott Lithgow, as advised by its solicitors, 
understood that Anangel Grace and Anangel Fame were in effect “shell” companies with 
no assets other than the incomplete vessels, which were in the possession (in component 
form) of Scott Lithgow. However, the company’s desired outcome was to prevent AAA 
from taking action to reclaim the payments already made, rather than claiming additional 
damages.435 To further this end the shipyard’s solicitors requested an Opinion of Counsel 
(an advocate) to decide upon the legality of the actions undertaken by AAA and the 
responses made by Scott Lithgow. In the advocate’ opinion Anangel Fame and Grace did 
not have frustrated contracts:436  
 
In my opinion these circumstances fall far short of the legal 
requirement for frustration. Fame and Grace are probably right when 
they say that the present prospects for tankers throughout the world are 
poor. But that is to say no more than that there has been a recession. 
The completed tankers would be available to compete for charters in a 
much-restricted market. There is no question of tanker charters having 
come to an end altogether as a result  (of a) cataclysmic event 
equivalent to war.437 
 
Moreover, the advocate discussed whether there was a case for the return of the 
payments made by Anangel/Agelef/Angelicoussis. In his opinion, there would be a case if 
there were no costs undertaken by Scott Lithgow in respect to the contracts. However, as 
this section has shown, Scott Lithgow made substantial orders for construction materials 
that required payment, and as the party that cancelled the contracts for the construction of 
the vessels, it was Anangel/Agelef/Angelicoussis’ responsibility to pay subcontractors. The 
advocate, therefore, emphasised this point, but with an important “fair-play” proviso in 
favour of AAA added in the last paragraphs: 
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...it appears that abortive outlays incurred by Lithgows and by 
their sub-contractors amount to very much less than the total instalment 
fund. For that reason it will be particularly important for Lithgows to 
scrutinise all claims by sub-contractors and suppliers with more than 
usual care...438 
 
He concluded his opinion with: 
 
Lithgows enjoy the important advantage that they hold the 
instalment fund. Fame and Grace are therefore faced with the problem 
of taking the initiative and of deciding what form their challenge should 
take. In my view the present dispute falls within the scope of the 
arbitration clause. In the light of the existing information I consider that 
Lithgows have reasonable prospects of justifying to the Arbiter 
(assuming the parties would undertake or indeed ever went to, 
arbitration) their retention of the entire instalment fund.439 
 
Bolstered by this opinion, Scott Lithgow instructed its solicitors to inform 
Anangel/Agelef/Angelicoussis of the possible liabilities they faced from the cancellation of 
the contract. Writing to Constant and Constant in May 1976, Scott Lithgow’ solicitors 
pointed out that their clients had already paid £634,126.10 to cover equipment ordered and 
had agreed a further £2,774,183.08 to pay for the bulk of the equipment ordered for the 
two tankers.440 However, Scott Lithgow’s solicitors did not stop there. The letter concluded 
by stating that, considering the condition of the new build market was such in 1975, any 
replacement orders gained by Scott Lithgow would have been loss making, and therefore,  
considering the overall loss in revenue, the sum total of the claims that could potentially be 
made against AAA would be in the region of £14,341,381.18 from a total of 
£16,876.756.68, less the £2,774,183.08 already settled and paid.441 Whether the two shell 
companies set up in Panama by AAA had such funds was not in doubt; after checking with 
attorneys based in Panama City, Neill, Clerk and Murray were convinced they did not.442 
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Nonetheless, considering the efforts being made by AAA to have their payments returned, 
these actions reinforced Scott Lithgow’s claim on the money it had already received. In 
response from AAA queried Scott Lithgow’s accounts and requested an independent audit 
to ascertain the true amounts owed by Scott Lithgow to its suppliers.443 Yet again AAA 
wrote that if an arrangement could be made concerning the disputed amount, there would 
be the possibility of negotiating new contracts for smaller vessels to be constructed by 
Scott Lithgow.444 The response to this by Scott Lithgow can be seen in a handwritten note 
sent by Ross Belch to Scott Lithgow’s solicitors, which, on the one hand, simply stated 
that, ‘We will certainly not open our books to them’ and, on the other hand wondered 
whether the shipyard should open into negotiations with Angelicoussis for additional 
vessels.445 
 
The dispute between Scott Lithgow and Anangel/Agelef/Angelicoussis had petered 
out by 1976, with Scott Lithgow retaining the money already paid, but not pursuing 
amounts from the shipping line, because Scott Lithgow had no further liabilities towards 
AAA and because the latter was clearly unable to pay any potential damages awarded 
against it. What is important to note is that Scott Lithgow did not try to complete the 
vessels, but preferred to enter into a damage limitation exercise to reduce its losses and as a 
result did not ask the government for any assistance. This is an important comparison to 
make with Scott Lithgow’s relationship with the Maritime Fruit Carriers concern, which, 
whilst initially the same as the one it had with AAA became embroiled in a larger web of 
government intervention and control. Therefore, the tale of Scott Lithgow and 
Anangel/Agelef/Angelicoussis provides an import context to the relationship between 
Scott Lithgow and its many private customers. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
Arosemena, Noriega & Castro, Abogados, Panama “Anangel Grace Compania Naviera, S.A. and Anangel 
Fame Compania Naviera, S.A.” 
443 GUAS GD 323/1/3/39 Letter dated 9th September 1976 from Constant and Constant to Neill, Clerk and 
Murray “Lithgows. Limited Anangel Fame Compania Naviera S.A. Ship No. 1197, Lithgows Limited 
Anangel Fame Compania Naviera S.A. Ship No. 1198” 
444 ibid. 
445 GUAS GD 323/1/3/39 handwritten note dated 14th September 1976 from Ross Belch to Alan McNeilage 
written on a letter from Neill, Clerk & Murray to Alan McNeilage, “Anangel Fame Compania Naviera S.A. 








Hindsight allows the historian to comprehend that few tankers ordered in 1973 
would end up being launched and if they were, a shipyard would take a loss on the 
contract. As a result the exposure of the British shipbuilding industry to the collapse of 
Maritime Fruit Carriers (MFC) should be seen in the context of the number of vessels 
ordered by MFC; nineteen large crude carriers in the UK. Compared to the number of large 
tankers manufactured overall in the UK in the period 1965 to 1980, twenty-four, then the 
effect on British shipbuilding of the collapse of the MFC contracts is obvious as this 
represented the majority of British shipbuilding capacity.446 Indeed, Maritime Fruit Carriers 
placed orders for six tankers of 333,000 tons from Harland & Wolff in January 1973 (in a 
contract worth £150 million) and further orders in March for eleven 250,000-ton vessels 
(valued at £150 million) placed with Swan Hunter, with two more on the Clyde at Scott 
Lithgow (valued at £18m each). 447 To take advantage of government grants to promote the 
construction of UK owned vessels (and the speculative tanker market of 1973), the Swan 
Hunter and Scott Lithgow orders were placed by companies jointly owned by the shipyards 
and Maritime Fruit Carriers.448 The repercussions of the collapse were felt in Newcastle 
and Belfast as well as Greenock, not merely for the fact that more orders were given to 
Harland & Wolff and Swan Hunter than Scott Lithgow, but for political concerns of 
unemployment in Scotland and the North East and the ongoing political struggles in 
Northern Ireland. The arrival of a Labour government in 1974 led to efforts to nationalise 
the shipbuilding industry to prevent its complete demise.449 
 
Maritime Fruit Carriers did not admit to having any problems, but by early 1976 
the reality was simple: the company was insolvent and was not in operation. Indeed, all its 
offices around the world had closed, the Israeli authorities had taken over the Haifa head 
office for the non-payment of taxes and creditors were suing the company in the United 
States. Nevertheless, despite all the trials and tribulations of the company, in 1978 the 
United Kingdom was the only country in which Maritime Fruit Carriers was recognised as 
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an existing corporation.450 This section will demonstrate that the presumption by Scott 
Lithgow and the British government that Maritime Fruit Carriers was a viable company 
compounded the effects that the failure of the supertanker market had on the shipyard. It 
will show that, despite producing a product that customers no longer wanted in a shipyard 
ill-suited to the task, the fear of the consequences of Scott Lithgow’s closure pushed the 
state into spending more money on the shipyard, which merely aggravated an already 
precarious situation, reducing the viability of Scott Lithgow as a shipbuilder in the 
process.451  
 
Scott Lithgow did not stop work on the two VLCCs being constructed for Maritime 
Fruit Carriers until May 1976 and the fact that these vessels were owned and financed by 
two joint venture companies, owned by MFC and Scott Lithgow, the Cartsdyke Dockyard 
Co. Ltd for vessel number 1191 and Atlantine Limited for number 1192, influenced the 
decision to keep working.452 Originally, Scott Lithgow set up the two wholly owned single 
ship owning companies to take advantage of construction grants for British flagged 
vessels. The two vessels received government construction grants under section 5 of the 
Industrial Development Act (1966), which allowed for subsidy grants up to the value of 
twenty percent of the capital expenditure on new UK flagged and owned vessels and in the 
case of Scott Lithgow, these grants were, £2,652,000 for vessel 1191 and £6,963,800 for 
the larger vessel 1192.453 In addition, the government guaranteed loans from the Bank of 
Scotland to the amount of £10.7 million for vessel 1191 and £11.7 million for vessel 
1192.454 However, by February 1976 the government was concerned that with the very 
public financial problems of MFC, the vessels would either not be completed on time, or 
that they would end up under a non-UK flag, making the government’s funding effectively 
worthless.455 The government issued a number of 90-day moratorium notices to give MFC 
more time to find additional funds, but by 28th April 1976 the government no longer had 
enough confidence in MFC to allow grant payments to continue.456 Writing to Cartsdyke in 
May 1976, the Department of Industry stated that, even with confirmation from Scott 
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Lithgow that construction would proceed, it was still uncertain about the financial 
condition of Maritime Fruit Carriers and therefore that the vessels would be completed.457 
That the government wanted to take over the companies rather the vessels, is indicative of 
a preference to recover investment grants and loans, (which the more realistic members of 
the government admitted was unlikely).458 There were three options open to the 
government. The first was the continuation of MFC ownership of the vessels, which even 
with the efforts of Scott Lithgow to arrange a 15-year charter with P & O under MFC 
ownership, was unlikely (a course of action the government did not support). The second, 
involved the Bank of Scotland taking over of the contract to either sell the vessels to a third 
party and the third option allowed Scott Lithgow to retain ownership and lease the vessels 
on a long term charter to a shipping company.459 
 
Once the government confirmed Maritime Fruit Carriers’ lack of viability, 
intervention was swift and on 29th November 1976 the Department of Industry 
informed MFC that the Bank of Scotland was to take over the contract for both tankers 
and find a purchaser.460 Initially, the actions of the government appeared rational, at 
least in terms of preserving employment and preventing the collapse of Scott Lithgow, 
but two very important factors must be taken into account when considering the 
government’s chosen course of action. First, the global tanker market was in a state of 
collapse; banks, shipyards and ship-owners had over extended themselves in the early 
1970s. Second, (despite the unlikelihood of selling the tanker for anything approaching 
cost price) the government was intent on reclaiming investment grants repayable if the 
vessel was sold to a party other than MFC after completion.461  
 
In the event of the Bank of Scotland calling in the guarantee, however, the 
Government would have to pay the full loan amount and sell the vessel, greatly increasing 
the cost to the government. In this situation, as pointed out by the Treasury Solicitor, the 
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government would in fact be both the creditor and the debtor for the £1.4 million grant.462 
By issuing an invoice for the repayment of the grant, or at least letting it be known that they 
would issue an invoice for repayment, the government would actually hinder the sale of the 
vessel, leading to the credit guarantee being called upon by the Bank of Scotland. A 
purchaser was found for vessel 1991 (Cartsdyke) by the end of 1976, which was the 
Niarchos group, one of the largest tanker companies in the world at that time.463 Niarchos 
offered £15.75 million, in cash, for the ownership of the vessel, which breaks down as 
£1.025 million to cover defaulted payments to the Bank of Scotland, £6.15 million to Scott 
Lithgow in instalments during construction, of which £4.1 million could be refunded if 
Scott Lithgow declared the contract frustrated and £8.575 million to the Bank of Scotland 
on delivery to cover existing loans.464 The remainder was used to cover incidental costs, 
such as brokers and legal fees.465 These amounts were less than the original contract price 
of £20,500,000 for hull no. 1191.466 Additionally, liability for the recovery of the £1.43 
million grant was the responsibility of MFC, but as the recovery of this amount was 
considered unlikely, the matter was deferred until a future date.467 However, during the 
trials of vessel 1191, now named “World Score”, serious faults were found in its design and 
construction. On the 20th February 1978, Scott Lithgow wrote to the Dolman subsidiary of 
Niarchos stating that delivery would be 73 days late because of “...material defects in our 
subcontractors’ materials and supplies and also unusual incidence of bad weather 
conditions...”468 Consequently, in 1978 the vessel underwent engine repairs and dry-
docking in Rotterdam to inspect the hull (World Score was not meeting the top speed as 
specified in the contract and the hull had to be checked for “roughness), which could not be 
done in Scotland as there were no facilities large enough.469 Niarchos became agitated and 
was concerned that the vessel was seriously flawed, and a delicate situation ensued which 
required W.O. Koppen, the international operations manager for Scott Lithgow, to warn 
Belch not to send any more ‘force majeure’ letters stating the problems with the vessel 
were not the fault of Scott Lithgow, because, ‘this might aggravate the present situation’.470  
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Nevertheless, the inability of World Score to function up to the standards requested 
in the building contract, aggravated Niarchos further and he wrote to Scott Lithgow and its 
owners (in 1978 after nationalisation) British Shipbuilders repudiating the contract and 
requesting that his money be returned (with interest), after hearing about further delays at a 
meeting with a member of the Scott Lithgow management, (Elderfield in Athens in June 
1978).471 After a heated exchange of telexes, and once Scott Lithgow was forced to admit 
to Niarchos that as the engine builder Kincaid was part of the Scott Lithgow group force 
majeure was not applicable, Belch made matters worse by writing a defensive and pithy 
letter to Niarchos. In his usual style, Belch wrote: 
 
‘As to the meeting in Athens on the 7th June, this was a casual conversation 
over drinks at a cocktail party...what has occurred is that your representatives have 
attempted, by misquoting what was said by Mr. Elderfield at an exploratory meeting, 
to find grounds which would give you a possible excuse for failing to honour your 
commitments. Needless to say such attempts are completely groundless and 
ineffectual.’472 
 
As expected, Niarchos demanded an immediate apology and retraction.473 Diplomatic 
relations were restored between Dolman and Scott Lithgow (at the insistence of British 
Shipbuilders) when both companies agreed that Elderfield did not have the authority to act 
for Scott Lithgow.474 In the end, and despite protestations from Elderfield that World Score 
was ‘a bad ship’, Scott Lithgow reduced the price of the ship by a further £3.45 million and 
the vessel was delivered to Dolman/Niarchos on 30th October 1978, heading immediately 
into long-term storage in Thessalonica.475 
 
The purchase of vessel 1192, or “World Scholar” by Niarchos (through its single 
ship owning subsidiary the Dexter Shipping Company), was fraught with additional 
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complications. Sold for an agreed price of £17 million in February 1977 and aided by a 
further £5 million from the government to guarantee construction and prevent the loss of 
3000 jobs, work on the vessel had barely started and many of the components were 
removed to complete the World Score on time.476 The amount of money received by Scott 
Lithgow for vessel 1192 during the course of its construction was in the region of 
£24,405,000, which included the amount paid by Niarchos, the additional £5 million from 
the government and the £2,405,000 already paid by MFC. However, at no point was a 
profit recorded on this vessel and in reality its construction continued to protect 
employment at Scott Lithgow. Progress on the vessel was slow and the highly publicised 
technical problems with the machinery combined with labour disputes created concern 
within the management of the parent company, British Shipbuilders. Indeed, as P.A. Milne, 
the Managing Director, wrote to Belch in September 1979: 
 
We are now extremely concerned at the progress situation on this ship and 
are beginning to doubt whether the present approach will achieve a delivery to the 
owner before the end of 1979.477 
 
Added to which, Niarchos requested the return of £250,000 because he felt machinery used 
on 1191 taken from 1192 was replaced at their expense and included in the price of vessel 
1192.478 Although the situation was unlikely to lead to the cancellation of the vessel 
(possibly because it was already chartered to Shell) Niarchos was fully prepared (and 
indeed attempted) to take Scott Lithgow to court over lost revenue due to the delays with 
the vessel. However, after much “off the record” discussion between British Shipbuilders 
and Niarchos, both parties agreed to reduce the price of the vessel by £4 million. With 
Belch only carbon copied onto the correspondence, British Shipbuilders effectively took 
the matter out of his hands.479 Scott Lithgow delivered the vessel to Niarchos on 31st 
January 1980 in Lisbon, the nearest and cheapest port with a dry dock large enough to take 
the vessel agreeable to both Niarchos and Scott Lithgow.480 
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According to The Times, the first vessel (1191) was subsidised by around £20 
million by the government in December 1976, but no accurate figures exist covering the 
difference between the sale price of £15.75 million and the actual cost of £30 million, 
including other additional costs taken into account by Scott Lithgow.481 On the 2nd March 
1977 Lloyd’s List stated that, even when the second vessel (1192) was still in two halves 
and not yet welded together, the Niarchos contracts were funded by a substantial 
government loss, including an additional £5 million in grants provided by a government 
shipbuilding intervention fund of £65 million set up in 1977.482 It is important to note the 
contradictory statements made at this stage by members of the government, because what 
was agreed between the civil servants at the Department of Industry and Scott Lithgow, 
differed on occasion from what was agreed between Scott Lithgow and the Minister for 
Industry, Gerald Kaufman.483 
 
Officials at the Department of Industry wanted to continue pursuing the rebate of 
£1.4 million in grant money given to Maritime Fruit Carriers as these funds only applied to 
vessels running under the UK flag and not to a vessel owned by Niarchos running under a  
(usually Liberian or Panamanian) flag of convenience. It is doubtful whether the 
aforementioned civil servants questioned whether or not the money would ever be repaid. 
Rather, both applied the rules as set out in Section 10 of the Industry Act (1972) rigidly, 
which stated that whilst the government may provide grants and guarantees for loans for 
the purpose of shipbuilding, if the recipient of the completed vessel was not that originally 
intended, then the amount is repayable in full (an opinion dogmatically advocated by civil 
servants). After further discussion, the government decided to start proceedings to recover 
the grant money from Cartsdyke and Atlantine on 5th April 1977.484 As these companies 
were joint ventures between MFC and Scott Lithgow and as MFC was in no position to 
pay its debts, the burden of repayment would fall on Scott Lithgow, which in itself was 
being kept alive by its share of a £65 million government fund to assist shipbuilding. 
Would the government, therefore, end up handing out money with one hand only to receive 
it with another? This was soon realised by the Department of Industry, which concluded 
that as the government would not receive any funds from either company, would it not be 
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better to write the money off instead because the recovery of the money was unlikely.485 
The accounting branch of the Department, however, decide that pursuing the claims was 
legally justified and requested that the whole issue be passed onto the Treasury Solicitor’s 
Office.486 Therefore, a claim was made against Atlantine on 8th November 1977 and 
against Cartsdyke on the 2nd February 1978. 
 
What remained of Maritime Fruit Carriers, as represented by Chaim Refaeli, its 
general manager contested the claim if only to prevent a diminished stock of assets 
becoming completely reduced. In an affidavit, he argued that Scott Lithgow ordered 
Atlantine from itself and not directly by MFC. Indeed, Atlantine was set up by Scott 
Lithgow on 21st October 1970 and the grant, was applied for and paid before Maritime 
Fruit Carriers took ownership of Atlantine.487 Agreeing with all the financial stipulations 
given by the government in regards to the guarantees, Refaeli stated that MFC made every 
effort to continue the vessel and that if the government had been less doctrinaire and more 
flexible, MFC would have completed the contract. 488 In effect Refaeli stated that without 
any prior knowledge of whether or not the government recovered its costs from the sale of 
the vessels to Niarchos and considering that Maritime Fruit Carriers were no longer in a 
position to repay the full amount of the grants, the government should debate whether or 
not this was a valid and worthwhile exercise.  
 
Nevertheless, the Ministry of Industry was of the opinion that pursuing Atlantine 
and Cartsdyke through the courts was indeed a worthwhile and valid exercise and treated 
the affidavit from Maritime Fruit Carriers as factually incorrect and far-fetched.489 
However, there were reasons why the government would want to pursue a debt that would 
force both Atlantine and Cartsdyke into administration, as the following extract from an 
internal memo circulated within the Department of Industry demonstrates: 
 
On 1191 (Cartsdyke): 
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Mr Rawlinson agreed that the investment grant debt should be used 
to put Cartsdyke into administration, thus avoiding the legal complexity 
which surrounds the section 10 loan and minimising the risk of a successful 
challenge regarding the sale of the ship. 
 
On 1192 (Atlantine): 
 
Again, it was thought desirable to use the investment grant debt to 
liquidate the company to prevent the sale being challenged.490 
 
It appears perverse to pursue a debt that in all fairness could not be repaid (especially 
considering the potential courts costs involved), but the government wanted to prevent 
Maritime Fruit Carriers challenging the sale of the vessels to Niarchos. Nevertheless, other 
considerations could still negate the value of such actions and it was advantageous to 
pursue insolvency to prevent the sales being challenged.491 
 
The defence of Maritime Fruit Carriers and the statement made by Chaim Refaeli 
made little impact and on the 19th June 1978, the Court of Session ordered Maritime Fruit 
Carriers to repay the grants given for the construction of vessel 1191.492 The same occurred 
for Atlantine on the 17th July 1978 and proceedings commenced to recover the debts of 
both companies.493 This happened very slowly and an attempt by MFC to offer $100,000 
was quickly rebuffed by the government, as was an attempt by Refaeli to negotiate the debt 
in person.494 In the end, Atlantine was wound up on the 27th November 1978 and it was 
soon discovered by the Ministry of Industry at the first creditors’ meeting that the company 
had no real assets, but debts totalling £14,396,000, the majority of which, £8,127,000, was 
claimed by the Inland Revenue.495 Cartsdyke, upon being wound up under the Scottish 
legal system on the 6th June 1979, was found to be in the same condition. The victory for 
the government was pyrrhic indeed, as neither company had any assets to pay its debts. 
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Consequently, the Department of Industry wrote to the Treasury Solicitor in September 
1979 requesting the amounts to be written off, which happened by February 1980 and thus 
the government ended its efforts to recover money from MFC. 496 This ended the 
relationship between MFC and Scott Lithgow and indeed signalled the end of Scott 
Lithgow as a manufacturer of large vessels. From a contract that had the potential to 
provide large profits speculating on the open market for newly constructed VLCC and 
ULCC crude oil tankers, through the trials and tribulations of finding a buyer for vessels no 
longer in demand and government efforts to recover substantial funds from the defaulting 
MFC, the saga ended with a whimper despite the potential for a very large explosion. 
However, in the end MFC, the 1970s Labour government and Scott Lithgow faded firstly 
into insignificance and then eventually disappeared altogether. 
 
Scott Lithgow failed to recover from the cancellation of the Angelicoussis and 
Maritime Fruit Carriers contracts and its efforts to recoup its costs and survive contributed 
little to the shipyard’s prospects even in the short term. However, Scott Lithgow and the 
shipping lines were not the only parties involved; the government played a major part in 
developments over the course of the decade reinforcing the hypothesis of this thesis that 
the outcome of negotiations between government and the shipbuilders contributed to 
policies that hastened the industry’s eventual demise.  Therefore, the fate of Scott Lithgow 
was interwoven and determined by its efforts to recover costs from AAA and MFC. 
Indeed, in the haste of Scott Lithgow and the government (in the form of the Export 
Credits Guarantee Department, ECGD) to sign orders from the Angelicoussis family, it is 
unlikely that proper oversight was exercised by either Scott Lithgow or the ECGD in 
determining the viability of Angelicoussis and its ability to service its debts in the event of 
an unforeseen circumstance. Furthermore, in the case of the ECGD in guaranteeing the 
loan for the two Angelicoussis vessels without first undertaking the necessary procedures 
in vetting an approved overseas bank for the transaction, the department acted hastily to 
ensure that the order was placed in a UK shipyard. Therefore, when both contracts 
collapsed and Angelicoussis requested the return of its money, Scott Lithgow was 
unprepared to deal with the consequences and hoped for the resurrection of the contracts, 
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at least for a period of one year. However, Angelicoussis did not end the situation without 
a demand for compensation and it was for Scott Lithgow to make sure that the shipping 
company did not have any sums of money awarded to it by the courts.  
 
The government was heavily involved with Scott Lithgow after the demise of the 
Maritime Fruit Carrier contracts. First (as with the Angelicoussis contracts) it was the 
guarantor of the financial arrangements, but second because the impact on British 
shipbuilding from the collapse of the contracts was much larger than the mere loss of a 
contract for two vessels in a single shipyard. In the case of Scott Lithgow, the involvement 
of the shipyard in joint ventures designed to exploit the speculative market for newly built 
supertankers in the early 1970s, opened it up to a number of legal challenges by Maritime 
Fruit Carriers concerning its liability for the costs of the cancelled contracts. That the 
shipyard and the British government continued to enter into negotiations with a 
representative of MFC after the Israeli government had suspended the company’s activities 
(and the US government’s Securities and Exchange Commission commenced an 
investigation into financial malpractice) demonstrates an a desperation to prevent a legal 
claim against the assets of Scott Lithgow. Therefore, the government took legal action to 
make both Atlantine and Cartsdyke return grant monies paid by the government, even 
though there was no prospect of payment from MFC, so that a sale of the two vessels to the 
Niarchos concern was guaranteed. Nevertheless, the sale to Niarchos was perpetually in 
danger of collapse itself through ill-tempered communications and poor build quality 
making the two tankers (even with the price and contact underwritten and subsidised by 
many millions of pounds of British government money) an unsavoury prospect for the 
Greek company. Niarchos aside, for all the parties involved in the collapse of the Maritime 
Fruit Carrier contracts the situation was an exercise in survival based on reacting to events 
as they unfolded. 
 
To summarise, the Scott Lithgow shipyard was fatally compromised by speculative 
contracts entered into with shipping companies to take advantage of the growing demand 
for supertankers between 1970 and 1973. However, once this market had collapsed 
through the events of autumn 1973, the cancellation of contracts by Angelicoussis and 
Maritime Fruit Carriers left the shipyard dependent on government intervention to survive. 
Nevertheless, this chapter has demonstrated the British government and the shipyard did 
not understand two crucial points, firstly that when negotiating with these firms they were 
in fact dealing with companies with few employees and little capital and secondly, that 




rather than providing funds to develop the Scott Lithgow shipyard into one with a new 
purpose, the government subsidised the continuation of vessels with no reasonable 
commercial prospects with an eventual buyer who was unenthusiastic and only took 
possession of the vessels after the government had effectively paid for both. Therefore, as 
with the development of the Scott Lithgow shipyard through the merger of Scott and 
Lithgows in the late 1960s, neither government nor the management of the shipyard itself 
reflected commercial reality as found in the market for newly constructed vessels and 
preferred to continue on a course of action, that whilst preserving employment in the short 









The report of the Geddes Committee did not advocate the creation of a large 
shipyard on the lower Clyde, although it did state that two groupings were possible in the 
west of Scotland. However, the approach by the Scotts and Lithgows shipyards to the 
Shipbuilding Industries Board in 1967 led to the SIB considering the idea as a serious 
proposition. With hindsight, it was logical that the two yards, being in close proximity to 
one another in Greenock and sharing suppliers, would make ideal partners. However, two 
factors influenced the merger of the shipyards to such an extent, that the process would 
eventually become little more than a paper exercise. First, the attempts to retain guaranteed 
naval construction at the Cartsburn and Cartsdyke shipyards of Scott and secondly the 
reluctance of Ross Belch (the eventual managing director of the merged Scott Lithgow 
group) to commit to any spending without the full financial backing of the Shipbuilding 
Industries Board. Contextualised by seven years of ongoing negotiations between the 
shipyard and central government and, as this thesis has shown, against a backdrop of 
declining traditional industries in Scotland and the promotion of newer forms of 
manufacturing by a Scottish Office with little influence or interest in a traditional industry 
such as shipbuilding, the narrative of Scott Lithgow in this period illuminates many of the 
wider concepts behind the study of an industry’s decline. 
 
The first factor, the negotiations to retain military construction, demonstrated the 
reluctance of the group to operate solely in the commercial market for merchant shipping. 
The Geddes report stated that the Royal Navy required only two, possibly three, military 
shipyards to service its needs and that the Scotts of Greenock yard was not one of them. 
Nevertheless, in its negotiations with the SIB the management of Scott Lithgow operated 
without this viewpoint present in their minds, using brinkmanship with the SIB and the 
Ministry of Technology to claim that the only way the merger could survive would be with 
guaranteed government orders. Unfortunately, this did little to enamour the shipyard’s 
management to the government so civil servants and ministers were reluctant to work with 
Scott Lithgow. Indeed, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, there was very little faith 
in the exercise succeeding, even in the highest levels of government. 
 
The second factor, the reluctance to spend any money redeveloping the shipyard’s 




speculation and risk taking, unless it was the government taking the risks. Indeed, Scott 
Lithgow hampered the initial discussions with the government over funding by its refusal 
to disclose any certain plans for the development of facilities. This was another misguided 
attempt at brinkmanship, with Belch first requesting how much money the shipyard was 
likely to receive prior to disclosing any concrete plans. Without concrete plans, the SIB 
was justifiably reluctant when dealing with Scott Lithgow; even when considering the 
more ambitious of the proposed development schemes, it believed from the very beginning 
that the shipyard did not intend to build a modern set of shipbuilding facilities. Indeed, in 
comparison to the modern shipyards being built in Japan and Europe in the 1960s, Scott 
Lithgow proposed to make the most of its existing facilities to do the similar tasks for a 
smaller capital outlay. Although joining two halves of a vessel whilst it is afloat makes 
sense in small, restricted harbours, for the combined yards of Scotts and Lithgows, it is the 
case that there was the space for a large modern yard. The reluctance of management to 
spend any money on development or even to make any more than a token attempt at 
merging their facilities shows that it is the case that management stretched the existing 
company as far at they could to compete in an evolving market for shipping. The need to 
retain military construction confirms this observation; the management wanted to continue 
making ships, but with the minimum amount of risk on safe state funded contracts. 
 
With a shipyard unable to engage with the developing market for tankers in the 
early 1970s, the demise of the ‘supertanker boom’ in 1973 dealt Scott Lithgow a fatal 
blow, particularly in light of the cancelled supertanker contacts. In the case of 
Anangel/Agelef/Angelicoussis, the shipyard solved the dispute with a minimum of 
government intervention; the recourse taken was a legal one to recover costs. Although it is 
a case that shipping unilaterally cancelled the orders and indeed Scott Lithgow suffered a 
loss of income, the overall effect was localised in Greenock. When it came to Maritime 
Fruit Carriers, the wider British shipbuilding industry felt the effects nationwide. 
Moreover, the loss of the VLCC contracts, in addition to the loss of the 
Anangel/Agelef/Angelicoussis orders had a profound effect on Scott Lithgow, the result of 
which would potentially have been the collapse of the company. With an interventionist 
government that advocated state ownership and that eventually nationalised the 
shipbuilding industry in 1977, a situation arose whereby an ailing shipyard received state 
assistance (even if it meant the completion of unprofitable contracts) to protect the jobs 





Therefore, the collapse of the Anangel/Agelef/Angelicoussis contract, while not 
attracting the publicity of the collapse of Maritime Fruit Carriers, did not as Murphy and 
Johnman state '...come as a blessing in disguise', their rationale based upon an assumption 
that to continue the vessels would have led to even larger losses.497 Scott Lithgow lost 
money, not only in the potential loss of income and forecasted profits (predicting which is 
an inexact science), but in the loss of the money already spent by Scott Lithgow in 
purchasing equipment for the order. That AAA was (in its dealings with Scott Lithgow at 
least) of the belief that the contract had been frustrated (i.e. the contract was no longer 
valid due to the actions of one or more of the parties involved) by the actions of Scott 
Lithgow, demonstrates that the company wanted to abandon the contracts without 
penalties. As demonstrated in this chapter, it is a simple case of a small family owned and 
run shipping concern that no longer wanted to take possession of unusable vessels, which 
were worth less than the building cost. This was the understanding eventually reached 
between Scott Lithgow and AAA, the shipyard knew that with the Byzantine financial and 
ownership structures of the companies run by the Angelicoussis family, in no way would it 
have been possible to claim, win and receive any further compensation without further 
losses on their part.  
 
This contrasted with the approach taken by Scott Lithgow and the UK government 
to the collapse of Maritime Fruit Carriers. In 1975, the government was looking at the 
demise nationwide of at least 19 orders and potentially many more. This was to the 
advantage of Scott Lithgow in off-loading the two MFC VLCC contracts and government 
negotiations led to the enormous Niarchos shipping concern taking the one vessel 
completed in 1978 and then purchasing the final VLCC the shipyard built in 1981. Neither 
contract made a profit, but by this time Scott Lithgow and the British government were 
more concerned with the preservation of jobs rather than the creation of profits. Therefore, 
in both cases, Scott Lithgow lost income and certainly did not record a profit, as the 
following table demonstrates, but in the case of MFC, they were at least part of a highly 
publicised national campaign to continue the construction of cancelled vessels. That both 
vessels were disliked by the eventual owner and made huge losses was of little concern to 
management, the ethos was to survive by any means necessary, prolonging and dragging 
out the existence of Scott Lithgow. 
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Table 4.1: Scott Lithgow, Profit and Loss, Vessels Built and Gross 
tonnage, 1970 - 1980. 
 













1970 8 268544 6456 41.60 400 
1971 9 200726 7496 26.78 -1,501 
1972 5 51434 8295 6.20 662 
1973 6 75873 8323 9.12 -1,609 
1974 7 249323 8396 29.70 -136 
1975 3 62679 8477 7.39 221 
1976 4 181178 8101 22.36 -883 
1977 2 13174 7818 1.69 -1,603 
1978 6 297177 7730 38.44 -22,432 
1979 5 153443 7830 19.60 -12,473 
1980 3 49446 6924 7.14 -42,313 
Source: GD 323/1/2/18-28, Annual report for directors, 1970-1981. 
 
Scott Lithgow made its last vessel (a tanker for British Petroleum using material 
left over from the cancelled Angelicoussis contracts) in 1982 and was closed for good in 
1987. In the 1950s, Lithgows was a major manufacturer of large vessels, equal in tonnage 
constructed to any Japanese shipyard, but by 1967, this was no longer the case. Scotts 
survived until the late 1960s on naval contracts, particularly submarines, but it was barely 
active as a manufacturer of merchant shipping. A large, consolidated, rationalised 
shipbuilding entity built on the lower Clyde to take advantage of the supertanker boom 
would have seemed a reasonable proposition in 1965, but the management culture of the 
two yards was just not able to grasp this fact. Indeed, by 1965, large shipyards in Japan had 
already moved onto pre-fabrication and the use of building docks. After an early start, 
Scotts and Lithgows prevaricated until 1969 before deciding on the form of their merger 
and future developments, which flew in the face of the corporate wisdom of the time found 
in successful shipyards in Japan and Scandinavia. That the eventual merged entity was a 
holding company, which planned to build modern vessels by utilising existing 
infrastructure to do what foreign companies constructed an entirely new shipyard for 
demonstrated Scott Lithgow’s lack of strategic vision. Once the OECD economies plunged 
into crisis in 1973, the shipyard was dealt a fatal blow and the care and attention given to 
Scott Lithgow after 1973 was palliative in nature; the shipyard did not adapt to a booming 
market and therefore its final demise in the 1980s, although delayed by political 
intervention from central government, was inevitable. However, as the follow chapters will 






The historical context of the relationship between the Harland 
and Wolff Shipyard, Belfast and Government in Northern Ireland 
and Scotland, focusing upon developments under the 









Introduction: Protestant Hegemony in Northern Ireland and 
Shipbuilding 1921 to 1975 
 
 
The relationship between the British and Northern Irish governments and the 
Harland & Wolff shipyard, Belfast, is central to the study of the economic history of the 
United Kingdom as well as Northern Ireland in the 1960s and 70s. The shipyard’s main 
institutional relationships in this period were with the Northern Irish Government at 
Stormont Castle, the Shipbuilding Industry Board and the Labour governments under 
Harold Wilson in London. The developments in the four years between 1966 and 1970 
radically altered the very nature of Harland & Wolff and acted as a pivot between two 
different periods in the shipyard’s history. The traditional business history of this period 
focuses upon concepts of industrial obsolescence and decline, the position held by 
Abramovitz, Olson and Lorenz498; whereas this chapter demonstrates that the wider 
political context of Northern Ireland heavily influenced developments beyond the 
traditional process of management decision making in response to changing market 
conditions. The story of Harland and Wolff in this period illuminates these themes and 
demonstrates that, when faced with potentially destructive forces of sectarian based civil 
disturbances, both governments chose to prolong the existence of an unviable business to 
prevent wider social and economic consequences. This is the context behind the 
government’s relationship with the Harland & Wolff shipyard which, it is argued here, 
influenced the decision-making processes of both regional and national government when 
deciding to intervene in the fate of the company, which went from being a private 
company that had to borrow money from the Northern Irish government to survive in 
1966, through a process of state intervention, shareholding and control to by 1975, a 
nationalized company under the ownership of the British government. 
 
This chapter will demonstrate how the process commenced and will show that 
increasing concern in Westminster over the potential for widespread unemployment in 
Northern Ireland, particularly amongst the predominantly Protestant workers of Harland & 
Wolff, led to a policy that stated the shipyard could not close at any cost. Focusing upon 
the relationship between the Wilson government’s instrument of modernization, the 
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Shipbuilding Industry Board (SIB) and the Harland & Wolff shipyard (H&W), this chapter 
develops a contextual narrative of developments between 1966 and 1970 under the aegis of 
its chairman, John Mallabar, and demonstrates that the shipyard and the Northern Irish 
government had a symbiotic relationship that determined the fate of shipbuilding as an 





Harland and Wolff under John Mallabar, 1966 - 1970 
 
 
Harland & Wolff had been in existence since 1861, the result of a buyout of an 
existing shipyard by the marine engineer from Scarborough, Edward J Harland and one 
Gustav Wilhelm Wolff, the son of Jewish merchants from Hamburg. Over the following 
century, rarely had the shipyard lacked employment, producing many famous vessels such 
as The Titanic and The Canberra, but also a line of large vessels for export customers.499 
However, by 1966, despite being a large UK shipyard in terms of physical size, workforce, 
output and financial turnover, the chairman Dr. Denis Rebbeck, stated in his address to the 
company’s shareholders that Harland & Wolff was vulnerable to Japanese competition and 
was unable to bring down labour costs and increase productivity because of restrictive 
practices, industrial action and the loss of contracts from traditional customers taking its 
toll on the company’s finances. 500 Certainly as a traditional client of the Admiralty, 
Harland and Wolff suffered from Royal Navy cuts as a response to Britain’s declining 
imperial ambitions and found it hard to adapt to a purely commercial existence. The 
unpopularity of redundancies in response to defence cuts in 1964 led to two years of 
industrial action and a contract signed in 1965 for five 70,000 ton bulk carriers for a 
Norwegian shipping line at a fixed price led to unsustainable losses. 501 With the added 
problem of unexpected increases in the cost of labour and materials, in 1966 the shipyard 
recorded huge losses, as table 5.1 demonstrates.502 
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Source: London Stock Exchange Company Reports, 1960 – 1966 
 
In order to survive, the company asked the devolved government of Northern 
Ireland for a loan to cover current and future losses. 503  Stormont was aware of the 
situation at H&W and at the meeting of the Stormont cabinet on 17th August 1966 the 
Northern Ireland Minister of Commerce, Brian Faulkner produced a paper stating that 
unless the government took swift action the yard would end up in liquidation within a few 
weeks.504 However, because of the impending incorporation of the Shipbuilding Industry 
Board (SIB), Faulkner stated that the loan was only to serve for bridging purposes until the 
SIB provided detailed proposals concerning the shipyard. Certainly, the Prime Minister of 
Northern Ireland, Terrance O’ Neill, believed that if the NI government was to provide 
funds for Harland and Wolff, then they were entitled to have a say in the company’s 
development, regardless of the views of shareholders.505 Consequently, Stormont 
announced in September 1966 financial arrangements designed to keep the yard solvent for 
the immediate future, until the shipyard had planned for its future. A government 
guaranteed loan of £1.5 million from two Northern Irish commercial banks (the Northern 
Bank and the Belfast Banking Company) was proposed by Faulkner at the meeting of the 
Stormont cabinet on 24th August 1966 to achieve this aim, but in return for providing the 
short-term finance to keep the company afloat, Stormont requested the right to appoint a 
financial controller.506 In the longer term, Faulkner proposed that Stormont should 
refinance the shipyard, which would require legislation. Nevertheless, whilst the loan gave 
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the company a short respite, it could not guarantee its survival and Stormont realised that 
detailed and extensive intervention was required to keep the shipyard afloat.507 
 
The NI government persuaded the Stormont legislature (upon the urgings of 
Faulkner) to approve the wider measures of intervention. A bill was placed before both its 
houses to give Harland and Wolff a further loan of £3.5 million, £2 million of which was 
an investment by government with a further £1.5 million to pay off the previous loan, 
which Harland and Wolff could no longer afford to pay. The reasoning of the Cabinet was 
simple: in light of the recently published Geddes Report the shipyard would be in a 
position to be able to claim substantial amounts from the soon to be created Shipbuilding 
Industry Board (SIB) and therefore the loans were merely a bridging measure.508 However, 
both houses of the Stormont legislature understood that without changes in the structure of 
Harland and Wolff, the shipyard would not survive. This issue was raised repeatedly 
during 1966 and when the Shipbuilding Loans Bill had its second reading on in Stormont 
12th October 1966, (in effect the first opportunity to discuss its provisions). Faulkner 
stated that the bill would place certain conditions upon Harland and Wolff: 
 
‘a) I [Faulkner] am empowered, as Minister of Commerce, to 
nominate a financial controller with a seat on the board of the 
company. 
 
b) Dividends cannot be paid to shareholders, or remuneration of 
board members altered, without the approval of my Department. 
 
c) The company must satisfy my department that it is implementing, 
as a matter of urgency, certain proposals for improving its financial 
position which have been made by the company’s auditors. 
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d) The company must, as soon as possible, produce proposals for the 
reconstruction of the undertaking to secure financial viability.’509 
 
This limited the freedom of Harland and Wolff as a commercial entity. The 
legislation passed the Stormont Commons on 12th October 1966 with only minor 
objections on points of substance and procedure.510 The following day the bill had its 
second reading in the Stornont Senate, and questions were raised concerning the nature of 
the loan given to Harland and Wolff and whether or not Harland and Wolff was in a sound 
enough economic position to receive and pay the loan back. As a Unionist member of the 
Stormont Senate, Dr. Quinn, stated: 
 
To borrow money to bridge a gap in trading conditions does not solve 
those conditions. It only gives time for other efforts to be made to 
solve them; that time should be used by everybody in settling their 
own minds first of all and then through the medium of those who act 
as their spokesmen - I am referring to the shareholders, the directors, 
the management and the workers - in seeing to it that they can get to a 
competitive basis with countries such as Sweden and Japan.511 
 
This comment is highly relevant to the overall historiography of Harland and Wolff, as 
Quinn was highly dubious of the prospects for Harland and Wolff’s future, whereas all 
other members of the Senate in that debate made the same assurances and supportive 
statements concerning its reconstruction.512 As Quinn continued: 
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The appointment of some official, be he a chartered accountant or 
somebody with other qualifications, does not give the answer. It is a 
matter of everyone directly involved making up his mind that he is 
prepared to suffer inconvenience and some hardship.513 
 
Passed in November 1966, The Shipbuilding Industry (Loans) Act (Northern 
Ireland) gave the Northern Irish government not only the authority to loan Harland & 
Wolff £3.5 million, but also to enact changes in the structure of the shipyard by appointing 
a financial controller, giving financial control to the Northern Irish government.514 
However, with the resignation of Rebbeck as chair at the same time, Harland & Wolff 
required not just a Financial Controller to bring costs under control, but also a Chairman 
and possibly a Managing Director. The usual Harland and Wolff method of appointing 
such a position was a long-term process of developing an internal candidate over the 
course of a decade.515 The eventual appointee, John Mallabar, (a chartered accountant who 
ran his own firm of accountants in London) was unique in several ways, not only because 
he originated from outside Northern Ireland, but also as he was Stormont’s candidate for 
Financial Controller. 516 Indeed, Mallabar had a reputation as a ‘fixer’ of companies 
undergoing financial difficulties, gaining a small amount of fame in the financial press for 
rescuing the engineering firm Ruston & Hornby as its chair in the years 1964-66.517 
Mallabar made a quick start by making 500 underutilized workers redundant on his 
appointment, with a further 500 a week later.518 However, high unemployment in Northern 
Ireland acted as a brake on the ambitions of Mallabar as the redundancies were politically 
unpopular, particularly as the shipyard had a predominantly Protestant workforce from 
which the Stormont government took so much of its electoral support.519 Nevertheless, in 
December 1966, there were 279 further redundancies.520 However, NI government 
intervention gave Harland & Wolff a lifeline and the conditions imposed on the £3.5 
million loan placed the onus of future development of the shipyard on Mallabar. For 
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although Mallabar’s first priority was to make redundancies and find savings to make the 
company viable, it was the creation of the long term development plan and strategy that 
was his legacy to the shipyard. 521 
 
In 1967, once the initial efforts of Mallabar to reduce the losses at Harland & Wolff 
had taken place, the question of the future development of the shipyard arose. From the 
production of the first Harland & Wolff VLCC (Shell’s SS Myrina) Mallabar knew that to 
build the larger vessels (oil tankers of between 250,000 and 500,000 tons deadweight), 
Harland & Wolff would have to undertake a comprehensive modernization.522 Mallabar, 
through negotiations with the Shipbuilding Industries Board (SIB), knew that the potential 
funds available from the SIB and the Stormont government would pay for the 
reconstruction of the shipyard. Mallabar announced on 19 September 1967 to the 
assembled media at the launch of the S.S. Myrina, that the only way forward for Harland & 
Wolff was to construct a large building dock and manufacturing facilities similar to those 
found in Japan.523 With access to the Musgrave channel, (constructed in 1899 to the east of 
the shipyard to provide tidal moorings and over 1000 metres in length), Mallabar argued 
that the creation of a large building dock would be easier for Harland & Wolff than it 
would be for other British yards. Indeed, it would only involve draining and fitting out the 
Musgrave channel; there would be no need for large-scale excavation and by December 
1967, the consultant engineers for the project to convert the Musgrave channel, 
Navalconsult, had issued their report into the feasibility of the project. 524  Whilst the 
project was possible and the channel suitable for conversion into a building dock, it was 
the opinion of the engineers that rather than build an interim facility for vessels of between 
250,000 and 500,000 deadweight tons, at a cost estimated at £6 million (1967 UK£), the 
entire channel should be drained and made into a building dock capable of building vessels 
of up to 1,000,000 deadweight tons for a cost of £7.5 million.525 
 
The government in Belfast and the Shipbuilding Industry Board in London 
supported the proposal as a way of guaranteeing existing jobs in Northern Ireland and 
creating further ones, but the British government treated Harland & Wolff differently from 
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other shipyards, because of the additional jurisdiction of the Northern Ireland 
Government.526 Certainly, Harland & Wolff’s relationship with Stormont created 
additional debate in Whitehall and the SIB as to whether the methods of funding available 
to the SIB, (grants and loans under section 4 of the Shipbuilding Industry Act (1967)) were 
applicable to Northern Ireland.527  However, whilst the debate over the rôle of Belfast and 
London in the affairs of Harland & Wolff continued, it was the global growth in the 
demand for crude oil tankers of over 250,000 tons deadweight that pushed matters to a 
head. With the advocacy of the project by a senior civil servant at the Ministry of 
Technology, C.H. Bayliss, to overcome any residual objections, the building dock project 
gained favour in both Stormont and Whitehall as a way for Harland and Wolff to enter this 
market. Indeed, in a submission to the British Minister of Technology, Anthony 
Wedgwood Benn, concerning shipbuilding facilities in the UK, Bayliss expressly stated 
that he was, ‘...departing from the advice of the Geddes Committee...’ as the market for 
crude oil carrying vessels was experiencing a period of sustained growth.528 Certainly, 
Bayliss advocated that the SIB announce a decision concerning the building dock before 
the public announcement of an order by the petrochemical company Esso to build 4 
tankers in the UK, which gave the minister the impression that the ship order was 
dependent on the modernization of the shipyard.529 
 
By January 1968, the government in London was in favour of building the larger 
version of the building dock, but on condition that the funding solely came from the SIB 
and not the Northern Ireland Government, to avoid the expenditure being classified as 
direct government spending.530 Moreover, London rebuffed attempts at rescheduling 
Harland & Wolff’s debt to Stormont, which wanted to merge its loans with those from the 
SIB, as this was not within the financial powers of the Northern Irish government. It was 
with these two conditions attached, that the Ministry of Technology and the SIB agreed to 
promote the 1,000,000-ton building dock and provide Harland & Wolff with the finance 
for its construction.531 Therefore, on 16th January 1968, William Swallow, the chairman of 
the SIB, delivered his submission to the Minister of Technology for his approval of a £8 
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million loan to Harland & Wolff. In his letter, Swallow emphasised that with the ongoing 
order for the construction of the Esso tankers, approval needed to be swift.532 However, 
although the submission included all the points concerning the redevelopment of the yard 
covered by the SIB, Whitehall and Harland & Wolff in their discussions, under the section 
outlining the four conditions of the proposed loan, certain rights held by both the UK 
government and Stormont were proposed for the first time. These were the right to appoint 
a chair or chief executive, the right for the UK government to appoint a director to 
represent its interests, the right to approve any financial measures, such as loans and 
dividends and finally, the right to request any information concerning the yard.533 
Consequently, the UK government had the power to intervene in the company if it was in 
its interests to do so and the conditions attached to the SIB loan consolidated strategic 
decision-making powers with both Stormont and the Westminster government. Whilst this 
did not represent overt government intervention, these powers gave the governments in 
London and Belfast substantial leverage in the affairs of the company. 
 
Despite this enthusiasm, elements of the government in London, namely the Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury, John Diamond, were not convinced of the merits of spending 
£13.5 million on Harland & Wolff, including a £5 million grant issued by Stormont.534 
Certainly, the Treasury needed reassurance that the proposed plans, in the light of the 
hurried nature of the decision to construct a building dock, represented the best-cost 
option.535 After two days of correspondence, the Chief Secretary gave his approval to the 
project in January 1968.536 Nonetheless, the issue of whether the Stormont government 
would contribute its own grants to Harland & Wolff for its development remained. 
Certainly, after the devaluation of the pound in 1967, the British government applied 
public expenditure restrictions on the Stormont Government in Northern Ireland and the 
Treasury was reluctant to spend money on Harland & Wolff.537 Any additional funds 
would have to come from the budget of the SIB, which would be obligated to loan rather 
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than grant additional amounts of money to Harland & Wolff.538 This impasse was broken 
in April 1968, when a relaxation of budgetary restrictions for Northern Ireland enabled 
Stormont to fund the additional £1.5 m grant, allowing the loan agreements to be signed 
and the project to progress beyond the early stages of construction.539  Finalized almost a 
year after construction of the building dock had commenced, the £8 million loan 
agreement was signed on the 29th January 1969 and consequently, the situation at Harland 
& Wolff looked positive.540 Certainly, the shipyard was starting to sell more ships and by 
April 1969, £58 million in new vessel orders had been received, the majority of which 
were for tankers to be built in the new building dock.541  
 
By the autumn of 1969, the second progress report to the Chief Secretary stated that 
whilst the situation was not critical, Harland & Wolff’s financial circumstances had 
worsened slightly. The main concerns were a six-month delay to the construction of the 
building dock, the potential for financial over-runs on the building dock project, problems 
with the construction of ancillary equipment and licenses to construct engines of a more 
modern design than those offered by Harland & Wolff. On the positive side, the report 
mentioned that the shipyard had avoided the political problems of Northern Ireland and 
that orders had increased (five VLCC tankers and nine large bulk carriers on order), which 
provided work for the yard until 1972.542 In his 1969 address to shareholders, Mallabar 
was optimistic for the future of Harland & Wolff, but he stated that, despite the spending 
on new infrastructure in the yard and its recent orders, three factors acted to the detriment 
of the future growth of Harland & Wolff: confrontational labour relations, low productivity 
growth and high steel prices.543 By 1970, many in Whitehall and Stormont had a high 
opinion of Mallabar, believing that he had arrested the decline of Harland & Wolff and 
certainly, in the early part of his tenure as Chairman, Chief Executive and Financial 
Controller he reduced the shipyard’s losses. 544  However, in 1969 a series of problems 
came to the fore that led to an unprecedented one-year loss in the company, the nature of 
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which the company’s auditors, Price Waterhouse, could not immediately verify.545 As 
reported in the company’s preliminary results to the Stock Exchange in April 1970 Harland 
& Wolff lost £3,774,770 up to 31st December 1969, the majority of which, £2,612,539, 
was on shipbuilding contracts during the year, a figure that rose to £3,126,261 when 
including depreciation and interest payments.546 This was a much larger figure than any 
losses previously at Harland & Wolff; in 1967 and 1968, the losses were £1,156,000 and 
£755,000 respectively. Moreover, the company’s auditors, stated that poor records kepts a 
further £3 million from being accounted for. Eventually, in 1971, the losses for 1969 were 
agreed at £8,330,000.547  
 
Mallabar resigned in 1970, but not without explanation in the annual statement to 
shareholders and the Stock Exchange. Opening by quoting the previous year’s report, 
Mallabar stated that the contracts obtained for large tankers in the period 1967 to 1970 
were priced at such a level there would be little, or no, flexibility to allow for an increase 
in costs. Continuing with the same theme, he emphasized that over the course of his four-
year tenure at the shipyard, although efforts had been made to modernize equipment and 
facilities and that productivity had risen along with a fall in losses, the trading conditions 
for Harland & Wolff were such that any changes in the underlying costs of the shipyard, no 
matter how small, had serious repercussions for the company.548 Mallabar apportioned the 
blame for these losses almost entirely with the staff directly involved in the construction of 
vessels, for whilst delivery times had improved and ships were being delivered almost 7 
months before they were due, he stated that the defining moment was in 1969 when the 
steelworkers went on an overtime ban for three months demanding higher wages. 
Consequently, labour and management engaged in a series of confrontations over the 
course of 1969, by which time delivery times had slipped and costs increased. Certainly, 
Mallabar emphasized that the increased cost of equipment and materials also affected the 
yard’s performance, but in his final report as chair, he identified the attitude of labour as a 
key factor in reducing the yard’s performance.549 
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(UK £ x 
1000) 
1966 n/a n/a n/a 11,454 n/a n/a -4,146 -361.97 
1967 3 55 92 10,049 9.16 6,091 -1,156 -115.04 
1968 5 244 460 9,007 51.07 15,956 -755 -83.82 
1969 1 58 106 9,274 11.43 3,579 -8,330 -898.21 
1970 4 196 358 10,007 35.77 15,322 -302 -30.18 
Source: Booz Allen & Hamilton Report, 1973  
 
The reaction of civil servants in Whitehall and Stormont was not one of surprise; they 
knew that a large loss was likely for 1969. Indeed, in 1970 the third progress report on 
Harland & Wolff by the SIB, (for the benefit of the Ministry of Technology as well as the 
Treasury) stated that, although the development of new facilities was proceeding and that 
there had been some progress in the construction of vessels, the net result of a four month 
‘go-slow’ in the yard would be large losses in the region of £3 million.550 Therefore, 
Mallabar had the foresight and understanding of the trading conditions at Harland & Wolff 
to pick the most opportune time to leave the yard and to make a point about the hindrances 
he had encountered as chair.  
 
Mallabar’s replacement was Joe Edwards, the 62-year-old former managing 
director of British Motor Holdings Limited, a holding company for the eclectic survivors 
of the British automobile industry.551 Edwards was technically retired and had no 
experience of the shipbuilding industry, but his appointment was supposed to be a 
temporary one until both the UK and the NI governments decided the fate of Harland & 
Wolff. However, in the short term Edwards had to work on the day-to-day concerns of 
running a shipyard and bring the crisis at Harland & Wolff to a satisfactory conclusion. 
However, the political climate and situation of Northern Ireland had changed since 1966 
and this was to the detriment as well as the benefit of the shipyard. To its detriment 
Harland & Wolff no longer gained the attention of the Stormont parliament that it once 
did. The sectarian troubles of Belfast and the doctrinal arguments within the Unionist 
majority at Stormont held most of the government’s attention. Nevertheless, it was the very 
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same troubles that gave Harland & Wolff a lifeline: the London government could not 
afford to have the redundancy of over 7.5% of the Northern Irish industrial workforce 
adding to the political situation in the province and so it was quick to emphasize that any 
rescue package would include provisions for a high level of government involvement.552 
This did not mean, however, that nationalization was the ultimate aim, there was hope that 
Harland & Wolff would remain a private company, possibly through being purchased by a 
third party.  
 
                                                




Conclusion, Harland and Wolff in 1970 
 
 
Even after a period of capital-intensive reconstruction, in 1970 Harland and Wolff 
was not economically viable. Mallabar was correct in trying to copy the prevailing 
orthodoxy of shipbuilding in Japan and Sweden to bring down production costs and 
increase productivity, but the political, social and economic diorama unique to Northern 
Ireland compromised his efforts in three ways. First, the sectarian nature of Northern 
Ireland and the links between the Unionist government and the Protestant workforce of the 
shipyard made any unpopular measure difficult to enforce during a period of peace, let 
alone during a period of sectarian conflict. Second, with Harland & Wolff employing 7.5 
per cent of Northern Ireland’s industrial workforce directly and a further 10 per cent 
indirectly, there was too much temptation for both governments to provide a financial 
bailout to keep the peace. Finally, a combination of these two factors fatally compromised 
attempts to create a modern shipyard; if a measure was unpopular with the workforce, both 
governments would fear the consequences of any potential confrontation. In short, by not 
having recourse to remedy the above problems, any solutions proposed by Stormont, 
Whitehall and the Shipbuilding Industry Board were unlikely to succeed in making 
Harland & Wolff profitable. 
 
As this chapter demonstrates, from the first government intervention in 1966 up 
until 1970 and the resignation of John Mallabar as chairman, the Harland & Wolff 
shipyard, with qualified local labour, ample government finance and a large production site 
had the potential to become a large profitable shipbuilding company similar to those found 
in Japan at the time, but was instead an unviable business. Nevertheless, the fear of having 
over 10 percent of the workforce of Northern Ireland becoming redundant overnight 
influenced the judgment of the Northern Ireland and British governments, particularly 
when the majority of those unemployed would be unionist Protestants. Indeed, these 
judgments were affected further by the Catholic civil rights movement of the late 1960s, 
which spiralled into violence at the end of the decade. The ever-prevalent fear for both 
governments was of an uncontrollable ‘civil war’, with the unemployed masses of both 
sides of the sectarian divide entering into an escalating conflict.553 Therefore, both 
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governments spent ever-increasing amounts of money to pacify the situation, regardless of 
the economic consequences of doing so. 
 
These factors contextualized John Mallabar’s chairmanship, he worked hard to 
increase output and productivity, the local environment compromised his efforts. The 
foresight of Mallabar in proposing a shipyard with a high rate of productivity capable of 
building vessels over 250,000 tons was correct, even if it was contradictory to government 
policy at the time. Intending to build a shipyard capable of competing effectively with 
those found in Japan, Mallabar and Stormont used the special circumstances of Northern 
Ireland to provide more central government funding than available to a comparable 
shipyard in the rest of the United Kingdom. For almost four years, this was a successful 
policy and the shipyard increased its output and productivity, as table 5.2 demonstrates 
output per a worker increased during his tenure.554 This context was advantageous initially, 
but it also provided the fatal blow to Mallabar’s career at Harland and Wolff. Indeed, for 
whilst Mallabar had cut costs, reduced staff, increased output and modernized equipment, 
he could not deal with the sectarian conflict and the strikes, go-slows and work to rules of 
1969/70 wiped out the gains of the past 5 years. For any other company, this would have 
been fatal, but the Northern Irish and UK governments could not allow the company to fail 
for fear of the consequences affecting the situation in Northern Ireland.  
 
To conclude, the declinist paradigm of the past thirty years has defined economic 
history as a discipline and in business history has highlighted the debates concerning 
individual firms. However, my research into Harland and Wolff demonstrates that it is very 
difficult to create an all-encompassing theory of decline, as local conditions and political 
movements rarely follow rational processes of commercial decision making. In the United 
Kingdom, the declinist movement describes a complex diorama of union management 
relations that restricted the nation’s economic growth, and yet rarely is the effect of 
political movements discussed or the fear of communal strife on economic policy. This 
chapter shows that regardless of the prevailing orthodoxy within an industry and despite of 
the commercial necessities a company faces daily, if the prospect of failure is no longer an 
incentive, as management and labour fail to work at an optimal level and therefore a 
company will cease to perform to its best. In 1966, John Mallabar understood that the 
particular social and political context of a divided Northern Ireland allowed him to ask for 
enough funding from government to restructure the Harland & Wolff shipyard. However, 
                                                




he failed to comprehend that the same environment removed incentives for his staff to 
follow his lead, as whilst the government would spend money to develop the shipyard, it 
was also understood by many that it would do the same to keep the shipyard open in the 
face of failure. The following chapters on Harland and Wolff will demonstrate how this 
affected the performance of the shipyard in the early 1970s and will show that despite all 
the attempts to keep Harland and Wolff in the private sector, once government intervention 







Deciding upon which future path to follow: the developing crisis 
at the Harland and Wolff shipyard, Belfast at the start of the 









The continuing failure of Harland and Wolff, 1970 - 1971 
 
 
In 1970, Harland and Wolff yet again faced the prospect of closure. However, the 
political climate and situation of Northern Ireland had changed since the last crisis at 
Harland and Wolff in 1966 and this was to the detriment as well as the benefit of the 
shipyard. To its detriment, Harland and Wolff would no longer gain the attention of either 
the Stormont parliament or cabinet as it once did; the ongoing sectarian troubles of Belfast 
and the doctrinal issues within the Ulster Unionist Party majority at Stormont were taking 
up most of the government’s time in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, it was these very 
same troubles that gave Harland and Wolff a lifeline: the Westminster government could 
ill afford to have the company’s closure adding to the delicate political situation in the 
province.555 The government was quick to emphasise that any state aid would include 
provisions for an increased level of government involvement in the shipyard.556 The 
Stormont government, however, did not want nationalisation and hoped that Harland and 
Wolff would remain a private company by selling the shipyard to a third party.  
 
The largest shareholder, Aristotle Onassis, was first to declare his interest in the 
shipyard and the SIB, with the involvement of Whitehall, entered into negotiations with the 
shipping magnet and his Norwegian rival, Fred Olsen.557 However, Whitehall had 
difficulties with Onassis’ first proposal, which was to lease the yard for ten years under 
foreign management but only after the government placed the company on a sound 
financial basis. In addition, his personal notoriety led to mistrust amongst civil servants 
and politicians in both London and Belfast. Olsen did not have these difficulties, but at the 
ministerial level, many understood that the workforce in Belfast would have reservations 
about working under German and possibly Japanese managers. Indeed, any moves towards 
foreign control would have aggravated an already tense political situation.558 Certainly, the 
fact that Onassis wanted to lease the yard only after government funding had made it 
solvent made Whitehall officials doubt his proposals and many argued that if the 
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government were to spend many millions on keeping Harland and Wolff alive, then 
perhaps it should remain under UK ownership.559 This chapter will argue that the 
government in London put to one side the commercial considerations of building ships at 
Harland and Wolff in the face of political pressure from the government of Northern 
Ireland. As a result, the Ulster Unionist-dominated Stormont parliament used the fear in 
London of civil war in Northern Ireland to promote, pursue and conclude its own scheme 
for a part nationalised corporation under UK ownership. The future of Harland and Wolff 
was no longer about employment or preventing the closure or the company; it was now 
bound up with the wider concerns and conflicts of a disintegrating peace in Northern 
Ireland. 
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Harland and Wolff for Sale, the bidding war of 1970 to 1971 
 
 
The Conservative government elected in July 1970, (with its ‘Selsdon Park’ 
manifesto focussing on deregulation) had a different agenda concerning industry from its 
Labour predecessor.560 Certainly, Nicholas Ridley (the new Parliamentary Under Secretary 
of State for Industry and a principal architect of the Conservative manifesto) was intent on 
removing any influence the SIB once had, because in his opinion, ‘all SIB funds go to the 
lame ducks, and none go to the successful’.561 This heralded a change in government 
attitude towards the financial grants given to shipbuilders and from now on negotiations 
and decisions for the mainland United Kingdom would be made and approved at 
ministerial level rather than at the SIB. For Harland and Wolff, this meant that decisions 
concerning its future were the responsibility of the Northern Irish government in 
Stormont.562 This was designed to prevent the protracted debates over finance witnessed in 
the past, as one of the first acts of the Conservative government was to plan the demise of 
the SIB as soon as practicable. Consequently, the remaining funds allocated to the SIB 
were available to those companies that required financial assistance and Harland and Wolff 
received £3.5 m in August 1970, with £1.5 m paid immediately to stave off liquidation.563 
Whilst this created a breathing space for Harland and Wolff, the future for the shipyard 
was far from certain. The SIB was of the opinion, that with the high demand for 
supertankers the yard would be successful, were it not for its large debts, labour and 
productivity problems. However, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Anthony Barber, was 
reluctant to commit funds if the result was a sale to a company that had, ‘...contributed 
neither effort nor money during the difficult years [which would] purchase a weakened 
Harland and Wolff.’564 
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The initial response of the SIB was to increase government financial control at 
Harland and Wolff as a condition for further financial support.565 However, the losses 
continued to mount up; the grant of £3.5 million provided less breathing space for the 
company than expected and Harland and Wolff needed a further payment of £1 million by 
the 20th August 1970 to keep trading legally.566 The SIB requested improved management, 
control of finances and increased productivity in exchange for a future payment and whilst 
these had been the stated goals of the SIB towards Harland and Wolff since 1966, it is 
unknown whether at the time the company even attempted to implement these conditions. 
Certainly, the SIB wanted further information from Harland and Wolff by the end of 
October 1970, a deadline the shipyard felt it was unlikely to meet and subsequently did 
not.567 Indeed, rather than providing a justification for its existence, by November 1970 
Harland & Wolff requested a further £2 million to prevent liquidation, £1 million of which 
could be covered by the final payment of the existing grant, but £1 million of which would 
have to come from additional sources whether provided by the SIB or by the 
government.568 The SIB sought government approval for the additional amount, because it 
was not prepared to give Harland and Wolff £1 million without the further £1 million 
coming from another source. Therefore, it requested that the Department of Trade and 
Industry provide some form of financial relief for Harland and Wolff that it, the SIB, could 
not.569 By November 1970, the DTI was prepared to act as a guarantor to a £2.5 million 
overdraft provided by Harland and Wolff’s bank, (The Midland Bank) a reflection of the 
confidence that the government had in a successful resolution to the affair. However, the 
DTI stated that the government would not act subject to SIB approval and that any 
additional finances or arrangements made for the company must be negotiated and 
approved at ministerial level.570 The government had two options to make Harland and 
Wolff viable and therefore prevent an economic catastrophe in Northern Ireland: the sale 
of the company to an outside third party, or the reform of the current company’s 
management and finances. 
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At the same time as the debates over Harland and Wolff were taking place in 
government, third parties presented bids for the purchase of the company. Despite the 
debts of Harland and Wolff, there were two factors in the shipyard’s favour. First, by 1971, 
the shipyard had a new and modern infrastructure and therefore the company was more 
than able to compete in the global market. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the 
London and Belfast governments needed to mitigate the ongoing civil strife in Northern 
Ireland and therefore would not be amenable to job losses. This did not mean a 
continuation of the Labour government’s policy of direct intervention, nor that the 
shipyard should remain with the same UK ownership. However, despite his strong position 
with the largest equity stake, neither Whitehall nor Stormont were enthusiastic about 
Onassis owning the shipyard. In the first meeting between the Shipbuilding Industry Board 
and a representative of Onassis, (Mr. C Simpson, who was also the Deputy Chairman of 
Harland and Wolff) held in July 1970, it was proposed that Onassis would lease the 
shipyard for a period of time, building supertankers for both the Onassis shipping lines and 
other tanker companies.571 To the representatives of the SIB, the fact that Onassis gave no 
details concerning the shipyard’s requirement for further state funding to prevent 
liquidation, (thought in 1970 to be around £10 million) was an indication that the tycoon 
was uncertain about what he had in mind for Harland and Wolff. The SIB informed Mr 
Simpson that Onassis had to produce a well-defined set of proposals and to bear in mind 
that Harland and Wolff was likely to receive more than one takeover bid.572 In response to 
the concerns raised, Onassis wrote to the SIB and the Minister of Technology, John 
Davies, reiterating his proposals. 573 In light of the financial losses at Harland and Wolff 
and the slow growth in productivity, the government believed that introducing ‘good’ 
foreign management rather than propping up ‘poor’ local management would improve the 
situation and reflect Conservative industrial policies.574 However, the Ministry of 
Technology and its successor, the Department of Trade and Industry understood that the 
local opposition to a foreign owner would be substantial and could halt future 
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developments.575 Therefore, London accepted that Harland and Wolff, Stormont and the 
trade unions would have to be involved in the decision making process to satisfy all 
parties, particularly those who could threaten any deal the government might negotiate 
with Onassis.576  
 
Onassis’ notoriety and negotiation style was also causing problems, not just with 
government ministers and institutions. Indeed, Royal Dutch Shell had negotiated with 
Harland and Wolff in August 1970 an order for five supertankers of 250,000 tons 
deadweight. However, Onassis stipulated in his proposals that a moratorium on new ship 
orders starting from September 1970 was necessary so that an examination of the yard’s 
finances could take place. This placed both governments in a quandary; Ridley and Roy 
Bradford (the new Minister of Commerce in Northern Ireland) knew the commercial future 
of Harland and Wolff depended on building ships, but both understood that Onassis 
provided one of the few options to keep the shipyard operating.577 More importantly, both 
Shell and BP were loath to do business with Onassis.  Both stated to the Ministry of 
Commerce that they ‘will have nothing to do with the Onassis proposal; would not give 
any work to Harland & Wolff if it were in Mr Onassis’ hands; and do not like the way in 
which the Onassis scheme is being worked up.’578 It is uncertain whether this represented 
the negotiating tactics of Shell and BP rather than corporate policy; the rise in crude oil 
consumption combined with a limited number of berths capable of constructing ships over 
250,000 tons dwt meant that ship-owners had to order where ever possible to avoid 
capacity problems.579 Nevertheless, Harland and Wolff required supertanker orders to 
provide for its continued existence and could not afford to lose vessel orders because of the 
ownership of the shipyard. The situation became increasingly perverse as Onassis stated in 
August 1970 that he was in negotiations with both Shell and BP for Onassis-owned tankers 
ordered from Harland and Wolff, provided on long-term charters.580 A short time later, 
however, Eden spoke to Shell and BP and both reiterated their opposition to the Onassis 
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takeover of Harland and Wolff, contradicting what he had heard earlier from Onassis.581 
The fact that Onassis dishonestly boasted at an British Embassy function in Athens around 
the same time that in return for £4.5 million support from the government for his Harland 
and Wolff endeavours he would order British plant and machinery for his factories in 
Greece, added to the trepidation concerning Aristotle Onassis in Whitehall and 
Stormont.582 
 
Aristotle Onassis was not the only shipping tycoon interested in acquiring Harland 
and Wolff. In August 1970, Fred Olson, the patriarch of a family ship-owning and 
constructing company based in Norway, declared an interest and produced a detailed 
proposal for taking over the shipyard. Unlike Onassis, Olsen had experience in the 
shipbuilding trade, running a group of small shipyards under the Aker name in Norway and 
Scandinavia, yards that by 1970 had a reputation for constructing supertankers. Moreover, 
Olsen did not have the notoriety associated with Onassis; his company operated with Shell 
and BP and he was more acceptable to the government and unions in Northern Ireland. 
Olsen proposed to create a UK registered company that would purchase the assets of 
Harland and Wolff and assume all the responsibilities of ownership. Certainly, Olsen 
understood that with Harland and Wolff being technically insolvent, the SIB would have to 
provide relief from the existing loans as well as provide addition grants to make the yard 
viable. Olsen offered to purchase Harland and Wolff for £15 million, of which £12 million 
would be paid in cash, with the further £3 million out of a cash subscription by Aker for 51 
percent of the shares of the company founded by them, referred to as XYZCo Ltd.583 
However, Olsen also requested that the repayments for the SIB loans for the building dock 
and the Northern Irish Government loans from 1966 be postponed and that a loan of £13 
million be extended to XYZCo Ltd by both the SIB and Stormont to assist the new 
company with working capital.584 Effectively, the loans and the proceeds from the sale of 
the shipyard to XYZCo Ltd would pay off the existing loans made by the SIB and 
Stormont.585 Finally, Olsen asked for full managerial control of Harland and Wolff and that 
the government be frank about the potential for disruption from unions and civil 
disturbances in Northern Ireland. In short, Olsen proposed a conventional takeover of the 
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shipyard, but with government financial backing and special clauses concerning debt and 
the particular local issues in Northern Ireland. 
 
In stark contrast to its attitude to Onassis, Olsen was in favour at the Shipbuilding 
Industry Board, which had visited the Aker shipyard at Stord on the Atlantic coast of 
Norway many times. The Stord shipyard was a major player in the construction of 
supertankers and had produced such vessels since 1960. The shipyard started construction 
of a building dock and associated facilities in 1955 for vessels of 50,000 tons dwt, with the 
plans adjusted in light of the Suez crisis of the following year to create a 100,000-ton dock. 
As the building dock had adaptability and expansion incorporated in its design, Akers were 
able to increase the size of the dock in relation to the increasing size of the vessels 
demanded by tanker owners in the mid 1960s.586 Barry Barker, the director of the SIB 
visited Stord in September 1971 to ascertain, ‘whether there was any particular magic’ 
about the higher productivity in the shipyard.587 What Barker found was a shipyard that 
had spent less money than Harland and Wolff in developing its infrastructure and had 
developed in a piecemeal fashion over time. For example, the Akers crane analogous to the 
£1 million goliath in Belfast cost £80,000 second-hand from the UK Atomic Energy 
Authority. Additionally, the company had few distinctions between management and 
labour and ‘had been strike and dispute free for 35 years’.588 That the yard in Norway 
employed a well-trained flexible workforce was not in doubt in Barker’s mind, but he did 
see that the conditions of the Stord yard would be very difficult to replicate in Harland and 
Wolff and consequently believed that Olsen did not have a sufficient understanding of the 
challenges he faced.589  
 
At first, Whitehall was not in favour of either proposal and thought Onassis was 
unrealistic in what he asked of government and unclear concerning exact details of his 
proposals. Indeed, beyond providing relief from the outstanding loans, the government in 
London was uncertain about its own role in the affair, questioning whether it had a genuine 
third party interest in assisting the proposals for the shipyard.590 Olsen had a serious 
interest in the shipyard and could provide the finance and expertise to continue Harland 
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and Wolff as an ongoing concern. Nevertheless, the government (whilst not overtly 
pursuing a ‘UK first’ option) was not enthusiastic about a foreign takeover of Harland and 
Wolff. Indeed the main civil service advocate of the UK option, S.W. Spain (a civil servant 
at the DTI) wrote in a memo that ‘there is finally a possible Swan Hunter interest which we 
can provoke if the Onassis/Olsen offers become clear front runners'.591 Consequently, the 
genuine intention of London in the early stages of negotiations is unknown and it is only as 
the proceedings developed further that a clearer picture emerges. In addition to the 
unenthusiastic attitude displayed by the government towards Onassis, it was the opinion of 
Whitehall (and in particular Spain) that the Onassis proposal to lease Harland and Wolff 
was unviable. This was particularly the case as Shell had unequivocally stated that whilst it 
was prepared to purchase five tankers from Harland and Wolff in 1970 and a further three 
each year afterwards, it would not do so if Onassis owned the company.592 Whitehall knew 
that Olsen’s bid was serious, but the feeling was (and certainly in the view of Spain and 
supported by Ridley) that a way should be found for the yard to continue in operation 
under British ownership. Therefore, from September 1970, Swan Hunter became a 
potential bidder, despite having shown only a vague interest in Harland and Wolff.593 
Indeed, in talks with Spain, Swan Hunter was not enthusiastic about being involved in 
Harland and Wolff through a merger with the company and preferred to offer management 
expertise ‘for a fee’.594 However, at the same time the situation changed, as Onassis, (upon 
being informed by the accounting consultancy firm Binder Hamlyn that his leasing idea 
was ‘unworkable’) had decided to embark upon a full takeover bid for the shipyard.595 
From this point onwards, the Northern Ireland Government started to object to both the 
Onassis and Olsen proposals and focussed upon developing the shipyard’s infrastructure 
and implementing changes in the management.596 
 
At a crucial meeting between Davies, Ridley and Bradford on the 16th September 
1970, the potential for Harland and Wolff remaining an independent entity was first 
mooted. The argument was made that if the current company received the assistance and 
funds requested by Onassis and Olsen, then its prospects would improve vastly and its 
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future be assured so why was it necessary to sell the company to a third party?597 Bradford 
was of the opinion that, considering the political situation in Northern Ireland, the 
difficulties faced by any outside owner of Harland and Wolff would jeopardise any efforts 
at making the shipyard viable. Davies responded that whilst he appreciated the position of 
Stormont, he would exclude no proposals from the discussions as it was in the interest of 
the Westminster government to keep Harland and Wolff open. Nevertheless, the regional 
policy of the United Kingdom concerning Northern Ireland in 1970 was such that 
proposals concerning Harland & Wolff had to allow for Bradford’s views, and any 
decision about the shipyard could not follow commercial criteria alone. Bradford repeated 
his view at the meeting’s conclusion, furthering his cause by fuelling London’s fear of the 
disturbances escalating in Northern Ireland if Harland and Wolff shut down. 598 
 
John Davies wrote to Harland and Wolff explaining that in the government’s 
opinion, it was down to Harland and Wolff to decide which bid to accept.599 Continuing, he 
stated that the government and the SIB were willing to provide further funds and assistance 
for the Onassis and Olsen bids, but as the government did not own Harland and Wolff 
(although it was its biggest creditor) it could not make a decision concerning the eventual 
fate of the company.600 Nevertheless, whilst the government was not empowered to decide 
the eventual fate of Harland and Wolff, senior civil servants favoured their own schemes 
and bidders. As previously discussed, Spain, (responsible for shipbuilding at the 
Department of Trade and Industry) wanted a UK bidder for Harland and Wolff, preferring 
Swan Hunter. However, Spain also contacted Scott Lithgow about the possibility of a link 
up with Harland and Wolff. The reply Spain received from Ross Belch was non-committal 
and Belch preferred to espouse the benefits of Harland & Wolff remaining members of the 
Shipbuilders and Repairers National Council, ‘which the government must insist upon’.601 
Fundamentally, there was more than one point of view concerning the future of Harland 
and Wolff found within the walls of Whitehall and Stormont. The Shipbuilding Industry 
Board through the aegis of Barker supported the Olsen bid, S.W. Spain and the Ministry of 
Technology advocated that a UK yard (effectively Swan Hunter) purchase the shipyard and 
finally Roy Bradford at Stormont preferred further state aid to enable Harland and Wolff to 
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continue in its present form. Barker and Spain tried to reconcile their different points of 
view at a meeting in October 1970, called as a response to a meeting between Onassis and 
Olsen concerning potential collaboration. It was to no avail, neither Barker nor Spain were 
prepared to diverge from their position that all of the potential solutions to the shipyard’s 
plight were based on suitors of unknown qualities that were promoting one idea to the 
detriment of others.602 Additionally, since Olsen needed Onassis’ assistance in purchasing 
Harland and Wolff (Onassis being the largest shareholder) neither proposed scheme would 
be straightforward in execution.  
 
In November 1970, the Shipbuilding Industry Board wrote to the government 
stating that it was in the interests of Harland and Wolff to accept Olsen’s proposals.603 
First, the letter discounted the continuation of the shipyard under the current management, 
stating that, despite changes introduced since 1966, the management had failed to 
capitalise upon the changing global market. Second, the SIB discounted the introduction of 
new management from within the UK shipbuilding industry; it was argued that the new 
yard at Harland and Wolff was of a design that no other shipyards in the UK had 
experience of using. Third, without even mentioning the Onassis proposal, it discussed the 
bid by Fred Olsen, stating that not only did he have experience of operating a shipyard 
(something that Onassis did not) but he also understood the modern techniques employed 
by Harland and Wolff. Summing up, the SIB stated that whilst the bid had some problems, 
in its opinion this was the only realistic bid for Harland and Wolff and therefore considered 
‘...that of the various alternatives the Akers scheme is one which should be proceeded 
with’.604 However, Roy Bradford and Nicholas Ridley had other ideas. Firstly, Bradford 
declared in a letter to Ridley that although Harland and Wolff urgently required state 
intervention to remain open, the Stormont cabinet agreed that a sale to a foreign concern 
would cause disturbances in Northern Ireland.605 Secondly, Spain was still working hard to 
create a British takeover bid. After writing to Swan Hunter in October 1970 enclosing a 
report on the finances of Harland and Wolff, Spain received a reply from Sir John Hunter 
stating that Swan Hunter would indeed be interested in taking over Harland and Wolff and 
that as a potential bidder the Tyne-based company should be kept informed of 
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developments in Belfast.606 Nevertheless, on the same day, Hunter wrote to Nicholas 
Ridley stating roughly the same, but with the financial proviso that Swan Hunter did not 
have ‘large sums of money at our disposal’.607 To summarise the situation at the end of 
1970, the future of Harland and Wolff was uncertain as the two principal ministries 
involved, the Department of Trade and Industry and the NI Ministry of Commerce 
negotiated with Onassis and Olsen, whilst simultaneously encouraging local interest in the 
United Kingdom. However, at the same time the shipyard itself continued as an unviable 
concern, saddled with debt and awaiting the completion of infrastructure intended to 
remedy its problems. In the short term, therefore, the government’s focus shifted towards 
keeping the shipyard viable and away from the debates over its eventual ownership. In 
December 1970 two events changed the direction of the negotiations. First, the stand-in 
chairman and managing director of Harland and Wolff, Joe Edwards, resigned and 
secondly, the government took full control of the shipyard for three months to provide 
stability before any handover in control and ownership. These events led to the 
negotiations with Onassis, Olsen and Swan Hunter changing direction and influenced the 
eventual outcome of the entire process.  
 
Joseph Edwards always intended to be an interim replacement for Mallabar. At the 
age of 63, and after a career within the British Motor Corporation, Edwards was already in 
semi-retirement and consequently did not want to continue with the shipyard into the 
future.608 Nevertheless, his resignation in December 1970 took both John Eden and 
Nicholas Ridley by surprise and came at a point when despite having a preferred bidder, 
Fred Olsen, neither Stormont nor Whitehall were in favour of selling the shipyard to a 
foreign company. At a meeting between Edwards, Eden and Ridley, Edwards stated that 
the delays in the negotiations were affecting the shipyard to its detriment.609 Edwards 
emphasised that with £20 million worth of investment in Harland and Wolff and many 
infrastructure projects near fruition it, ‘would be a pity... (if Harland and Wolff) were to be 
handed over to an overseas concern.’610 Indeed, he contended that if Harland and Wolff 
received the promised government grant of £3.5 million in one lump sum and then 
confirmed the Shell orders, the shipyard would have been in a much better condition in 
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December 1970. Therefore, Edwards blamed the British government for Harland and 
Wolff’s predicament and strongly believed that local institutions in the United Kingdom 
should come to the aid of the shipyard rather than millionaire businessmen from 
overseas.611 On the following day, Stormont, the SIB and Whitehall asserted their rights 
over Harland and Wolff built up over the past five years using the conditions attached to 
the loans issued to the company.612 Specifically, after Edwards’ resignation Stormont 
appointed a new financial controller, D.H. Templeton (a Belfast accountant with 
connections to the Stormont government) and Alan Watt, the Managing Director of 
Harland & Wolff, became acting chairman until a replacement was found. 613 Although 
these actions by Stormont and the SIB were not a takeover of Harland and Wolff by 
government, it represented de facto control by both Stormont and Whitehall. Indeed, by 
December 1970 Harland and Wolff was in default on its interest payments to the Northern 
Ireland government for the 1966 loan and, in theory, this would have given more powers to 
Stormont and reduced the control that Onassis had as the largest shareholder in Harland 
and Wolff.614 
 
At a meeting of the Stormont cabinet just before Christmas, the Minister of 
Commerce, Roy Bradford, put forward four proposals for the future of Harland and Wolff. 
Three involved the takeover of the yard by either the Onassis concern, Fred Olson or Swan 
Hunter. Bradford further proposed that Harland and Wolff continue in its current form but 
no specific ideas were advanced on how to do this. All four proposals required government 
finance and all provided for the restructuring of the company’s management. The details 
for the three potential purchasers were as follows: 
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Table 6.1: Proposals for the take-over of Harland & Wolff, 1971 
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Source: PRONI CAB/4/1574/18 Stormont Cabinet Minutes dated 23 December 1970 ‘Belfast Shipyard: 
Memorandum by the Ministry of Commerce’, pp 1-2. 
 
All three potential suitors for Harland and Wolff proposed that more government 
money must be spent on the yard, but they also recognised that the level of debt at Harland 
and Wolff was such that debt relief was required for the yard’s future success. Of the 
proposals, the choice that caused the fewest problems for both the SIB and Stormont was a 
takeover by the Olsen group of companies, as Stormont (despite a desire for a British 




opposed to any bid from the Onassis empire.615 Indeed, although Onassis was the largest 
shareholder in Harland and Wolff, he was seen as an unsuitable candidate, not only 
because of the fact that the Onassis orders had contributed to the majority of the shipyard’s 
recent losses (£3.4 million of the £5.5 million Onassis wanted written off as part of his 
takeover proposals), but also because of negative Whitehall reaction to his reputation as an 
unscrupulous business man threatening to use his large shareholding to block Olsen.616 
Onassis’ difficult and fraught relationship with the government of Northern Ireland existed 
for reasons that are hard to define. During the 1960s and 1970s, Aristotle Onassis was a 
famous and well-known figure and his marriage to the widow of John F. Kennedy, 
Jacqueline Kennedy, only made him more so.617 Therefore, Onassis’ notoriety influenced 
perceptions of him within the Northern Irish government. Indeed, the same cabinet meeting 
agreed that of all the proposals, the one from Onassis was ‘politically unacceptable’.618 
However, this did not mean that the Olsen bid for Harland and Wolff was a fait-accompli, 
as the potential for agitation concerning the future of the shipyard was a reality of which 
the Northern Ireland government was fully aware. 
 
All the parties bidding for Harland and Wolff were aware of the socio-political 
situation of Northern Ireland. Indeed, Olsen and Onassis entered into talks with the local 
and national trade unions to mitigate any radical opposition to their plans. These talks were 
a public relations exercise with no agreed measures, but the unions based in Northern 
Ireland had links to the mainstream and radical Protestant and Unionist movements in 
Northern Ireland and therefore developing a friendly relationship was in the interest of all 
the bidders.619 This was to Onassis’ benefit, as the SIB changed its position and wrote to 
Nicholas Ridley in December 1970 stating that they now preferred the Onassis bid as a 
solution to the crisis at Harland and Wolff.620 In the letter (penned by Barry Barker), the 
SIB quickly discounted Swan Hunter’s bid and Harland and Wolff continuing on its own 
for the reason that both proposals required further injections of government funding and 
that Swan Hunter also had problems of its own.621 Additionally, Olsen’s inability to engage 
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in a bidding process and modify its proposals in competition with the continual changes 
proposed by Onassis had alienated the SIB. Certainly, with the prospects of the Shell 
orders becoming more competitive as market prices increased, combined with the fact that 
Onassis offered to bring in his own resources as well, made him the SIB’s preferred bidder. 
Indeed, with Onassis being the largest shareholder in Harland and Wolff he could ‘...block 
or at least delay any other scheme...’ and therefore held the dominant position.622 Certainly, 
the government in Westminster wanted a quick resolution and felt that a modern shipyard 
with new facilities could not continue with a caretaker management made up of temporary 
members.623 
 
At the end of 1970, different government institutions preferred different bidders for 
the shipyard; the SIB was now in favour of an Onassis takeover, whilst the DTI favoured 
the Olsen bid. In Stormont, both bids as well as the Swan Hunter proposals (...financially 
out-of-court.624) were the cause of much concern, but the fact that Onassis already 
possessed the majority of Harland &Wolff’s shares was used by the SIB as the reason for 
allowing the tycoon to purchase the shipyard.625 Early in 1971, elements within both 
Stormont and Westminster governments promoted the idea of Harland and Wolff 
continuing as an independent company. The news media supported this view, which asked 
why an extensively renovated and modern shipyard should close and why it was important 
for a foreign investor to take control to prevent this?626 Onassis proceeded as the preferred 
bidder and notionally at least Olsen was still interested in the shipyard. However, from 
January 1971 a change of tone appeared in the correspondence between the parties 
involved in the negotiations. The signs that the preferred bidder would not gain control of 
Harland and Wolff were apparent early in 1971; Onassis spoke to the media about quitting 
Harland and Wolff unless the government made a decision.627 Olson withdrew on 8th 
January 1971, with a terse press release that stated, simply: 
 
‘The Fred. Olsen Aker Group announces that they have withdrawn 
from their negotiations to acquire control of Harland and Wolff. Their 
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withdrawal is due to the situation which has been created by the 
existence of competing proposals and the consequent delays in a final 
decision being reached.628’ 
 
The initial reaction in London was to try to force the completion of the Onassis proposals. 
To this end, Ridley circulated a memo at the DTI asking those involved within the DTI to 
take steps to conclude a deal with Onassis ‘immediately’.629 The civil servants within the 
DTI disagreed with the forceful nature of Ridley’s intervention, and widely circulated 
doubts about the viability of the Onassis plan; Ridley was alone in his enthusiasm.630 
Indeed the wider view of the political situation in Northern Ireland came sharply into focus 
for the Minister of Trade and Industry, John Davies, who received daily telegrams from 
shop stewards at Harland and Wolff demanding local control.631 Added to this were the 
increasing losses at Swan Hunter that effectively removed it from the running. 
 
The fulcrum upon which events turned was a series of meetings with the merchant 
bank Schroder Wagg and the DTI during January 1971. The bankers had assessed the 
financial viability of the Onassis and Olsen bids at the DTI's request. In this meeting, 
despite Ridley’s assertions to the contrary, the bank saw little merit in either the Olson or 
Onassis scheme and argued that the changes and fluctuations in the Onassis proposals were 
such, that they were unsure as to which proposals were current at any one time.632 The 
bank pointed out that, with the amount of government funding required by all three 
potential owners in comparison to their own funds, it made little sense to transfer 
ownership in the light of the shipyard’s potential with newly completed fabrication 
facilities. Therefore, the merchant bank proposed a five-year period where central 
government supported the shipyard’s cash flow and new management would turn the 
shipyard into a viable concern, developing areas that thus far had not been modernised.633 
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Indeed, these proposals were popular with both S.W. Spain (the first to promote a ‘UK-
only’ solution) and the Stormont Cabinet, which went on to circulate details of the 
proposal within Northern Ireland and Whitehall. Certainly, the press received details of the 
proposals through controlled leaks from Stormont.634 The fact that Onassis used the 
withdrawals of Olsen and Swan Hunter from the race to attempt to gain further advantage 
and concessions from both Stormont and Whitehall, only served to promote the proposals 
of Schroder Wagg.635 
 
Matters came to a head during a meeting between Nicholas Ridley, now a strong 
advocate of the Onassis takeover, and Roy Bradford, a strong opponent of Onassis and a 
continuing advocate of Harland and Wolff continuing along its current lines. Ridley 
admitted that there were many aspects of Onassis’ proposals that were undefined and that 
important questions remained about financing, but he continued to advocate the Onassis 
bid as one that involved less government financing and direct control. Bradford, however, 
had a different point of view. First, he mentioned that the unions and political parties in 
Northern Ireland were opposed to any foreign control of the shipyard and that Onassis 
would face heavy opposition. Secondly, he stated that it would be politically difficult to 
propose the foreign ownership of a company that the government had spent over £20 
million renovating. Third, he stated that Onassis had no experience of shipbuilding and the 
proposed relationships with other yards were not agreed and one, the HDW yard in West 
Germany, was making a loss at the time. Finally, Bradford doubted the intention of 
Onassis to make a long-term commitment to Harland and Wolff and feared that he would 
walk away if it started to lose money. 636 Bradford made a counter proposal, which was to 
support the refinancing of the shipyard and the introduction of new management with 
government in Northern Ireland taking a shareholding and exercising an increased level of 
control over its affairs.637  
 
Therefore, the choice for the Stormont Government was between spending an 
additional sum of approximately £3 million on Harland and Wolff under its existing 
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ownership, or spending a larger amount of £7.5 million on the company under the 
ownership of Aristotle Onassis, but with the proven management expertise from successful 
overseas yards. Both proposals recognised (as was pointed out by Mallabar in his 
resignation address) that labour and management practices had to change (whether they 
actually wanted to or not), but the differences between the two proposals were very small. 
What differentiated the schemes, however, was that the Onassis proposal would lead to the 
yard ending up under foreign ownership.638 This led to a difference of opinion between 
Stormont and Whitehall. The DTI was in favour of the Onassis proposal (reflecting the 
government policy of no intervention in the management or ownership of private 
enterprise) but the Stormont cabinet was opposed to the Onassis takeover because any 
legislation would be impossible to get past members of both houses of Stormont. The 
reasons given for opposing Onassis were his age (70), a lack of succession if he died or 
retired (he had sole ownership and management of his empire), no experience of building 
ships and lastly his known volatility and notoriety as a highly public figure. 639 In practical 
terms, the Stormont cabinet found the proposals of Onassis to be ‘unrealistic’, calling the 
offer to bring a retired Managing Director from a successful German yard unproven and 
instead advocating a younger man with industrial experience (not necessarily from the 
shipbuilding sector). Additionally, Stormont felt that Onassis’ financial demands in 
combination with his proposals for improving the labour force of the shipyard were risky, 
and if they failed, would lead to the withdrawal of Onassis from the whole endeavour.640 
Finally, the cabinet strongly stressed that, as it was public knowledge in Northern Ireland 
that Onassis was paying less for the tankers that he had ordered from Harland and Wolff in 
1969 than they cost to build, public and political opinion was against such a takeover.641  
 
With the intransigence of both the Stormont government and protestant-unionist 
unions in Northern Ireland, (the latter released a statement on the 10th February 1971 
stating that on no account would they support any proposal for the shipyard that removed 
local control), Westminster accepted the inevitable and worked towards making Harland 
and Wolff viable under its current ownership.642 However, the government was also 
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dealing with the repercussions of two other prominent bankruptcies at the same time, Rolls 
Royce (Aviation Engines) Ltd and Upper Clyde Shipbuilders, and therefore had doubts 
about supporting another company with public money. The final deliberations, held in 
Whitehall between DTI ministers and civil servants, reflected this. In a February meeting 
there was still a tacit preference held by Ridley to allow Onassis to takeover the shipyard. 
Nevertheless, a paper prepared by the cabinet’s Economic Policy Committee (EPC) 
outlined the benefits of the Harland and Wolff restructuring under the government’s aegis 
Indeed the Treasury advocated liquidation as the first step of restructuring the shipyard.643 
There was now a move towards a convergence of opinion between London and Belfast. 
Nevertheless, in a final act of defiance lit by the waning light of the Shipbuilding Industry 
Board as it sped towards its demise at the end of 1971, Barry Barker wrote a letter to 
Nicholas Ridley (as well as a few others) ostensibly to report a few findings concerning his 
recent visit to Harland and Wolff, but in reality with a very different agenda. The report 
was not an objective assessment of the situation at the shipyard, but was an attack on the 
involvement of Stormont (referred to by Barker as NIG) in the bidding process. Barker 
described the government and unions of Northern Ireland as ‘...negative, parochial and 
regressive’, deriding the sale of Harland and Wolff’s assets outside Belfast (London, 
Glasgow, Southampton) and the desire for a chairman from Northern Ireland as part of a 
Stormont managed process of entrenchment at Harland and Wolff.644 Barker’s report was 
to no avail; the combined opposition of Stormont and civil servants in Whitehall (who 
were now joined by the Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling and the Prime Minister) to 
any proposal by Onassis acted in the interests of Harland and Wolff continuing under its 
current ownership.645 
 
On 3rd March 1971, Roy Bradford made a statement to the Stormont House of 
Commons at the same time as Davies in London released a parliamentary written answer. 
In his address to the Stormont Commons, Bradford did not mention the previous 
negotiations with either Onassis or Olson, nor the role of Westminster, but he laid out four 
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steps Harland and Wolff had to follow were it to be successful. 1) Harland and Wolff had 
extensively modernised in the past 5 years and would be a modern and viable shipyard if it 
were not for its financial difficulties. 2) A new management team, including chairman and 
financial controller, were to be appointed and the board of Harland and Wolff 
‘strengthened’, 3) Unions and workforce were to be consulted and 4) Government money 
would be invested, but this would not continue into the ‘long term’.646 This resembled the 
previous commitments by Stormont and Westminster and many commentators in the 
media wondered aloud if Harland and Wolff would be successful.647 However, before 
either government in Northern Ireland or Westminster could proceed, both had to conclude 
two formalities. First, two days after the announcement, Ridley informed Onassis in a 
telephone conversation of the government’s decision. Onassis took the news calmly and 
stated that he ‘fully understood the government’s position’.648 Secondly, the government in 
Westminster wanted assurances that Stormont, as the principal advocate of the ‘go it alone’ 
course of action regarding Harland and Wolff, would enact and bear responsibility for the 
proposals. Bradford communicated the agreement of Stormont a few days later.649 
 
Therefore, despite a year long search for potential buyers and the negotiation with a 
number of parties, the only proposal to end the woes of Harland and Wolff was a ‘status 
quo ante plus’ solution that would change very little about the yard or its ownership. 
Indeed, whatever the view of management at Harland and Wolff, it was civil servants, such 
as S.W. Spain in London, that sympathised with the wishes of Stormont and it was their 
actions that led to Westminster approval for Stormont’s plan to keep the shipyard under 
British ownership. However, the ministers in the Conservative government were of the 
opinion that the financial aid for the shipyard had to come from Stormont’s coffers, but, 
despite the limited tax raising powers of the Northern Irish Government and share of 
central taxation handed over by Whitehall each year, it still had to rely on an injection of 
funds from central government in London.650 Attitudes towards Stormont hardened in 
Whitehall once civil servants realised that the intention was not just to provide financial aid 
but also to purchase a share in the company of around 50%, ostensibly to prevent a hostile 
takeover bid (although some commentators thought this was more to prevent non-
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protestants owning the shipyard).651 As the stated policy of Edward Heath’s Conservative 
administration was to pursue free market solutions in business, the proposed shareholding 
was a point of dispute in meetings between ministers from the two governments in the first 
half of 1971.652 However, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Sir John Eden 
realising the strong intent of Stormont, decided that as long as the media saw the decision 
as Stormont’s alone, the plan did not contradict the stated non-interventionist policy of the 
Heath government.653 Consequently, civil servants in London and Belfast prepared a draft 
letter outlining the terms and conditions of a rescue package for Stormont government to 
implement.654  
 
In June 1971, the Stormont cabinet discussed the options for financial assistance to 
Harland and Wolff. Although the expressed goal was to return Harland and Wolff to 
commercial viability, politicians in both London and Belfast understood that, as the 
company was heavily in debt, it could not receive any more loans. Therefore, the Stormont 
cabinet supported paying £4 million in exchange for an equity stake of 47.5% in the 
company and the rest in the form of grants to cover the losses of the shipyard as they stood 
on 3rd March 1971.655 The new NI Minister of Commerce, R.J. Bailie, gave the news to 
the Stormont Commons on 6th July 1971 and announced the choices for the position of 
Chairman of Harland and Wolff and Managing Director.656 The role of chairman was 
reduced in its importance; the candidate, Lord Rochdale, would only be serving in a part 
time capacity and the position of managing director became essential to the operation of 
the company. The individual selected for that position, Iver Hoppe, had been the managing 
director of the Odense Steel Shipyard in Denmark, a modern shipyard that had been very 
successful during the ‘supertanker boom’ of the late 1960s and able to compete with the 
Japanese.657 Nevertheless, now that Stormont had announced its intentions for Harland and 
Wolff, the financial controller at the time, D.H. Templeton, had to assess the required 
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amount of funding required to execute Stormont’s plans by a deadline of 30th September 
1971.658  
 
The problem for management, Stormont, Whitehall and Westminster alike was that 
(due to poor financial record keeping by the company) the losses of Harland and Wolff 
since 1969 were difficult to quantify. Harland & Wolff made a loss of £302,000 in 1971, 
£182,000 in 1970 and once the auditors, Price Waterhouse, had agreed a figure in March 
1971, the losses for 1969 were recorded as £8.33 million.659 However, although the 
operating losses for 1970 and 1971 were less than those reported in 1969, all losses were 
carried over to the balance sheet and as a result, Harland and Wolff retained a £9.36 
million deficit.660 Moreover, losses continued to grow because of the unprofitable Onassis 
contracts and consequently any government grant would have to take into account the 
current deficit as well as any losses. Therefore, Brooke reported that the amount required 
to remove a threat of insolvency was £17.054 million and that this substantial increase over 
the deficit as shown in the 1971 Annual Report was attributable to cost escalations over the 
12 months without hands-on management during a period of higher than usual inflation.661 
However, a percentage of these losses would never be recovered by debtors that had either 
gone into liquidation or had written the debts off and consequently, Templeton proposed 
that the amount of grant required to make Harland and Wolff, ‘commercially viable’ was  
£14.154 million.662 This proposed grant was larger than expected and Whitehall was 
reluctant to make the payment, reminding Stormont of the understanding of the previous 
year that it was not liable for financing Harland and Wolff. However, there was some 
concern as to whether Stormont understood that this was the situation, especially when the 
decision to purchase a stake in Harland and Wolff and wipe off the debts of the shipyard 
was taken not only by Stormont, but with Westminster and Whitehall working behind the 
scenes. 663 However, the DTI was resigned to the fact that eventually the government in 
London would have to pay the grant to Harland and Wolff.664 
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Conclusion: a brighter future for Harland and Wolff? 
 
 
By July 1971, Stormont was the largest shareholder in Harland and Wolff and the 
£14.1 million grant paid had put the shipyard into a financially stable condition. 
Nevertheless, despite many millions spent on creating the building dock and associated 
equipment in the latter half of the 1960s, the new management was of the opinion that 
further investment would be needed to make the shipyard able to compete directly with its 
overseas competitors. This chapter has shown that whatever the government or indeed the 
owners of Harland & Wolff wanted for the future of the shipyard, the local context would 
always influence the decision-making process. Indeed, even without the ever-increasing 
sectarian tension and violence in Northern Ireland, the existence of the legislature at 
Stormont with powers that were both separate and overlapping with those of Westminster 
complicated the situation and made the development of a government support package that 
both institutions could agree upon difficult. Both legislatures were constrained by the 
political realities of Northern Ireland in the early 1970s and when it came to selling the 
shipyard to another private company, particularly one from outside the province or the UK, 
the combined forces of political nationalism in London and local unionist sympathies in 
Belfast prevented this from occurring, so the shipyard continued as a restructured and part 
nationalised company. It is unclear whether this was the optimal solution to the shipyard’s 
crisis; even the bids to purchase the shipyard by Onassis, Olsen and half-heartedly by 
Swan Hunter required a substantial injection of government funding to provide develop 
funds and write off debt.  
 
As a result of the financial collapse of Harland and Wolff in 1970, Westminster and 
Stormont had spent many millions of pounds in the form of grants and loans to prop up the 
company and as a result the question arose in both London and Belfast about whether more 
development could be undertaken in the shipyard to made it profitable and economically 
viable. Indeed, many in government in both London and Belfast were starting to see 
potential in Harland & Wolff: the shipyard was modern, large and capable of making the 
types of vessel heavily in demand at this time, so could it become a commercial success? 
The following chapter will answer this question and demonstrate that, despite further 
investment and management changes, the Harland and Wolff shipyard in Northern Ireland 




turbulent period in Irish history, on the one hand, and to rapid doctrinal and policy changes 
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Direct Rule in Northern Ireland and Changing Governments in the UK, 
Harland and Wolff 1972 – 1979 
 
In 1972, Harland and Wolff was still experiencing difficult times.  The shipyard 
continued as a loss making enterprise, but these were of a magnitude smaller than the 
losses of the late 1960s; the shipyard was no longer in a perilous position and was looking 
towards the future. With government support, the shipyard started a process of 
rejuvenation, called P200, which by the late 1970s would introduce a vastly improved level 
of productivity. However, the political environment changed for Harland & Wolff with the 
suspension and eventual abolition of the Stormont parliament in 1972. As a result the 
company operated under greater scrutiny by civil servants in London. Indeed, the shipyard 
had to fight for government funding during a period of monetary and economic instability 
and as a result could no longer enjoy the advantages it previously had with the local 
politicians in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, the continuing and growing violence in the 
province at this time impacted upon the shipyard’s relationship with government and 
funding decisions by the government always took into account the possible effects of 
Harland and Wolff’s closure on the peace of Northern Ireland. 
 
After its election in 1974, Labour pursued a fundamentally different policy to that 
of the Conservatives, preferring direct intervention in the affairs of the province and for the 
state to perform an active economic rôle. The development of policy concerning the 
economy of Northern Ireland by the 1974 to 1979 Labour government overlaps this case 
study of the Harland and Wolff shipyard over a nine-year period between 1966 to 1975 
and, therefore, it is important to focus on two Labour party manifesto commitments made 
in 1974. First, in both the February and October manifestos, the party committed itself to 
nationalising the entire UK shipbuilding industry and second, to a United Ireland by 
consensual, democratic and non-violent means. Both had wide implications for Harland 
and Wolff and both coloured the judgement of politicians and civil servants in Whitehall in 
the second half of the 1970s. The following chapter will explore these themes and 
demonstrate the defining rôle of government in both Belfast and London in the 




P200: The continued development of Harland and Wolff, 1972-1974 
 
In February 1972, it became apparent to management that after making incremental 
performance improvements over the course of a year the shipyard required further 
development to guarantee its survival. However, politicians and civil servants in both 
London and Belfast barely agreed to the 1971 funding package and were still questioning 
the level of grant required to write-off the losses of the three previous years, and between 
1966 and 1972, Harland and Wolff had received £ 40.1 million in government loans, grants 
and an equity purchase to prevent liquidation and modernise its equipment. Nevertheless, it 
was apparent to the Chairman, Lord Rochdale, and the MD, Iver Hoppe, that whilst 
Harland and Wolff had large facilities in terms of its building dock, cranes and workshops, 
it lacked the correct equipment to compete with foreign yards. Indeed, because of a focus 
on large vessels as opposed to improved production methods, it was not organised on lines 
of competing yards found in Japan and Scandinavia.  Rochdale and Hoppe therefore 
lobbied the Minister of Commerce in Northern Ireland, R.J. Baillie, in February 1972 to 
discuss the future of the shipyard. The two directors of the shipyard stated, therefore, that 
whilst the government had injected a substantial amount of money over the past five years, 
it would require another intensive programme of renewal to make the business one of the 
largest of its type in operation.665 Indeed, Rochdale and Hoppe pointed out that £133 per 
person monthly wage levels for engineering labour was now lower in Belfast than the £180 
per person monthly wages in Japan. Therefore, Harland and Wolff had the potential to 
thrive as a shipyard, but only if productivity was at the same level as an equivalent yard in 
Japan. If this were the case, Harland and Wolff would be competitive on price and make a 
profit in the process. 666 
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Image 7.1: The layout of Harland and Wolff, 1973 
 
 
Source: Moss, Shipbuilders to the World, p. 492 and Belfast (Street Maps), (Ordnance 
Survey of Northern Ireland, 2006) 
  
 
In February 1972, Harland and Wolff sent details of the investment proposals to the 
governments in Belfast and London. First, the shipyard proposed increasing its steel 
processing ability from 120,000 to 200,000 tons by the introduction of new methods and 
techniques that would reduce the amount of time it took the shipyard to process steel, 
increase the size of steel that could be worked upon and reduce the planning required in the 
manufacturing process. Second, by improving productivity as well as output, the shipyard 
aimed to compete with similar yards in Japan on price, as well as improving quality control 
to guarantee delivery dates. Finally, to achieve both aims, the management of Harland and 
Wolff realised that improved labour relations and staff retraining would be a central part of 
any programme of development and proposed new methods of labour relations based on an 
improved relationship with the unions.667 In effect, whilst Hoppe and Rochdale stated that 
Mallabar had been correct in developing the yard along build dock lines and rationalising 
the process of construction, they argued that he did not go far enough in developing 
improved techniques within the yard or improving productivity through the whole process. 
                                                





Harland and Wolff’s management proposed incremental developments of the 
existing shipyard rather than another wholesale reconstruction. This included improved 
raw material handling combined with the creation of improved staff welfare, canteen, 
medical and training facilities, all of which were overlooked when developing the building 
dock. However, the proposed scheme was expensive, estimated at £30.4 million, with a net 
cost to government of £19.8 million (£11.9 million in the form of development grants and 
£7.9 million from ‘N.I. Government Funds’), with the assumption that these would be 
provided by a loan. The final £10.6 million would come from the company’s own 
resources, based on an assumed return to profitability by 1975 giving access to commercial 
credit.668 Nevertheless, the management of Harland and Wolff also emphasised that, whilst 
they could promise a return to profitability by 1975, as new large shipyards opened in other 
parts of the world the capacity to make profits would be significantly reduced, again 
threatening the very survival of the company. This was an optimistic forecast by the 
company’s management as many of their predictions relied on further government 
investment as well as a stable market for Harland and Wolff products.669  
 
As had become the norm for Harland and Wolff in this period, the proposals, (now 
referred to as P200) were very popular in Stormont. Therefore, to promote the scheme with 
the Conservative government in Westminster, Brian Faulkner (NI Prime Minister) and R.J. 
Bailie (Minister of Commerce) wrote to their opposite numbers in London.670 However, 
the proposed scheme was met with concern in Whitehall (although not at the same level of 
antipathy within Whitehall as the £14 million grant), particularly as other shipyards in the 
United Kingdom (UCS in Glasgow and Cammell Laird in Liverpool) were already 
receiving government funds to prevent bankruptcy.671 Indeed, politicians in Westminster 
were aware that Scott Lithgow and Swan Hunters were competing in the same market as 
Harland and Wolff and argued that the Northern Irish yard was treated unfairly.672 
Moreover, with few Roman Catholics working at Harland and Wolff, it was noted that the 
Northern Ireland government had to make sure that a representative number of new jobs 
went to Roman Catholics as well as Protestants not only to reflect the wishes of the 
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government in London concerning equal opportunities, but also to alleviate the economic 
difficulties of the province by providing a benefit to the largest number of people. 673  
 
To coincide with the publication of a detailed plan by Harland and Wolff’s 
engineering advisors, MLH Consultants Limited, Stormont and the Ministry of Commerce 
were anxious to announce government funding for the proposed scheme in March 197.674 
As the stipulations for government support fell within the Industries Development Act 
[Northern Ireland] 1966 Stormont felt that the approval of Westminster was not necessarily 
required and most civil servants in Whitehall were of the same opinion. But the Treasury 
was concerned because of the system used to fund the Northern Ireland Government. 
Indeed, the financing for the project came under the devolved powers of Stormont, the 
loans given to Harland and Wolff by the now defunct SIB included certain decision-
making powers over the shipyard now exercised by the DTI. Therefore, although London 
based civil servants had no formal power to influence the provision of £18.5 million to the 
shipyard by Stormont, the requirement that the SIB (now DTI) approve any loans and 
capital expenditure gave Westminster and Whitehall leverage over the P200 development 
plan.675 Then the imposition of direct rule from London on the 30th March 1972 changed 
this situation. The devolved legislation of Northern Ireland still applied but the decision 
rested with the newly created Northern Ireland Office (NIO). In practice, despite the 
existence of separate ministries operating in Northern Ireland, the transfer of power to 
politicians sitting in Westminster gave the DTI and the Treasury a greater say in the affairs 
of the Northern Irish P200 scheme. 
 
The appointment of the merchant bank J.Henry Schroder Wagg & Co. Limited at the 
request of the Treasury to advise the Department of Commerce in Northern Ireland 
signalled the start of a sustained involvement in the affairs of Harland & Wolff by civil 
servants in London. The bank was of the opinion that, whilst Harland and Wolff wanted 
loans as well as grants to fund the P200 project, it would be in the interests of the 
government to consider an increased shareholding as an alternative to lending the company 
further sums of money.676 Although the Northern Ireland government had stated a year 
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earlier that it was not averse to increasing its shareholding in Harland and Wolff, the 
official position of the NIO in August 1972 was opposed to nationalisation. This policy 
reflected the current government relationship with the shipyard, with its large shareholding 
the government treated Harland and Wolff like any nationalised industry.677 The Treasury 
and the DTI had similar views, believing that the injection of funds into the company 
would increase the value of the privately held shares at the government’s expense. Both 
ministries, however, were of the belief that government had every right to request certain 
actions of Harland and Wolff and demand up to date reports on developments. Therefore, 
both ministries recommended replacing the grants with loans so that the government could 
make a higher return on an already substantial investment.678 
 
The Treasury was adamant that it could not agree to the purchase of an increased 
equity stake by the government and was not in favour of any more grants. Rather, the 
Treasury favoured increasing the level of loans to Harland and Wolff from the proposed 
£7.9 million to £12.5 million. This proposal, (which came from Patrick Jenkin, the Chief 
Secretary to The Treasury) was based on the view that the shipyard was now on a sounder 
financial basis than it had been two years previously after receiving over £14 million in 
1971 to ‘wipe the slate clean’.679  Indeed, the Treasury argued that if the shipyard was not 
performing then the government should withdraw support at the end of 1973. This 
concerned both the NIO and the DTI, which were of the opinion that no further changes to 
the proposed funding were necessary.680 This was not just because (in their view) an 
agreement had been made under the previous Stormont regime, but also because the 
trading conditions facing UK yards were still difficult (despite the ongoing demand for 
large tankers) with European yards competing for the same vessels and benefiting from 
unseen subsidies and therefore Harland and Wolff still required further funding to enable it 
to compete on commercial terms with the largest shipyards globally.681 
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Harland and Wolff, however, found the proposed break clause unacceptable, as was 
the suggestion that it take on further loans.682 However, once Harland and Wolff realised 
that the Stormont regime was no more and that the Treasury now had the final say in the 
finances of Northern Ireland, it agreed to an increase in the loans being included in the 
funding package. Indeed, the Ministry of Commerce communicated its decision in terms 
that limited any compromise the shipyard might try to seek.683 Therefore, rather than the 
£7.9 million loan and £11.9 million grant to the shipyard originally envisioned, two loans 
of £5 million, and £8 million were made, a total of £13 million. Additionally, as Harland 
and Wolff could not guarantee funding from its own resources, the loans enabled the 
company to reduce its amount of funding by £2 million.684 The Ministry of Commerce 
made its offer to Harland & Wolff on 5th December 1972, outlining its conditions, 
including the increased debt to fund the P200 project and the provisions for two reviews of 
funding to be made in December 1972 and again the following year. It must be noted, 
however, that the offer letter was sent just three weeks prior to the first review; if at any 
stage during the P200 project a financial review recommended that the shipyard should not 
continue, the government would withdraw financial backing. In reality, with the 
government’s shareholding in the company and with the growing civil unrest in Northern 
Ireland, the collapse of Harland and Wolff would have had many adverse consequences 
and therefore was not an option the government could consider.685 This was further 
complicated as the board of Harland and Wolff did not discuss the ratification of the offer 
letter from the Ministry of Commerce until mid January 1973 and therefore the scheduled 
review was delayed until later that month.686 Nevertheless, Harland and Wolff accepted the 
offer of assistance from the government, subject to a favourable outcome to the first review 
of its finances, (which occurred in April 1973) and the project commenced in January 
1973.687 This is an important point to make, Harland and Wolff strongly believed any 
funding would be a fait accompli regardless of an conditions imposed by either London or 
Belfast. 
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It is also important to note that, whilst Harland & Wolff continued its P200 
development plans, many problems continued to hinder the shipyard. First, steel had to be 
ordered (by law) from the state monopoly, British Steel, which itself was undergoing 
constant industrial strife and unable to deliver on time and in the quantities the shipyard 
required: indeed, this was the subject of an intervention by Edward Heath in 1972, who 
wrote to British Steel concerning the delays.688 Second, industrial tensions continued to 
plague the shipyard with steel workers deliberately slowing their pace of work until the 
shipyard increased their wages. Third, workers were resistant to change: they exhibited a 
reluctance to learn new methods; there was a blanket refusal to take on new apprentices 
and demarcation still existed in unofficial forms.689 Despite these issues, the yard had a 
brighter outlook as new orders came in, most notably one signed for six vessels of over 
313,000 tons deadweight (with Maritime Fruit Carriers).690 Consequently, by the summer 
of 1973 Harland and Wolff had its best prospects for almost a decade. 
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The nationalisation of Harland and Wolff, 1974 - 1975 
 
By the autumn of 1973, the security situation was having a profound effect on the 
decisions of the government, but regardless of the ongoing problems in Belfast, Harland 
and Wolff continued upon its P200 development plan. Nevertheless, the shipyard needed 
finance to survive long enough to take advantage of these new orders and the productivity 
increases created by the P200 scheme, which would not become apparent until 1975. After 
some discussion by the Cabinet, the government decided to give further financial aid to 
enable the shipyard to continue trading ‘within the law’.691 The government announced its 
decision to Parliament in November 1973, but the move was contentious.692 To save face 
the government subsequently requested that the merchant bank SG Warburg & Co 
investigate the available options for providing Harland and Wolff with further financial 
support. The results were presented to government at a meeting in London between senior 
officials from the bank and civil servants in November 1973 and it became clear that the 
burden of debt taken on by Harland and Wolff in the previous 8 years was detrimental to 
the shipyard’s survival. The bank, therefore, recommended that the government replace the 
loans with an equity stake of convertible preference shares (‘B shares’) that would have no 
voting or dividend rights, but that could be converted after 1977 into ordinary shares. This 
was attractive to the government, which wanted to avoid charges of intervening directly in 
industry and saw the potential of selling off the shares at a future date to recoup its 
investment. Furthermore, if the shipyard could come to an arrangement with private banks 
and the government acted as a guarantor for an overdraft facility, then it would be to 
Harland & Wolff’s benefit. Therefore, the government proposed to replace the 
accumulated £10.262 million of government debt with 8.1 million non-preference, non 
voting shares of £1 in value and offered a guarantee for an overdraft of £10 million. 693 
 
Although ministers were in agreement with the arrangements, many felt that the 
Northern Ireland Ministry of Commerce, as the local economic ministry, should own the 
entire shareholding in Harland and Wolff.694 However, the Department of Trade and 
Industry disagreed, arguing that the loans were from both the Northern Ireland government 
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and the SIB, and therefore asked for a fifty percent split between both London and Belfast. 
After the introduction of the Northern Ireland Government Act (1974) the DTI held many 
economic responsibilities in Northern Ireland and it therefore requested equal 
responsibility for Harland and Wolff.695 Nevertheless, it was agreed in January 1974 that 
the loans from the Ministry of Commerce and the SIB would be converted into an equity 
shareholding held by the NIO and that the government would act as guarantor of a £10 
million overdraft.696 Harland and Wolff was optimistic, a view confirmed two weeks later 
when Iver Hoppe and Lord Rochdale met with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
Willie Whitelaw, to finalise financial arrangements and the shipyard reported improving 
output, cost effectiveness and ship orders even with a continuing undercurrent of poor 
labour relations.697 
 
However, with an unexpected change of government from the Conservative Heath 
administration to the Labour administration of Harold Wilson in February 1974, the 
direction of government policy towards Harland and Wolff changed; the incoming 
government had a strong commitment to nationalising the shipbuilding and the aviation 
manufacturing industries and the Belfast shipyard was no exception to its plans.698 
Moreover, the new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Merlyn Rees, took a view that 
the management of Harland and Wolff was entirely responsible for the industrial relations 
strife affecting the yard. Indeed, Rees had a very poor and fractious relationship with the 
Managing Director of Harland and Wolff, Iver Hoppe, and from his first day as Secretary 
of State worked in opposition to many of his plans.699 Two events conspired against 
Hoppe. The first was the ongoing collapse of the market for oil tankers from the fuel crisis 
of 1973, which affected all major shipyards around the world.  However, the second, the 
Ulster Workers Council strike of 1974, compounded the issue. With the government 
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refusing the shipyard any further assistance until the strike was over, the company's 
commercial prospects were seriously compromised.700 
 
Government policy shifted towards nationalisation in April 1974, which was seen as 
the only viable option for the continuation of Harland and Wolff. With the potential for 
increased civil strife in Northern Ireland, liquidation was politically untenable. Also, with 
the government as the majority shareholder in Harland and Wolff, it would be responsible 
for most of the company's debts. The government, therefore, was against any further 
assistance to Harland and Wolff as a private company, because it already owed large debts 
to the government and private banks. As a result, civil servants in London and Belfast met 
on a number of occasions in 1974 to develop a plan of action and work out the details of 
any changes in the shipyard’s status.701 Additionally, civil servants presented 
nationalisation as a way of mitigating the industrial disputes affecting Harland and Wolff, 
as in their opinion, ‘the unions would be better (served) in a nationalised concern 
responsive to their needs’. 702 This comment demonstrates that, whilst the government was 
still concerned with making Harland & Wolff viable c, from this point onwards a number 
of other concerns came to the fore that affected this.  
 
With the appointment of Merlyn Rees, the attitude of government changed markedly 
towards industry in the province. After a career as a teacher and as an official for the 
National Union of Teachers,) Rees became a notable member of the Labour Party.703 
Consequently, Rees attributed the majority of blame for the shipyard's circumstances upon 
the management and believed that the company’s management treated unions unfairly.704 
In his first contact with the shipyard, Rees wrote a confrontational letter in April 1974 to 
the chairman of Harland and Wolff, stating that he found the inability of the shipyard’s 
management to negotiate with unions vexing. Rees stated, therefore, that he would use the 
powers that the government had inherited from the Shipbuilding Industry Board and the 
old Ministry of Commerce to remove the authority of management to resolve pay claims. 
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Indeed, Rees also stated that he was unsure whether to continue with the debt for equity 
swap agreed only a few months earlier.705  
 
Rochdale was enraged, writing back to Rees demanding that the government return 
the power to negotiate pay claims on its own, but also honour the assurances made by the 
previous government.706 Rochdale continued, stating that, whilst union and labour 
difficulties held up the P200 expansion plan (with demarcation and restrictive practices the 
norm amongst the shipyard’s workforce), the main problem was one of rising costs caused 
by inflation and uncertainty over the status of the shipbuilding industry caused by the 1973 
oil crisis. However, Rochdale stated that Rees’ position towards the workforce was naive, 
particularly considering the nature of Northern Ireland: 
 
‘I have no hesitation, therefore, in suggesting that, provided our 
present problems are solved, the Company’s long term future can still 
be regarded as bright but we must recognise and have on record that 
fifteen months of refusals to accept change and less than full co-
operation in the shipyard will make it more difficult to effect rapid 
changes than it otherwise might have been. I need hardly add that 
political unrest and the terrorist campaigns do nothing to soften these 
attitudes.’707 
 
Despite Rochdale’s letter defending Harland and Wolff’s management’s position, 
by May 1974 the government in London was actively working to change the management 
of the shipyard, although neither politicians nor civil servants admitted to doing so 
openly. Using a number of reports from Northern Irish politicians and civil servants that 
attributed the antagonism between the unions to Iver Hoppe as justification, the 
government in London worked towards the removal of Hoppe as Managing Director.708 
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Indeed, Hoppe was aware of such moves and called E.V. Marchant in the Northern 
Ireland Office to discuss the situation, stating that the board of Harland and Wolff was on 
the verge of resignation because of Rees’ interference, which Marchant, (to his 
embarrassment as he was aware of the situation at Harland & Wolff) knew was not the 
case.709 
 
Matters came to a head on 18th July 1974, when the management of Harland and 
Wolff declared that unless additional aid was forthcoming, the company would close on 
the 22nd and liquidate its assets as, in the board’s opinion, the company was no longer 
trading legally. Indeed, when the board of Harland and Wolff adjourned for lunch at 12.30 
at their meeting on the 18th July, it told the government that it had one hour to respond to 
their request.710 Therefore, to prevent the immediate closure of the shipyard, the 
government gave a verbal commitment to swap all debts for an equity stake, despite a 
concern that the rescue would eventually cost the government around £35 million.711 In 
reality, the Labour administration’s actions were a continuation of the proposals put 
forward by the previous Conservative government to exchange the shipyard’s 
accumulated debts for a majority shareholding in the company.712 The move was not 
uniformly popular; the workforce expected more from the government and the 
Conservative opposition, (which was moving its economic policy to one of government 
non-intervention and deregulation) questioned whether the survival of the shipyard was 
worth the money.713 
 
However, a growing dislike of Iver Hoppe by government tinged its commitment to 
provide further financial support and from July 1974 onwards, politicians and civil 
servants at the Northern Ireland Office conspired to remove him from his position. 
Rochdale was complicit in these actions, but documentation from the time shows that he 
was motivated more by self-preservation than animosity towards Hoppe, which was a 
pointless exercise since the Labour administration was intent on his removal as well. 714 
Therefore, the Northern Ireland Office employed two senior civil servants, Frank Cooper 
and John Smith, to organise the removal of Hoppe and both men spent the early summer of 
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1974 researching the use of Harland and Wolff’s articles of association to find a lawful 
mechanism to force the resignation of Hoppe. Two clauses appeared to be of use to Cooper 
and Smith: article 81(f) in which he could be removed from his post by the board and 
article 81(b), where the Ministry of Commerce could remove him.715 Moreover, both 
discussed who would take over managing the shipyard if Hoppe left, indicating that, while 
the action was planned well in advance, the notice given to Hoppe would be minimal and 
therefore Harland and Wolff would have to operate under caretaker management.716 All 
these activities were hidden from normal civil service life; when reporting to the Secretary 
of State for Northern Ireland, both Cooper and Smith would leave details of the scheme at 
the very end of apparently mundane documents reporting their daily activities.717  
 
The government acted covertly until the end of July 1974; in ministerial meetings 
any discussion of Hoppe’s dismissal were minuted independently and referred to in official 
minutes as ‘a matter dealt with separately’.718 Finally, in a meeting held on the 29th July 
1974, Merlyn Rees came out as the principal organiser of Hoppe’s imminent demise 
orchestrating the actions of Cooper and Smith. Rees stated that the entire situation at 
Harland and Wolff was caused by Hoppe’s inability to work with trade unions combined 
with his ‘heavy handed’ attitude towards the company’s employees and therefore he had 
decided through consultations with trade unions that Hoppe had to be removed from his 
position with ‘all due haste’. 719 Few in the meeting supported Hoppe, but W.E. Bell (a 
Northern Irish civil servant who was an important player in the rescue plan of 1966 and 
had known Hoppe since he started in Belfast) disagreed with Rees’ views. Indeed, Bell 
stated that whilst the shipyard was suffering commercially, it was the commercial flair of 
Hoppe in obtaining orders whilst planning for the company’s future that had kept Harland 
and Wolff competitive.720 Nevertheless, the Bell’s intervention was to no avail. After a 
final, futile, argument between London and Belfast over which department had appointed 
Hoppe, the Permanent Secretary of the NIO wrote to Hoppe on 5 August 1974, asking him 
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to resign or be removed with immediate effect from the board of Harland and Wolff.721 
Hoppe resigned and left Northern Ireland; within a few weeks, he suffered the first of 
many strokes, which began a downward spiral that let to his premature death. 
 
Once Merlyn Rees had engineered the removal of Iver Hoppe, the debt for equity 
swap paved the way for the government to achieve its ultimate goal: the nationalisation of 
Harland and Wolff.722 From the very first discussions between the two parties, the 
government openly declared the intention to purchase the majority of shares in the 
company regardless of either the current ownership of the shipyard or the external 
pressures of the situation in Northern Ireland.723 Despite a number of initial consultations, 
(in particular with the Northern Ireland executive set up by the Sunningdale agreement) the 
Labour government prevaricated over the issue of nationalisation and a number of 
ministers of state  (in particular Michael Foot and Shirley Williams) focussed instead upon 
peripheral issues of employee vetoes and involvement in the power structure of Harland 
and Wolff.724 By the start of 1975, however, Tony Benn, as Secretary of State for Industry 
agitated for the nationalisation of Harland and Wolff as soon as practicable. In the early 
half of 1975, Benn worked towards solving the fundamental problem holding up 
nationalisation, the status of the government in Northern Ireland and the legal rights held 
by the London government.725 
 
The nationalisation of the shipbuilding and aviation manufacturing industries was 
contentious; the legislation that created British Shipbuilders and British Aerospace in 1977 
required the use of the Parliament Act (1911 & 1949), which allowed the House of 
Commons to force legislation through Parliament in the face of opposition from the 
Lords.726 In Northern Ireland the authority for such a decision rested initially with the 
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Stormont Parliament and Northern Irish Government, which had been replaced by the 
Northern Ireland Office (NIO) in 1972. The legislative authority of Stormont had been 
replaced by wide ranging reserve powers held by the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland, who could rule the province by decree, but mostly used the powers as a reflection 
of London government’s will. This was the main debate in government circles concerning 
the nationalisation of Harland and Wolff and indeed by 1975 the government held a 
substantial equity stake and exercised a vast range of financial and managerial 
responsibilities. Therefore, the nationalisation of Harland and Wolff merely put the 
shipyard under total rather than partial government ownership. However, which 
government would own the shipyard, London or Belfast? 
 
It was the advocacy of Tony Benn that pushed the situation forward; he was adamant 
that as the government in London held (through the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland) Royal Prerogative powers to legislate in the province, then it should do so even if 
the course of action was outside the scrutiny of Parliament.727 Therefore, instead of a long 
drawn out legislative process in Parliament, Benn proposed the use of an ‘Order in 
Council’, which is an order emanating from the Privy Council stating the will of the 
government.728 This was not uniformly popular in Cabinet, Harold Lever, the Chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster, said that to use such legacy powers would damage the standing 
of the United Kingdom as a democratic nation and was unnecessary when the company 
was almost in total government control.729 Nevertheless, the intervention of Lever was in 
vain, influential members of the cabinet, namely Michael Foot and Shirley Williams 
wanted increased worker participation in the shipyard and therefore supported the Benn’s 
proposals as a way to achieve this aim.  When combined with a Home Secretary, Roy 
Jenkins, who feared that the closure of Harland and Wolff would create widespread unrest 
in Northern Ireland, the order in council became a fait accompli.730  
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On 26th March 1975, Stanley Orme as Minister of State for Northern Ireland 
announced to Parliament that the government would bring Harland and Wolff into full 
national ownership using an Order in Council. With the death of Aristotle Onassis in the 
days preceding the announcement, the government stated that the nationalisation was a 
response to the shareholding of Onassis coming on the market. However, in reality, 
regardless of the circumstances, the government was intent on nationalising the shipyard, 
and indeed the entire shipbuilding industry.731 The only differences for the Northern Irish 
shipyard were the wider consequences of the shipyard’s closure on the peace process and 
the disputed sovereignty of the province. Indeed, Labour Party policy proposed to bring 
about the peaceful re-unification of Ireland and therefore Orme stated that the use of an 
Order in Council guaranteed the ownership of Harland and Wolff remained with the people 
of Northern Ireland regardless of the status of the territory, be it a devolved government or 
merged with Éire.732 Consequently, with little fanfare and no change in management, 
Harland and Wolff was taken into full government ownership on 13th August 1975, two 
years before the rest of the shipbuilding industry and with little controversy.733  
 
When researching the nationalisation of Harland and Wolff, many historians 
portray the actions of the Labour administration in 1975 as a response to an ever-
increasing crisis within the company.734 Indeed Harland and Wolff lost over £60 million in 
1974 because of the collapse of the oil tanker market and in 1975 had few viable orders.735 
However, this section has argued that, whilst it is clear that the government responded to a 
serious crisis, it was also the case that government ministers had many separate and 
conflicting motives. First, Merlyn Rees wanted the removal of Iver Hoppe because of his 
own prejudices and therefore agitated for his removal at the earliest opportunity. Secondly, 
members of the cabinet, such as Foot and Williams, were interested in promoting their own 
campaigns, regardless of the economic and commercial reality at Harland and Wolff. 
Finally, the government was intent on nationalising as many industries as possible and 
proceeded to achieve that aim. To conclude, the nationalisation of Harland and Wolff 
represented not only the rescue of a corporation by government, but also the interwoven 
desires of that government superimposed upon a private company. 
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Conclusion, Harland and Wolff 1966-1979 
 
 
 The story of Harland and Wolff between 1966 and 1975 is complex and 
multifaceted and intertwined with the wider context of conflict in Northern Ireland.  From 
the appointment of John Mallabar in 1966, through a number of financial crises up to 
nationalisation in 1975, any proposal concerning Harland and Wolff faced the scrutiny of 
not only both governments in Belfast and London, but also a variety of interested factions 
in Northern Ireland. Therefore, regardless of the motivations of the shipyard’s management 
and what experts at the time agreed was the correct course of action, the solutions 
presented for Harland and Wolff would only follow a path amenable to those who had a 
stake in the shipyard’s survival. Consequently, the local context of Belfast and Northern 
Ireland influenced decisions of Harland and Wolff beyond the rational, commercial 
concerns of running a profitable company. Indeed, from 1960 to 1980, Harland and Wolff 




Table 7.1: Harland and Wolff, Profit and Loss, Vessels Built and Gross 







Tonnes ( x 000) 
Work 
force 
Fixed Assets   
(£ x 000) 








1960 9 50 n/a 8,799 210 n/a n/a 
1961 14 50 n/a 9,347 140 280.00 n/a 
1962 8 48 12,582 9,950 123 256.25 9.78 
1963 7 85 11,372 10,030 144 169.41 12.66 
1964 4 90 11,681 7,848 -327 -363.33 -27.99 
1965 2 70 13,019 7,434 -1,932 -2760.00 -148.40 
1966 5 80 11,454 6,633 -4,146 -5182.50 -361.97 
1967 3 55 10,049 6,134 -1,156 -2101.82 -115.04 
1968 5 244 9,007 8,652 -755 -309.43 -83.82 
1969 1 58 9,274 11,308 -8,330 -14362.07 -898.21 
1970 4 196 10,007 13,482 -302 -154.08 -30.18 
1971 3 240 9,129 13,172 -182 -75.83 -19.94 
1972 3 190 9,950 14,211 -513 -270.00 -51.56 
1973 2 195 9,996 19,713 -33,012 -16929.23 -3302.52 
1974 2 200 9,947 26,524 -16,711 -8355.50 -1680.00 
1975 2 226 9,657 32,610 -4,884 -2161.06 -505.75 
1976 3 220 9,236 33,424 2,591 1177.73 280.53 
1977 2 230 8,706 32,039 -1,907 -829.13 -219.04 
1978 1 70 8,212 30,469 -25,452 -36360.00 -3099.37 
1979 3 143 7,542 28,335 -43,296 -30276.92 -5740.65 
1980 4 357 7,370 25,612 -31,997 -8962.75 -4341.52 
Total 52 528     -6944   -52.58 
Source: ‘British Shipbuilding 1972’, A report to the Department of Trade and Industry by Booz-Allen & 
Hamilton BV, Cmnd 4942, HMSO, London, Chapter 17 ‘Finance and Accounting’ pp 174- 186, Lloyds 
Register of Shipping 1960-1973, Lloyds, London and Moss, M & Hume, J.R. (1986) ‘Shipbuilders to the 
World: 125 Years of Harland and Wolff, Belfast 1861 - 1986’ (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press).  
 
From 1966 onwards John Mallabar worked hard to increase output and productivity 
in the shipyard, but was compromised by the environment in Northern Ireland. Mallabar 
had the foresight to create a shipyard capable of building vessels over 250,000 tons capable 
to compete with equivalent shipbuilders in Japan, even if this contradicted government 
policy at the time. Mallabar also benefited from the special circumstances of Northern 
Ireland, with its own local legislature, and therefore received more funding from both 
governments than was available to comparable shipyards in the rest of the UK. For four 
years this was a successful policy and the shipyard increased its output, but the underlying 
context, whilst advantageous in some ways also provided the fatal blow to Mallabar’s 
career. Indeed, whilst Mallabar cut costs, reduced staff, increased output and modernized 




unions of Northern Ireland and, as a result, the strikes, go-slows and work to rules of 
1969/70 wiped out the gains of the previous 5 years in a few short months.736 
 
Harland and Wolff could have been sold as a going concern in 1970; both Aristotle 
Onassis and Fred Olson expressed interest in purchasing the shipyard. However, 
negotiations between government in London and Belfast and the prospective owners were 
fraught with complications; many institutions, whilst not overtly involved in the process, 
claimed a vested interest in the shipyard (namely trade unions, Northern Irish political 
factions and the Shipbuilding Industry Board in the final year of its existence). Therefore, 
from the very beginning the attempt by both tycoons to gain control of Harland and Wolff 
was doomed to failure against the dynamic complexities of Northern Ireland in the early 
1970s. Moreover, with economic nationalism in the UK and the need to keep Stormont and 
the Northern Irish workforce happy, the eventual continuation of an independent Harland 
and Wolff, with all debts written off by the UK government, did not come as a surprise to 
many.  
 
By the end of 1973, after three years of stability and investment under the 
management of Iver Hoppe, Harland and Wolff was still only just viable as a going 
concern. The shipyard had not made a profit since 1963, and the accumulated losses in the 
ten years to 1973 amounted to £50.038 million, notwithstanding the £64.9 million the 
government had advanced in loans, grants and the equity purchase of £4 million worth of 
shares in 1971. With the P200 expansion scheme, the shipyard had increased its output in 
tonnage markedly since 1971 and certainly, the shipyard received many orders and 
delivered vessels on time. Nevertheless, from 1966 Harland and Wolff did not make any 
profits and relied upon government intervention and funding to remain in existence. The 
losses of 1969 were a foretaste of the situation to come, as the losses increased in size 
again in 1973 after 3 years of improvement.737 However, (profit and loss aside) Harland 
and Wolff had been successful in gaining contracts for the construction of large crude oil 
supertankers and was the pre-eminent shipyard in the United Kingdom in this sector, 
building thirteen to Scott Lithgow’s four vessels and Swan Hunters’ eight.738 
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Unlike other shipyards in the United Kingdom, however, Harland and Wolff had a 
hinterland of a semi-independent government. Sectarian violence between two divergent 
communities was used by local politicians to preserve the advantage of a Protestant, 
Unionist government at Stormont Castle and to persuade central government in Whitehall 
to advance larger and larger sums to businesses in Northern Ireland based on the fear of 
mass unemployment in Belfast. Harland and Wolff employed approximately 7.5% of the 
industrial workers in Northern Ireland (with unemployment in Northern Ireland higher than 
the UK average). With 95 percent of the workforce from the Presbyterian working class of 
East Belfast, the closure of the shipyard would have had a profound effect on the political 
process of Northern Ireland. Therefore, from 1970 onwards the conflict in Northern Ireland 
influenced government decision making in both Belfast and London towards Harland and 
Wolff and the failure to agree terms with Onassis or Olsen, as well as the large sums of 
money injected into the business, reflect this. In comparison, the P200 scheme to increase 
the shipyard’s output to two-hundred thousand tons per annum was a commercial decision 
based upon contemporary market conditions not a reaction to the pressures of being an 
employer in a troubled city. Nevertheless, by the early 1970s decisions made by 
management or government about the future of Harland and Wolff never truly followed 
commercial criteria and instead reflected the multifaceted requirements of a wide variety 
of factions with a vested interest in the shipyard.  
 
With the return to power of the Labour party under Harold Wilson in 1974, the 
situation for the shipyard changed yet again. Whilst the local context of sectarian conflict 
in Northern Ireland remained the same, new cabinet ministers in London brought an 
entirely new set of opinions and prejudices that descended upon Harland and Wolff. The 
company’s fate was determined by two factors, firstly a manifesto commitment to 
nationalise the aviation and shipbuilding industries and, secondly, the personal agendas of 
cabinet ministers (such as Michael Foot and Shirley Williams). The first factor is highly 
important in the national context and in 1977 the legislation to nationalise the industries 
required the Parliament Act (1911 & 1949) to overcome opposition by the House of Lords, 
but in the case of Northern Ireland the personal views of individual politicians are much 
more important. The days of Iver Hoppe and Lord Rochdale in charge of Harland and 
Wolff were effectively numbered the moment Merlyn Rees became Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland as he proceeded to intervene and interfere in whatever way possible in the 
affairs of the shipyard. At first this limited the management’s commercial decision making 




Rochdale from Harland and Wolff, regardless of the consequences that would befall the 
shipyard or indeed the individuals concerned. 
 
Nationalisation proceeded slowly at first. As has been shown, ministers were initially 
more interested in mapping their own particularly ideologies onto the company. 
Nevertheless, the project was driven forward by a minister with his own obsession for 
nationalisation, Tony Benn, and early in 1975 the Northern Ireland Office and the 
Department of Trade and Industry worked to bring Harland and Wolff into state 
ownership. However, because Stormont was no more and efforts to return legislative 
independence to Northern Ireland had failed the way to proceed was not clear. With a 
small minority in Parliament, the Labour government chose to use an Order in Council to 
bring Harland and Wolff into national ownership. This was controversial; whilst the 
executive in the United Kingdom at the time exercised a number of prerogative powers 
these were limited in scope and execution. In the case of Northern Ireland, all the 
legislative functions exercised by Stormont through a democratic process were now within 
the prerogative powers of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Therefore, while 
strictly legal under the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1973, the government 
used what was in effect a short-term measure until local democratic rule could be restored 
to Northern Ireland. At the time, ministers and civil servants in London questioned whether 
this was a correct action for a democratic nation to undertake in peacetime. Nevertheless, 
the government intended to nationalise Harland and Wolff and therefore used whatever 
means possible to achieve this end.  
 
Harland and Wolff are still in existence today, but as a general engineering company 
with a vastly reduced workforce. Despite a profitable ‘Indian Summer’ under the 
management of the Olsen concern upon privatization in the early 1990s, the shipyard has 
survived on the few military orders that come its way and has not built a merchant vessel 
since the last cargo ship, the MV Anvil Point (subsidized by the UK government and on 
long term military charter) left the building dock in 2005. It is unlikely that Harland and 
Wolff will ever build a vessel again and the city government in Belfast has decided to 
create a new commercial district called Titanic Quarter on land that once belonged to the 
shipyard. What was once an important industry in Northern Ireland that held the fate of so 
many in its hands and had a symbiotic relation with governments in London and Belfast 
has gone the way of industrial obsolescence, superceded by shipyards in countries such as 
Korea and China, which do the same work as Harland and Wolff, but on time, to budget 




played an active, but inadvertent, rôle in the decline of the British shipbuilding industry. In 
the case of Harland and Wolff the government intervened aplenty but a combination of 
poorly executed good ideas and promoting the bad propelled the company onto its eventual 
fate, but at least it has continued to survive in the three decades after the events described 











The relationship between government and shipbuilders as a cause of 
the industry’s decline 
 
 
This thesis argued that under the guidance of the Shipbuilding Industry Board, 
government ministers and civil servants agreed a series of publicly funded interventions to 
modernise British shipyards. However, the actual plans agreed upon did not represent the 
best practice nor the prevailing orthodoxy found in more productive shipyards in Japan and 
Scandinavia, but were a series of compromise positions agreed over the course of months, 
sometimes years, between the wishes and views of government and shipbuilding 
companies. As such, the implementation of these modernisation plans hindered rather than 
helped the industry, with short-term gains in output and productivity wiped away, first by 
overseas competition for orders and, second, by the 1973 OPEC Oil shock. Also, this 
thesis has argued that a diorama of wider relationships between government and the 
shipbuilding industry constrained the industry’s development, by creating a mechanism for 
compromise instead of following the correct course of action. This conclusion will show 
how this thesis has demonstrated the above argument. 
 
As this thesis has shown, government and the SIB attempted to engage with the 
shipbuilding industry to the full extent of its powers, but the shipbuilding industry itself 
was unwilling to allow the SIB to pursue the full extent of its remit and therefore sought 
negotiation and compromise from an early stage. However, whilst shipyards were 
unprepared to allow the SIB full reign, they could not ignore the potential for lucrative 
grants and low interest loans. Consequently, the decision making process from the start, 
whilst following the plans for negotiation outlined with the SIB’s mandate (which was not 
allowed to act without a shipyard’s consent), was compromised by a number of conflicting 
viewpoints held by a number of major actors within the process.739 Nevertheless this was 
to be expected, as the entire process leading up to the creation of the SIB from the initial 
murmurings about the fate of British shipbuilding in the early 1960s under the 
Conservative to the creation of the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee under Reay Geddes 
was intertwined with the desires of a number of different actors from wide ranging 
backgrounds.  
 
                                                




As shown in chapter one, the development of an interventionist stance by the 
Wilson in opposition and in government owes much to the policy deliberations of the 
Labour Party in the 1930s and 40s and the development of the centralised government 
machinery under the Atlee government.740 However, if the influences behind Labour’s 
policies up to 1964 are broken down and treated as a policy network, three distinct interest 
groups are at the fore of decision-making. First, membership of the Labour party, from 
general members to politicians to unions, play an important part, if not in formulating 
policy whilst in government then by providing the diorama upon which particular themes 
evolve. This is an important point when taken in light of the work on ‘inventing’ decline 
by Tomlinson and Supple and certainly in light of Edgerton’s work on technology in the 
1960s.741 Consequently, in the 1960s the movement away from nationalisation to the 
promotion of scientific management reflected the prevailing zeitgeist of the day, which 
was also reflected in the flirtation with planning by the Conservatives in the late 1950s and 
60s.742 Second, following the same theme, the relationship between academia, the Labour 
Party and government is important in comprehending the development of a Keynesian 
paradigm after 1945, reflecting the influence not just of John Maynard Keynes after 1940, 
but also the influence of academics such as Kaldor at Cambridge and Balogh at Oxford.743 
Whilst an influential formal relationship existed between government and academia, the 
informal environment is important as well in terms of the propagation of ideas to the 
decision-making classes, which define the prevailing economic orthodoxy of the time.744 
Third, the development of a large civil service with wide ranging powers during the 
Second World War and perpetuated by the Atlee and the Conservatives up until 1964 is an 
important factor in defining policy developments in this period. In the context of 
developing policies that advocated and recognised the rôle state intervention as an 
economic mechanism, the existence of a state machinery that once a government was 
elected would be able to enact programmes from day one of a Labour election victory was 
a power factor. Moreover, the relationship between the civil service and academia, on the 
one hand, and academia and the Labour Party, on the other hand acted as an axis upon 
which policies of industrial intervention and scientific economic management travelled.  
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Nevertheless, whilst this provides the diorama upon which this study depends, it cannot 
truly explain the development of policy towards shipbuilding in this period. 
 
Chapter two discussed the creation of the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee and the 
Shipbuilding Industry Board. The development of both institutions owes a lot to the 
influence of shipbuilders and ship-owners, the shipbuilding unions and the influential 
economic and trade media. In the case of the first grouping, from the 1950s British builders 
and owners of shipping had lobbied the government for assistance to address the effects of 
foreign competition. The response from the Conservative administrations was, firstly, to 
promote a joint British Productivity Council/Government/Shipbuilding industry inquiry 
and report into the industry, which occurred during 1961 to 1962 and, secondly, to provide 
cheap credit to those wishing to purchase merchant vessels in British shipyards.745 The 
productivity recommendations were never implemented and the Shipbuilding Credit 
Scheme created only a moderate boom in shipping orders and therefore neither solved the 
innate problems of the industry. After the election of the Labour party in 1964 the 
Shipbuilders and Repairers National Council (the owners of vessels and shipyards) were 
lobbying the government to develop policies to deal with the industry’s malaise.746 The 
TUC made a similar approach on behalf of the shipbuilding unions, which lived with the 
fear of mass redundancies from both overseas competition and the introduction of new 
methodologies.747 However, the views of the individual unions and the TUC diverged on 
the point of new technology and demarcation, with the shop stewards being against the 
introduction of new methods and the TUC seeing the modernisation of the industry leading 
to greater output and more employment.748 Finally, the print media had become more 
active in its defence of British shipbuilding since the 1950s and opinion pieces concerning 
the demise of an industry were widespread in the following decade. Whilst individually 
editorials demanded government action over shipbuilding (as well as other industries) were 
of little direct influence, as a sum total of the parts, the creation in the media of debates 
concerning Britain’s effectiveness as an industrial and technologically advanced nation 
were powerful indeed.749 Consequently, whilst the 1964 Labour Party Election manifesto 
made no mention of shipbuilding as an industry, it did propose that industry would be 
managed and controlled by new government departments and bodies and therefore the 
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creation of a body such as the Shipbuilding Industry Board in response to pressure from 
interested parties was have been a logical step.750 
 
However, it is hard to find a relationship that demonstrates that a comprehensive 
dialogue took place either between the SIC and shipbuilding or the SIC and government. 
From the appointment of Reay Geddes, chairman of the Dunlop Tyre Company, to the 
methodologies of visits and submissions, solicited or otherwise, the committee did not 
incorporate in its membership individuals from the shipbuilding industry.751 This was a 
different situation compared to the shipbuilding industry inquiries of the previous four 
years, which had involved the British Productivity Council, the British Shipbuilders 
Research Association, the Shipbuilding Advisory Committee at the Ministry of Transport 
and the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. By contrast, individuals external 
to the industry staffed the Geddes committee.752 Even the methodology of the Geddes 
committee differed from the previous inquiries by focussing heavily on evidence from 
government departments at the expense of enquiring further into the affairs of the 
shipbuilding companies, particular as these had submitted only scant evidence to the 
committee. That the government economic departments, specifically the Department of 
Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Technology and the Treasury, had scant interest in the 
shipbuilding industry did not help matters, either. What is curious about the eventual report 
is that whilst the previous reports provided prescriptive recommendations to implement 
modern methodologies and equipment, Geddes’ main recommendation was the creation of 
larger groupings through mergers. These proposals mirrored developments in other 
countries, particularly Japan, where larger shipbuilding groups had sprung up in the early 
1960s, but they did not address the core issues of redundant working techniques and 
obsolescent shipyards. Indeed, Geddes discounted the creation of shipyards built around a 
dry dock and ship factory as those found in Japan as being unnecessary, (despite the views 
of the Minister responsible for shipbuilding at the time of the committees inception, Roy 
Mason, who visited Japanese shipyards in 1964) yet this strategy was being adopted in the 
rest of Europe on both sides of the iron curtain.753 Mergers would help reduce overheads 
and lower costs, but in 1966 the shipbuilding industry in the United Kingdom needed to 
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change its production methods to reflect the prevalent orthodoxy elsewhere in the world 
and the Geddes report did not address this, indeed saw the entire subject it as an expensive 
and time consuming distraction754 
 
Creating a defining model for the processes of the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee 
is difficult, as the body has proven itself to be both enigmatic and distant in its dealings 
with the shipbuilding industry. However, any institution charged with developing policies 
reflects the views and opinions of those who make up its members. Therefore, this thesis 
proposes that the Geddes Committee did not reflect either the wider views of government 
or the views of management and labour within the industry. Rather, the conclusions of the 
committee reflected the response of its members to the submissions made and visits 
undertaken rather than a complex model of policy formation in the fashion of 
Rhodes/Hall/Pemberton.755 This is not to discount the value of external relationships 
between the committee and its members with the government or shipyards, but the 
evidence available does not point to a complex set of relationships. However, this is not the 
case of the Shipbuilding Industry Board, which found itself at the nexus of a wide series of 
relationships between government and the shipbuilding industry. The SIB did not have the 
powers to impose programmes of action on the industry.756 Indeed, it was dependent on 
negotiations with shipbuilders to decide upon a plan of action and its case was not helped 
by the remit and provisions of the Geddes report that proposed modernisation and mergers, 
but did not prescribe the exact form this would entail. This was magnified in the case of its 
relationship with Scott Lithgow, where the process of negotiation over funding took four 
years to complete in the face of intransigence and undefined plans.757 Therefore, whilst the 
SIB attempted to follow the guidance of the Geddes Report to the letter, it quickly found 
this to be an inadequate way to proceed and after 18 months diverged from its remit. 
Indeed, at first the board took the guidance of the report to such an extent that it refused to 
negotiate with the John Brown shipyard in 1967, over a proposed scheme to turn Newshot 
Island on the River Clyde into a modern Japanese style shipyard capable of producing 
                                                
754 Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee, Report, Section 13. 
755 Pemberton, H. ‘Policy Networks and Policy Learning: UK Economic Policy in the 1960s and 1970s’ 
Public Administration, 78:4 (2000) pp 771-792. See also, Marsh, D. Rhodes, R.A.W. Policy Networks in 
British Government (Oxford, 1992), Rhodes, R.A.W. ‘The Hollowing out of the State’, The Political 
Quarterly, 15:2 (1994), pp 138 - 151, Rhodes, R.A.W. ‘From Prime Minister to Core Executive’, Prime 
Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive (Basingstoke, 1995), Rhodes, R.A.W, Understanding Governance: 
Policy Networks, governance, reflexivity and accountability  (Buckingham, 1997) and Smith, M.J. 
‘Reconceptualizing the British State: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges to Central Government’, Public 
Administration, 76 (1998), pp 45 - 72. 
756 Shipbuilding Industry Act, 1967. 





vessels of over 500,000 tons deadweight, instead forcing the yard into a merger with other 
local shipyards to create Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS).758 However, 12 months later in 
1968 the SIB questioned the Geddes report to such an extent that it did not dispute funding 
the building dock proposal at Harland and Wolff.759 Indeed SIB personnel mostly came 
from a non-shipbuilding background; the chairperson, Sir William Swallow, was formerly 
of the Vauxhall Car Company and the staff were seconded from a multitude of civil service 
departments. Therefore, the SIB changed over the course of its existence as the board’s 
cognisance of the shipbuilding industry increased, but from 1967 as other Whitehall 
departments became increasingly involved, so did the government. Consequently, the 
process of the Geddes Report and the creation of the Shipbuilding Industry Board 
represented a typical example of Hall’s Second Order change, the fact that over the 
lifecycle of the SIB the institution evolved from its original mandate and represents in 
itself a process of institutional change in relation to changing perceptions.760 
 
When setting up the Shipbuilding Industry Board the Labour government did not 
intend to involve either the Ministry of Technology or other Whitehall ministries (the 
Treasury in particular) directly in the decision making process. Powers given to ministers 
or civil service departments were either for the purposes of consultation or for overall 
accountability towards the funding applications at the final stage of their development. 
However, once the SIB started to evolve from the provisions of the Geddes Report and 
shipyards disputed the Geddes plan, then civil servants from other departments and 
government ministers became involved.761 This had a number of distinct causes, most 
notably the efforts to restrict government expenditure as a result of the 1967 Sterling crisis 
and the recommendation by the Geddes Report that all military construction be focussed in 
a maximum of three shipyards, but also because of the sheer inertia at Scott Lithgow and 
the political situation of Harland and Wolff in Northern Ireland.762 In the first instance, the 
Treasury objected to large development schemes without comprehensive justification for 
the expenditure and acted to restrict the amount of finance given. In the second instance, 
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shipyards that had previously received strong orders from the Admiralty decided in most 
cases to dispute the fact with the relevant minister, or in many instances their local MP, 
who would campaign on the shipyard’s behalf.763 In all cases, intransigence from the 
Treasury over funds and the shipyards over naval contracts substantially held up 
negotiations for government funding. This thesis has demonstrated in the case of Scott 
Lithgow in chapter three that these negotiations were responsible for holding up plans of 
action by developing compromise positions between Government, the SIB and 
shipbuilders. In the case of Harland and Wolff, as shown in chapter five, a plan of action 
developed quickly, but the government in London still had to make allowances for the 
Northern Irish government in Stormont. These solutions may have developed a common 
ground between the different groups that led to action, but this was not necessarily the 
correct course for the industry, as the two case studies in this thesis have demonstrated. 
 
The case study of Scott Lithgow in chapters three and four demonstrated the flaws 
inherent in the negotiation process between the Shipbuilding Industry Board and an 
individual shipyard.  In theory, at least, the merger of Scotts and Lithgows looked like a 
sensible proposition, both shipyards were located close to one another in Greenock and 
shared local suppliers.764 Moreover, being on the lower Clyde 40 km from Glasgow the 
shipyards in Greenock had very different wage and cost bases compared to the yards in the 
city of Glasgow and therefore when they proposed a merger to the SIB in 1967, it was 
taken as a welcome sign of progress for the shipbuilding industry in Scotland.765 However, 
the issue of bidding for and being guaranteed military orders by the government almost 
unhinged the entire process, as did the reluctance of the senior management at both Scotts 
and Lithgows to give any definite plans or funding requests to the SIB for its 
consideration.766 On the first condition, the Royal Navy had little confidence that Scotts 
was capable of making the technologically advanced vessels it needed and on the second 
the SIB attempted in 1968, with little success, to impress upon Scott Lithgow the limited 
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timeframe that it was working with.767 This was to no avail and Scott Lithgow went on to 
claim that military work was essential to its very existence, despite evidence to the 
contrary and the decision by the Geddes committee to focus military construction in three 
high technology shipyards.768 The SIB increasingly despaired of the shipyard’s position 
and even Anthony Wedgwood Benn, the Minister for Technology, was fed up with Scott 
Lithgow’s attitude.769 In the end, Benn had to write personally to Ross Belch stating that 
the companies’ position was unacceptable and if they did not agree to the government’s 
offer of assistance, then none would be forthcoming.770 
 
Whilst an entity called Scott Lithgow had existed since 1967, this was little more 
than a token company with a value of £100 and the two shipyards did not complete a 
merger until the 31st December 1969, almost four years after starting negotiations and did 
not receive government assistance until March 1970.771 As diagram 3.1 in chapter 
demonstrated, Scott Lithgow was in effect a holding company for Scotts and Lithgows, 
which for all extents and purposes continued as separate entities.772 The shipyard continued 
to be run as two operations and proposed a plan to develop facilities capable of building 
the largest crude oil carrying tankers demanded by shipping companies. The plan, 
however, relied heavily on using existing facilities being developed to build the tankers in 
two halves, which ran counter to the developments in other nations that used purpose built 
facilities.773 Belch justified the company’s decision by stating that due to the naturally 
uncertain nature of the market for new shipping, he felt following a path of fiscal 
conservatism would protect Scott Lithgow’s interests in the long run better than following 
the current trends in the shipbuilding industry.774 By doing so and as its insistence on 
military orders demonstrated, Scott Lithgow followed a policy of building a range of 
                                                
767 TNA FV 37/21, SIB Board Minutes for 9th Oct 1967 and TNA FV 37/21 Letter dated 30th January 1967 
from B. Barker, director SIB to M.A. Sinclair Scott, chairman of Scotts’ Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. 
Ltd. and carbon copied to Sir. William Lithgow, chairman of Lithgows Limited. 
768 TNA FV 37/21 letter dated 3rd April 1968 from M.A. Sinclair Scott, chairman of Scotts’ Shipbuilding 
and Engineering Co. Ltd., to C.H. Bayliss, Ministry of Technology and Statement on Defence Estimates: 
1966. Part I: The Defence Review, Cmnd 2901, (London, 1966). 
769 TNA FV 37/21 letter dated 8th April 1968 to C.H. Bayliss, Ministry of Technology from B. Barker, 
director SIB and Letter dated 19th April 1968 from C.H. Bayliss, Ministry of Technology to B. Barker, SIB. 
770 TNA FV 37/21 Draft letter dated 11th November 1968 sent to V.I. Chapman, Ministry of Technology and 
C.H. Bayliss, SIB, to be sent to M.A. Sinclair Scott, chairman Scotts’ Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd. 
and William J. Lithgow, chairman Lithgows Limited. 
771 GUAS GD 320/3/16 Notes dated 4th November 1969, entitled, ‘Scott Lithgow Merger - Accounting 
Arrangements: Notes for Meeting - 4/11/69 at 2.15’. 
772 ibid. 
773 TNA FV 37/21 Memo dated 28th May 1969, by G.W.S. Reed, entitled, ‘Note of a visit to Scott Lithgow 
on Wednesday, SIB, p.1.’ and ‘Melania: Largest Tanker built in Holland’ Shipping World and Shipbuilder, 
February 1969, pp. 331-332. 
774 GIAS GD 323/1/4/16, Scott Lithgow Group Development Plan 1968, p. 2-3, Marketing Section p. 3-5, 
GUAS GD323/1/1/50, Scott Lithgow Group Development Plan, 1970, GUAS GD 323/1/4/6, Scott Lithgow 




vessel types in small market segments, rather than focusing on the main vessel type in 
demand at any particular time. Scott Lithgow did build and sell large crude oil tankers, but 
in very small numbers and with a minimum of resources, particularly when compared to 
competitor shipyards in Europe or Japan.775 In theory, Scott Lithgow should have been well 
placed to benefit when the global market for shipbuilding collapsed at the end of 1973 by 
being able to build whatever vessel the market required, but this was not the case. In the 
government-sponsored Booz Allen and Hamilton report of 1973, Scott Lithgow was 
heavily criticised for taking £18.5 million of public money from the Shipbuilding Industry 
Board and yet achieving little in the way of integration or development.776 Therefore, when 
in 1973 the shipyard was left with cancelled orders and partially completed tankers, it was 
ill prepared to deal with the consequences and had to again ask for government assistance. 
Government assistance was not just about the nationalisation of Scott Lithgow in 1977, as 
argued by Johnman and Murphy, it was about a wide ranging and varied relationship 
between the British government and the shipyard.  
 
Chapter four compared the two ways in which Scott Lithgow reacted to the 
cancellation of contracts for the construction of supertankers.  In the case of the 
Angelicoussis company, when it cancelled its orders for two tankers of 134,000 dwt in 
1975, Scott Lithgow was apparently taken unawares, despite the contract being moribund 
for over a year.777 Scott Lithgow dealt with the situation by attempting to recover costs 
through negotiation but despite an offer from Anglicoussis to convert the orders into a 
number of smaller bulk carriers, the relationship between the two parties broke down in 
1975, with both sides wanting compensation for their losses.778 The problem for Scott 
Lithgow was that Angelicoussis prevaricated and could not accept that the orders were 
cancelled or ended, forcing Scott Lithgow to take legal action to recover its costs.779 By 
1976, the dispute had finally petered out in Scott Lithgow’s favour, but only in as much as 
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it was entitled to retain the money Angelicoussis had already handed over and therefore 
managed to limit any damage.780 
 
In comparison, the cancellation of the Maritime Fruit Carrier contracts affected the 
shipyard to a much great extent and the process of resolution required the intervention of 
national government. Maritime Fruit Carriers (MFC) had ordered nineteen large crude 
carriers in 1973 from UK shipyards, none of which would have sailed to or from an 
Arabian port under the Israeli flagged MFC.781 Rather, the orders were for resale to another 
company, taking advantage of the demand for supertankers in the early 1970s.782 By 1976, 
Maritime Fruits Carriers was insolvent and could not afford to complete the carriers, but in 
the UK both Scott Lithgow and the British government still recognised the company as a 
functioning corporation.783 This compounded the problems of Scott Lithgow and the 
government, and chapter five demonstrated that this continued assumption concerning 
MFC created a situation whereby both parties were in negotiation with a failed corporation 
that had no financial assets.784 The government, however, was worried about 
unemployment in industrial areas and acted in November 1976 to have the two 
uncompleted vessels that Scott Lithgow was building for MFC taken into the ownership of 
the Bank of Scotland, which provided the funding for both vessels.785 The intention was to 
resale the vessels to another shipping line, but in a heavily depressed market with an 
oversupply of supertankers, this could only happen with a further supply of government 
funding.786 In the end, Maritime Fruit Carriers went to its demise and the two remaining 
vessels were sold to the Greek Niarchos shipping line after many disputes that led to a 
price reduction and with a further injection of £25 million in government subsidies.787 
Chapter four showed that the way in which Scott Lithgow and government dealt with the 
cancelled Maritime Fruit Carriers and Angelicoussis contracts led to the shipyard’s 
eventual demise, as it attempted to sell unwanted vessels in a depressed market, not to 
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further its commercial prospects, but to keep the shipyard open by any means possible. 
Which, in many ways sums up Scott Lithgow and its relationship with government in the 
1960s and 1970s; it was a company that wanted to continue trading and survive in a 
changing market for its products and yet was unable to use a substantial amount of 
government funding to change its fate, using the funds to prop up the business rather than 
adapting to a changing world. 
 
The case study of Harland and Wolff in chapters five, six and seven provided a 
comparison to the relationship between government and the Scott Lithgow shipyard. 
Harland and Wolff had an additional layer of government to contend with in the form of 
the devolved Northern Irish administration based in Stormont Castle, Belfast. While the 
same themes of preventing unemployment and arresting decline are prevalent at Harland 
and Wolff as they are at Scott Lithgow in this period, these are contextualised by sectarian 
conflict in the Northern Irish shipyard. Harland and Wolff was first provided what was 
supposed to be a temporary lifeline in 1966, when the Northern Irish Government loaned 
the company £3.5 million to stave off temporary difficulties. In return, Stormont requested 
that a series of powers be given to the government to appoint a financial controller and 
have oversight of the company records, which resulted in the government’s candidate for 
financial controller, John Mallabar, becoming the chair and chief executive of Harland and 
Wolff.788 As chapter five showed, Mallabar worked quickly to cut Harland and Wolff’s 
costs and promoted a scheme to construct a large ship factory and building dock analogous 
to the developments in Scandinavia and Japan. After receiving funding from the SIB to 
build the scheme, the shipyard underwent a large increase in orders for supertankers.789  
However, much as Mallabar’s plan developed the shipyard to take advantage of the 
Supertaker boom of the 1960s and early 1970s, a combination of disruption to production 
during the construction of the building dock, low level industrial strife and poor accounting 
practices led to record losses for the Northern Irish shipyard and in 1970, Mallabar 
resigned, though not before he poured scorn over those he considered responsible for the 
company’s fall from grace.790 
 
Chapter six detailed the aftermath of Mallabar’s fall and the detrimental effect it 
had on the future prospects of Harland and Wolff. The governments in Belfast and London 
felt this in two specific ways. First, they had already loaned and given the company 
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substantial amounts of funding over the previous four years with few results; the shipyard 
may have increase its output, but it had not become profitable in the process. Second, a 
burgeoning civil rights conflict in Northern Ireland was having a serious effect on day-to-
day life and, with Harland and Wolff employing 7.5% of the population of the state-let 
directly, (and around one in ten indirectly) the potential for widening the conflict if all 
these people lost their jobs overnight was huge.791 However, a paradigm shift had occurred 
in London with the election of a Conservative administration unwilling to provide 
investment for failing companies and therefore the shipyard could not expect the 
government to provide a further bailout.792 As a consequence of this, the government in 
London stated that it would only become involved with Harland and Wolff if the company 
met certain minimum standards and that it alone would act a the principal mediator in 
negotiations aimed at providing a buyer for the company, which it saw as the best solution 
to its woes.793 
 
Two buyers came forward almost immediately, the Greek-Argentine shipping 
magnate Aristotle Onassis and his Norwegian competitor Fred Olsen and over the course 
of 1970 they battled it out to impress the governments in London and Belfast.794 However, 
there was little to choose between the two bidders and many politicians in London and 
Belfast wondered aloud whether it would be in the national interest to let Harland and 
Wolff be taken over by a foreign company and they started to work on an alternative 
scheme for the shipyard to be taken over by Swan Hunter in Newcastle.795 This was a 
pyrrhic exercise, as table 6.1 shows, bar nationality, there was little between each bid and 
all three would have needed major injections of government funding for the company to 
survive.796 The government, therefore, decided that rather than provide funding and then 
hand ownership of the company to another private enterprise it would keep Harland and 
Wolff under its current ownership and swap the debts of Harland and Wolff for a 
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government owned equity stake.797 This came with a further condition: new management 
had to be introduced into the yard to restructure operations back to a sound commercial 
basis and Stormont achieved this by recruiting Iver Hoppe, the managing director of a 
successful supertanker shipyard in Odense, Denmark.798 In 1971, therefore, with a modern 
shipyard, no debts and new management, the future looked bright for Harland and Wolff. 
 
By 1974, events had started to overtake Harland and Wolff and again its future was 
in doubt. For the first two years of Iver Hoppe’s time as Managing Director, he scored 
notable successes in reducing losses and bringing in new orders for supertankers.799 His 
major contribution to the company’s development was the P200 development scheme, 
which aimed to increase the through-put of steel at the shipyard from 120,000 tons a year 
to 200,000 by improving the material handling processes to make the most use of the 
building dock.800 If the demand for supertankers had continued upon its exponential curve, 
then such a course of action would have given Harland and Wolff much improved 
commercial prospects. However, the oil crisis of 1973 dented orders and after the 
imposition of direct rule from London in 1972, the shipyard had to deal with a worsening 
security situation on its doorstep as well as losing its special relationship with the Stormont 
assembly that had kept it well supplied in financial assistance for so long. 801 The 
relationship with government was an important factor. In comparison with the case study 
of Scott Lithgow; Harland and Wolff had a symbiotic relationship with the government in 
Belfast and a much closer relationship with the central government in London. This was to 
Iver Hoppe’s detriment; the incoming Labour government of spring 1974 was committed 
to nationalising the entire UK shipbuilding industry, but what was worse for Hoppe was 
the extreme personal dislike that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Merlyn Rees 
had for him.802 
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By March 1975 Iver Hoppe had been forced to resign from the board of Harland 
and Wolff and the shipyard was in government ownership. The shipyard had not made a 
profit for over 9 years (as table 7.1 shows, it did so in 1975) and had been inextricably 
linked with government in both Belfast and London through ever increasing sums of 
money that came with ever more stringent conditions for the shipyard to follow. 
Nationalisation was the last act in a decade long process of government entrancement at 
Harland and Wolff, the majority of the shares in the company were already in the hands of 
the government and therefore, without a parliament in Stormont to dispute the measure and 
with the passing of Aristotle Onassis removing one obstacle, the state ownership of the 
shipyard in 1975 was little more than a fait accompli.803 The end of the tale of Harland and 
Wolff is not as sad as that of Scott Lithgow; the company still exists and is still working, 
although not building ships anymore. Purchased by Fred Olsen in 1990, the company had 
an ‘Indian Summer’ building commercial and military vessels, but it must be emphasised 
that it is no long a major player in the shipbuilding market and in the 1990s only made a 
fraction of what Japanese and South Korean yards did.804 
 
The case studies of Scott Lithgow and Harland and Wolff demonstrate the crucial 
rôle that central and regional government played in the development of the shipbuilding 
industry in the 1960s and 70s.  Both relied upon government funding to develop facilities 
and both had to rely upon the government to help alleviate trading difficulties. However, 
there are important differences between the two cases, the most important of which is the 
nature of the relationship each shipyard had with government, both local and national. 
Scott Lithgow had a distant relationship with both the government and the Shipbuilding 
Industry Board, seeing them not as partners in developing facilities, but as a source of 
funding to be negotiated with. This was to the detriment of the shipyard as its reluctance to 
show its hand or even commit to a solid plan of action delayed developments for four years 
until 1970, leaving the company with only a three year window of opportunity to take 
advantage of the demand for supertankers. Harland and Wolff had a different relationship 
with government, in particular with the Northern Irish parliament at Stormont Castle. This 
is a vitally important difference between the two case studies, the administrative 
devolution of the Scottish Officer mattered little to Scott Lithgow, but the Belfast shipyard 
was seen as a cornerstone of a politically distinct Northern Irish state. Therefore, when 
Harland and Wolff entered into negotiations with the Shipbuilding Industry Board it did so 
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with the additional participation of Stormont and the additional funding the government in 
Northern Ireland could provide.  
 
This relationship could be seen further in the way each shipyard dealt with the 
demise of the market for tankers: Scott Lithgow started a commercial debt recovery 
process with the lost Angelicoussis contracts, but soon needed government support when 
the Maritime Fruit Carrier company dealt it a near fatal blow. Harland and Wolff relied on 
local and regional government much more than the Scottish shipyard and received much 
more in financial assistance, not least because of the fear in government circles that the 
collapse of the shipyard could precipitate a civil war in Northern Ireland, but also because 
of the protestant workforces relationship with the Unionist Party and the Orange Order, the 
de facto hegemony in Northern Ireland. What is apparent in both case studies is the rôle 
particular individuals and politicians had in influencing the eventual direction the company 
took and these relationships illustrate the core of the hypothesis. In the case of Scott 
Lithgow, Ross Belch and William Lithgow held up negotiations for almost four years, until 
the Minister for Technology, Anthony Wedgwood Benn, insisted that they come to an 
arrangement with the SIB or lose out on funding. Furthermore, the efforts to recover from 
the lost Angelicoussis and Maritime fruit carrier contracts were played out against the 
interacts of Belch, the Angelicoussis family, Chaim Refaeli and numerous civil servants at 
the Ministry of Industry. Harland and Wolff, from 1966 onward, held the attention of 
senior politicians in both London and Belfast and when it almost collapsed in the 1970s 
had the attention of the Prime Minister Edward Heath. When the Labour Party returned to 
power in 1974, the management style of Iver Hoppe drew negative attention from the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mervyn Rees and the shipyard was eventually 
nationalised in 1975 through the intervention of Anthony Wedgwood Benn.     
 
This argument is strengethened by the circumstances of the Shipbuilding Industry 
Board’s demise and the continued rôle of the government in the industry once it had ceased 
to exist. With it’s commitments to liberalise the economy, removing government controls 
and closing down institutions tasked with economic planning functions, the Heath 
government closed down the Shipbuilding Industry Board in 1971.805 However, by 1972, 
the Heath government had undergone many economic trials and tribulations; a number of 
companies went bankrupt during the course of the year and Heath responded with 
nationalisation. The potential for mass unemployment and union agitation was such that 
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the Heath government underwent a policy ‘u-turn’ in 1972 and not only continued to 
provide government assistance to the shipbuilding industry, but, in conjunction with the 
Northern Irish government, de facto nationalised Harland and Wolff.806 Whilst at first the 
Heath government refused to lend assistance, agitation from the management of Scott 
Lithgow in Scotland and government pressure in Northern Ireland forced the government’s 
hand and the creation the Industrial Development Executive in 1972 restored many of the 
old planning structures put in place by the Wilson government. A crisis atmosphere was 
prevalent within the Conservative government (and was not helped by a miners’ strike 
coinciding with the 1973 Oil Crisis) and the Labour opposition, and by the 1974 general 
election state economic controls were advocated by both major parties. Labour also 
proposed the wholesale nationalisation of all the large-scale industries in the United 
Kingdom, particularly shipbuilding, aerospace and automobiles. 
 
When returned to power after the first inconclusive spring election of 1974, Harold 
Wilson and the Labour government worked towards nationalising the shipbuilding industry 
and the aerospace manufacturers. The relationship between shipbuilders and government 
changed again, although on this occasion it was a case of compulsory government 
ownership rather than state assistance and guidance. The impetus for Labour had changed 
during the 1970 to1974 spell in opposition in response to the agitation of Tony Benn, but 
also the prevailing zeitgeist in the international and British economy had changed as 
well.807 Whereas during the long boom of 1950-1973 the focus was on scientific 
management and control of the economy in a government and industry partnership, by 
1974 a wave of bankruptcies in the private sector was discredited many companies in the 
eyes of voters. Consequently, a slender majority of three created pragmatic relationships 
with other parties, such as the Liberals and the nationalist parties, and Labour 
backbenchers held more individual control over policy than usually occurs when a 
government has a large majority. Therefore, the move to nationalisation was not merely a 
reaction to circumstances. That shipyard owners and managers supported nationalisation, 
particularly in Scotland on the Clyde and on the Tyne in North West England, reinforced 
the sense of crisis and the need to act to prevent the industry’s demise. Passed in 1977 after 
3 years of deadlock (and using the Parliament Act (1919) to overrule the House of Lords), 
legislation created British Shipbuilders from the merger of all the remaining private 
shipyards, bar Harland and Wolff, which was nationalised in 1975 under the remit of the 
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Northern Ireland Government. British shipbuilders only lasted six years, until the Thatcher 
government dissolved the corporation into smaller private companies in 1983, most of 
which had closed down by the mid 1990s.808 
                                                




The last few words 
 
 
This thesis rests upon the interaction of a series of institutions at the centre of 
British industrial and economic policy between 1945 and 1979. In reaction to both a 
perceived and genuine weakening of the United Kingdom’s status as an economic power, 
caused in part by genuine relative decline in the face of competitor nations creating a 
heightened (and some might say irrational) obsession with national decline amongst the 
establishment, an incremental increase in government control over the economy took 
place. The tripartite efforts of the Conservative government from 1957 with the creation of 
the British Productivity Council aimed to bring management, government and labour into a 
series of informal, but influential, bodies to decide the economic goals for the economy, 
the National Economic Development Council and Office being the two prominent 
examples.809 However, these bodies, depending largely on the goodwill of participants 
lacked the authority to impose solutions on industry. As the example of the reviews into 
shipbuilding by the Conservatives in the early 1960s demonstrated, the bodies could 
recommend the correct course of action, but without some form of central guidance, 
compulsion and planning, this was to little, or no, avail. 
 
With the election in 1964 of the Wilson Labour government a fully fledged system 
of state planning and guidance for industry was implemented, but this still replied upon the 
agreement of the parties involved as, despite having an enthusiasm for scientific planning 
and control, the government shied away from mandatory schemes and preferred a system 
of consultation prior to the creation of any body.810 This preference is behind the story of 
government’s relationship with shipbuilding between 1964 and 1970. This thesis has 
shown how an excess of inquiry, a lack of compulsion and a surplus of negotiation 
produced outcomes unsuitable to the industry during the 1960s and early 1970s. The 
relationship between shipbuilders, ship-owners, government, trade unions and, in a wider 
sense, the media left a distinct mark on the schemes implemented by the Shipbuilding 
Industry Board and is reminiscent of the three institutionalisms theory of Hall and 
Taylor.811 However, there are certain ambiguities in this model. First, the Geddes 
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Committee interviewed and took evidence from interested parties concerned with the 
shipbuilding industry, but those parties were not central to the process and the decisions 
concerning the recommendations of the committee rested solely on the views of the 
committee’s composition. The Geddes Report proposed a limited modernisation of 
obsolete equipment in British shipyards and yet discounted changes in yard layout and 
practices found in Japan and other competitor nations in Western Europe, which was to the 
industries cost.812 Second, the creation of the Shipbuilding Industry Board represented a 
second order change as per the Hall model and that a policy network existed between the 
board, shipyards, unions and government, but this cannot explain how the decisions of the 
board took the form they eventually did. This thesis showed that the SIB ‘learnt on the job’ 
and changed its views as it evolved over time and that protracted negotiations with 
shipyards diluted the measures of the board to such an extent that with a decade the 
industry was all but removed from the British industrial environment.813 Finally, the 
management of the shipyards themselves, whilst an interested party and part of the policy 
network surrounding the SIB, rarely desired the creation of modern shipyards as found in 
Japan and Western Europe, but preferred to bid for lucrative and safe Royal Naval 
contracts and commercial contracts subsidised by central government.814 The thesis 
illustrated the inspiration behind such decisions and demonstrated the seclusion of British 
shipyard management from wider influence and also the distorted commercial environment 
created in part by the reliance on military orders over the course of two centuries, but also 
by increasing reliance on government aid and intervention. 
 
To conclude, this thesis has shown that the extended processes of consultation 
under the aegis of the first Wilson Labour government, from the public inquiries of its 
early years to the negotiations with companies concerning state aid from 1966 onwards, 
restricted efforts at introducing modern working practices and equipment into British 
shipyards. This is not to state that the neither government nor the shipyards were unaware 
of developments, rather it is to show that the government was hindered by a report 
recommending a process bearing little relation to the prevailing orthodoxy found in global 
shipbuilding, by the shipyard’s reluctance to move away from the comfort zone of Royal 
Naval orders and subsidised commercial contracts and, finally, by external and internal 
political pressures. The Shipbuilding Industry Board institutionalised many of the 
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industry’s problems and therefore the verbatim imposition of the Geddes report on to the 
shipbuilding industry by the Wilson government actively sped up the decline of the 
industry. As the case study of Harland and Wolff showed, the government did move away 
from the provisions of the Geddes report, but the eventual outcomes for the industry rested 
upon negotiations between a small group of individuals and as such represented not the 
best plan of action for any particular shipyard, but only a compromise position between 
different points of view. This diorama of interested parties in the industry was varied and 
complex, but from the mid 1960s it was the government that decided to act as the saviour 
of shipbuilding and as such it should have exercised a more defining centralised rôle. 
However, the government did not and instead of bringing about a new epoch of growth in 
the shipbuilding industry, it instead exacerbated existing problems and eventually changed 
its rôle from helping shipyards deal with the future to helping them deal with the 
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